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The “normalization” of politics in new democracies is an important concern of political science 
research. Normalization could refer to democratic consolidation when democracy “becomes the 
only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996). Some of the factors contributing to normalization 
are stable institutions, the rule of law, and transparency in power transfer, among others. Yet, it 
can be argued that the democratic process is normalized when programmatic parties compete for 
political office by wooing a sophisticated and knowledgeable electorate (Kitschelt 1992, 1995, 
2000). This inquiry is a story of such normalization in the case of a new post-communist 
democracy – Ukraine. In the literature the Ukrainian public is depicted as highly apolitical, 
unsophisticated, and divided along the ethno-cultural regional cleavage which contributes to the 
problems of normalization of electoral competition. Moreover, there is a general sense that 
voters are “the least likely segment of Ukrainian polity” to influence political processes (Copsey 
2005). Yet, the events of the Orange Revolutions showed otherwise. It does not seem reasonable 
any longer to ignore the Ukrainian voter and her role in the development of a democratic 
Ukraine. Recently Timothy J. Colton (2011) lamented the lack of the individual level analysis of 
Ukrainian electorate. This study is a decisive attempt to remedy this oversight. Using the survey 
data from International Foundation for Electoral Studies (IFES) from 1994, 1997 -2008 I develop 
and analyze a model of the sophisticated voter in the new democracy. I argue that over time, as 
voters have more experience with democratic processes, they learn how to properly link their 
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own preferences with appropriate parties and candidates, relying on numerous factors including, 
but not limited to, the ethno-cultural and socioeconomic attributes, such factors as evaluation of 
the political leaders and issues are also instrumental in voter decision making. The results of this 
study have important implications for the study of Ukrainian politics and a broader literature on 
voting behavior. The curious case of the Ukrainian voter suggests a need to reexamine the 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks of democratic consolidation hypotheses as well as the 
developmental modes of electoral behavior. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION: A NEW DEMOCRATIC VOTER  
A frequently asked question of political science research of the new democracies has to do with 
the “normalization” of politics in these societies. Normalization could refer to democratic 
consolidation, or stabilization of regime, when democracy “becomes the only game in town” 
(Linz and Stepan 1996). There are many factors that contribute to this so-called normalization, 
such as stable institutions, the rule of law, and transparency in power transfer, among others. Yet, 
one can also argue that the democratic process is normalized, stabilized, and/or consolidated 
when programmatic parties compete for political office by wooing a sophisticated and 
knowledgeable electorate (Kitschelt 1992, 1995, 2000). This inquiry is a story of such 
normalization in the case of a new post-communist democracy – Ukraine.  While there have been 
several studies analyzing the normalization of politics by examining institutional structures and 
elite behavior (D'Anieri 2006; Hesli, Reisinger, and Miller 1998; Kuzio 1997; Kuzio 2000; 
Kuzio 2003, 2005; Zimmer and Haran 2008), this study takes a different approach.  Put simply, it 
is a story of the development of a sophisticated democratic Ukrainian voter and her role in 
electoral politics of this new democracy.  
Ukraine has often enjoyed a reputation of a divided society. Having a very short history 
of independence, the very existence of this territorially and culturally cohesive polity-state has 
been questioned numerous times.  The electoral cycles have contributed to these speculations as 
well, particularly during the 2004 presidential elections when the seemingly irreconcilable 
differences between the western, central, eastern, and southern Ukraine reached unprecedented 
peaks, threatening to tear Ukraine apart.  This research project focuses on the mechanisms 
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behind the development of electoral patterns in a new democratic state of Ukraine. What are the 
bases for the political elite-electorate relationship?   
The presence of institutionalized programmatic political parties is a necessary component 
of consolidated democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996). The political parties serve several key 
functions in the democratic process. They organize the political elites, aggregate the political 
views of the public, and articulate these concerns into public policy proposals. In short, the 
political parties provide organizational structure for the relations between voters and elites 
(Kitschelt 1992, 1995, 2000). However, the formation of these parties has been nothing but 
problematic in the new post-communist democracies including Ukraine due to the legacy of 
“patrimonial” communism, the overall distaste for political parties, and sheer lack of prior 
experience with the democratic process. It has been suggested that in new post-communist 
democracies the programmatic parties would be difficult to form and sustain as long as 1) there 
is no economic growth and 2) voters remain unsophisticated (Kitschelt 1992).  
Among the scholars of Ukrainian politics, the voters received very little attention. 
Moreover, there is a general sense that voters are “the least likely segment of Ukrainian polity” 
to influence political processes (Copsey 2005).  However, as the events of the Orange Revolution 
have shown, the Ukrainian public is ready and capable to take on a more prominent role in 
politics.  In the following pages I develop and analyze a model of the sophisticated voter in the 
new democracy. Voters are capable of making appropriate electoral decisions on the basis of 
numerous factors available to them. What is more, the accuracy of electoral decisions increases 
as voters learn from the experience with the democratic process.  
As Herbert Kitschelt (1995) rightfully points out, nearly all of the studies of political 
party competition in any part of the world rely on the conclusions reached by Martin Lipset and 
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Stein Rokkan (1967) regarding political party developments in Europe. According to these 
conclusions, the political parties develop a unique set of programmatic appeals based on the 
cleavage structures introduced by the national and industrial revolutions. The political 
competition, thus, takes places within the scope of these ideological programs by means of which 
the voters are mobilized in their partisanship and vote choice.  However, more recent studies of 
electoral competition have suggested that voters and parties do not behave exactly as predicted 
by Lipset and Rokkan. Some have suggested a decline in the salience of the cleavages introduced 
by Lipsest and Rokkan (Andersen and Yaish 2003; Clark 2001; Clark and Lipset 1991, 2001; 
Knutsen 1988; Norris 2004) others identified new factors that guide the voter/party relationship, 
such as particular issue(s) stances (Achterberg 2006; Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997; Inglehart and 
Abramson 1994; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  
The new democracies of the post-communist Europe provide a unique laboratory for the 
scholars of electoral competition to test the new and old hypothesis. As these societies are often 
new to electoral competition, they offer a somewhat blank canvas upon which the new 
democratic drama plays out. Given the historical legacies of imperialism and communism, a 
number of the post-communist states did not enjoy the full experience of the national and 
industrial revolutions the same way as the rest of Europe. Often these states are hosts to 
numerous ethnic and linguistic groups, who have divergent political agendas. Moreover, the 
communist experiment stifled the development of socioeconomic societal distinctions, such as 
development of the middle and working class. Thus, numerous scholars have argued that the 
development of socio-cultural and socioeconomic cleavage based politics in these societies is 
inevitable. Ethno-cultural cleavages are arguably the easiest to form in the wake of 
democratization (Birnir 2007; Linz and Stepan 1996; Snyder 2000).  Many scholars have argued 
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that the democratic transitions contribute to the rise of nationalism and ethnic hostility within the 
society (Basch 1998; Cordell 1999; Ellingsen 2000; Kohli 1997; Mousseau 2001; Riggs 1998; 
Smith 2000; Snyder 2000; Vetik 1993).   
 As economic market reforms take root and the social welfare net previously provided by 
the communist regime disintegrates, it is not unreasonable to expect that socioeconomic 
divisions should manifest themselves as well.  The increased awareness of differences in life 
choices based on the new socioeconomic realities should fractionalize voters along the lines of 
socioeconomic status.  Moreover, the political actors could capitalize on these divisions in their 
campaign for office. Several scholars have found evidence of social cleavage development, ala 
Lipset and Rokkan, in these societies and suggest that socioeconomic cleavage development is 
pivotal for electoral politics (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1993; G. Evans 
and S. Whitefield 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1998, 2006; McAllister and White 2007). Thus, 
one should expect manifestation of these cleavages in the political realm and programmatic 
stances of political parties and candidates. 
Yet, Kitschelt (1992, 1995, 2000) argues that in cases of post-communist Europe the 
development of political competition politics is a bit more complicated than the scenario 
presented by Lipset and Rokkan. In post-communist newly democratic states that are undergoing 
economic as well as political transition, politically salient cleavages revolve around the various 
experiences of population with economic market reform as well as country specific socio-
cultural divisions. The socioeconomic cleavage, Kitschelt argues, develops between the 
“winners” and “losers” of the reforms and transition. The winner of economic transition or those 
persons whose “occupational resources” (Kitschelt 1992) are easily transferable into the market 
economic system are pegged against those persons who will surely lose in the process of market 
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transition. Further, the development of programmatic parties depends on the communist legacies 
of institutional structures, economic development, and resource allocation (Kitschelt 1995). The 
legacies of pre-democratic regime make it easier for some democracies to develop programmatic 
parties while also making some systems more prone to clientelistic and charismatic parties.  
 Ukraine is a perfect laboratory to evaluate the cleavage and political party formation. It is 
a new democracy transitioning from a command economy. Among the former Soviet republics, 
Ukraine has been among the precious few to avoid backsliding to authoritarianism and develop a 
meaningful democratic institution. Moreover, Ukraine is a brand new state that has never had 
experience with sovereignty. From a cursory glance Ukrainian society is ridden with socio-
cultural and socio-economic differences. Moreover, the development of programmatic politics in 
Ukraine is further hampered by its pre-democratic legacy of “patrimonial communist” which 
fosters clientelistic and charismatic political relationships between the electorate and leaders 
(Kitschelt 1992). In the literature the Ukrainian public is depicted as highly apolitical, 
unsophisticated, and divided along the ethno-cultural regional cleavage which contributes to the 
problems of normalization of electoral competition.  
 In the following pages I argue that these conclusions are hasty and oversimplified due to 
the limited capacity of the existing developmental models in the literature. While the emphasis of 
ethno-cultural and socioeconomic cleavages as the basis for electoral politics is quite important, 
these models tell only a part of the story. The ethno-cultural and socioeconomic factors play a 
large part in voters capacity to evaluate their electoral choice and cast votes, however, they play 
very little role in the systematic development of voters’ capacity over time. The developmental 
process is much broader and extends far beyond the mere economic self-interest or group 
affiliation. I argue that over time, as voters have more experience with democratic processes, 
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they become more sophisticated and learn how to properly link their own preferences with 
appropriate parties and candidates, relying on numerous factors including, but not limited to, the 
ethno-cultural and socioeconomic attributes, such factors as evaluation of the political leaders 
and issues are also instrumental in voter decision making.  
Moreover, I attempt to link the various aspects influencing vote choice to the 
development process of democratic consolidation more generally.  I develop a model that utilizes 
the mathematical and theoretical principles of Lau and Radlawsk’s “correct voting” measure 
(Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Lau, Redlawsk, and Andersen 2008) to argue that as democracy ages 
the voters are becoming more correct in their vote choice. Moreover, the correctness of the vote 
does not depend solely on ethno-cultural or socioeconomic factors. Issue self-placement and 
evaluation of political leaders are pivotal in determining the vote choice. The empirical 
evaluations of this study utilize the survey data from International Foundation of Electoral 
Studies (IFES) from 1994, 1997 -2008. This range of data allows me to focus on the individual 
level of voter and thoroughly evaluate the behavior of Ukrainian voters since the first free 
democratic presidential and parliamentary elections of 1994.  
 My analyses suggest that Ukrainian society is a vibrant patchwork of political interest 
comprised of politically-savvy voters.  First, Ukrainians are well aware of their socioeconomic 
status and form opinions on the salient domestic and foreign policy issues based on these 
characteristics. Second, as democracy ages, the Ukrainian public is displaying higher levels of 
voter sophistication overtime. This suggests that voters are learning the democratic process and 
are capable of evaluating the political performance of political leaders and cast their votes 
appropriately instead of relying on the group cues alone. These findings are promising for the 
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stabilization of Ukrainian democracy, provided the institutional climate remains stable and 
political elites maintain democratic commitments.  
This inquiry presents several contributions to the broader literatures on comparative 
political behavior, post-communist transitions, and to the literature on Ukrainian politics in 
particular. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a more thorough sketch of the overall 
scope and argument of this inquiry, and is organized in the following fashion.  First, I outline the 
models of electoral linkages in the broader literature. The political map of Ukrainian electoral 
landscape then follows. Here I attempt to provide an overview of Ukrainian political actors and 
their ideological and political placements in light of the broader developmental literature.  The 
curious case of the Ukrainian voter is presented in the next section where I seek to review the up 
to date evaluations of Ukrainian electorate. The concluding section of this chapter provides a 
roadmap of the argument to be developed in the following chapters and concludes with several 
important implications of this study.  
1.1 ELECTORAL LINKAGES OF PARTY COMPETITION 
Political parties serve very important and specific roles in democracies around the world.  Parties 
provide structure to the political contestation that is associated with democratic governance. 
They serve as vehicles of interest, aggregation, and articulation of these public concerns in to 
policy proposals. As Kitschelt (1992; 1995; 2000) suggests, parties provide organizational 
structure for the voter/politician relations.  It is rather costly in terms of time and energy for each 
voter to make detailed inquiries into the candidates’ policy proposal. Likewise, the cost of 
mounting a political campaign alone proves very costly to any one candidate.  Political parties 
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solve these problems.  Parties identify the common ground (platform) where numerous 
politicians can converge, thus providing voters with clear identification of political actors and 
their policy stances. The formulation of such ideological platforms allows voters to easily 
identify the positioning of the party members vis-à-vis other parties, as well as their approximate 
stances on wider variety of political issues (Kitschelt 2000).   
In the developed democracies, political party systems and the way parties provide the 
important link between voters and their elected leaders have undergone much scholarly scrutiny. 
The majority of studies delving into the topic of political party formation are linked to the 
historic-sociological model proposed by Martin Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan in their 1967 
classic Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. These scholars 
suggest that there is a connection between the development of party systems and societal 
divisions. Focusing on the modern history of Western Europe, they trace the important 
developments of the national and industrial revolutions that have created societal divisions or 
cleavages along religious, ethnic, and racial lines as well as introduced economic and class 
cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).  These social divisions imply that there are convergent 
political interests among various groups. Thus, the political distinctions between these groups 
can be summarized in the presentation of several dyadic relationships – capital versus labor, 
urban versus rural, religious versus secular, center versus periphery, and others. 
The links between parties and voters as conceptualized by the sociological model of 
voting, then, exists on both the supply and demand side. On the supply side, the political parties 
organize themselves along the lines of these social conflicts and translate them into political 
platforms. On the demand side of the relationship, the social groups align themselves with those 
parties that are most representative of their interests. When such links are established, the party 
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systems stabilize in such a way that parties and electorates aligned according to these ideological 
distinctions. Thus social cleavages, according to Lipset and Rokkan, very much influence the 
formation of party systems in the countries of Western Europe.  
Several studies of electoral politics have taken this argument out of the context of 
Western Europe and found convincing data elsewhere to support the claims of sociological 
model of vote choice. Religious, ethnic, linguistic, and social class differences between groups 
have been named as important predictors of vote choice (Chandra 2004; Featherman 1983; 
Horowitz 1998; Landa, Copeland, and Grofman 1995; Leighly and Vedlitz 1999; Lijphart 1971, 
1979). Gender and age group distinctions have also been added to the list of social characteristics 
dictating the vote preferences (Inglehart and Norris 2003). 
Yet, the sociological model is not without its faults and has been criticized widely. The 
cross-national analysis of the model proved that there is a host of cleavages that might be 
deemed responsible for particulars of electoral competition in one given society. However, which 
cleavages can be seen as most powerful cross-nationally? While socioeconomic class has been 
given much attention in developed democracies of the west, studies in other contexts proved that 
religious, ethnic, and linguistic differences trump class as predictors of vote choice (Horowitz 
1985, 1990, 1998; Lijphart 1971, 1979). 
Further, critics have argued that even in developed western democracies the party 
systems have hardly been “frozen” and have undergone quite a few changes. More recent studies 
have come to criticize the sociological model by bringing new evidence that voters in developed 
democracies have begun to align with parties based on considerations other than socially based 
divisions (Dalton 2000). Socioeconomic class, for instance, has been pronounced by many as a 
poor predictor of vote choice and party identification (Clark 2001; Norris 2004). Inglehart and 
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Welzel suggest the shift of values in these societies to “post-materialism” might explain why 
class’ predictive value is waning (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  As the populations moved along 
the path of industrialization to post-industrial societies, the near universal education and 
heightened levels in quality of life have contributed highly to resolution of the “old” social 
conflicts and introduced new sets of values. These values then dictate the new types of political 
divisions along the lines of one’s positioning with regard to one of the other issue and not her 
social positioning per se. Thus the political parties also have tried to adapt to these new moods 
by adjusting their programmatic platforms in order to meet the demand of realigning issue 
publics (Bafumi and Shapiro 2009).  
Thus in an attempt to deal with the seeming inadequacies of the sociological model, 
which by some account include the inability to deal with change and disregarding the individual 
voter’s choice by lumping the voters all into groups, several alternatives are proposed in the 
literature of political behavior. These more psychological theories suggest that voters’ choices 
are derived from their attitudes toward specific candidates and, in line with Ingleheart and 
colleagues’ proposal, specific issue stances.  
The importance of candidate evaluation in vote choice has been primarily analyzed with 
regard to presidential elections, where candidates are few, widely publicized, and clearly 
identifiable. Some scholars have focused on the specifics of candidate personalities, behaviors, 
appearances, and even facial expressions during debates as means to determine what is more 
important in a voter’s evaluation of candidates (Milton  Lodge, Kathleen M. McGraw, and 
Patrick  Stroh 1989; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1995; Marcus 1988). The research has also 
divided along the lines of incumbent versus novice candidate evaluation, thus introducing an 
additional component to evaluation of candidates – voters’ evaluation of previous performances 
 11 
and experiences. This retrospective evaluation of a political leader’s performance is of particular 
importance for the study of the new democracy. In the context of the newly introduced political 
competition, the voters should be able to punish and reward the political actors, a privilege 
denied to the citizens under previous non-democratic regimes. Thus, one can expect that 
leadership evaluation should be one of the prominent features of new democracies. 
However, in the context of parliamentary elections several challenges exist.  An 
evaluation of individual politicians is more difficult if candidates are many and less known.  One 
can suggest that candidate evaluation in these election could be easier done in electoral situation 
of SMD, where there are clearly identifiable candidates competing for single seat. In the case of 
PR, however, specific candidate evaluation becomes more problematic. Thus, as in presidential 
elections the personality and behavior of the party leader might be much more important in this 
situation. Recent studies on the evaluation of political leadership in parliamentary contexts 
suggest that party leaders and future Prime Ministers receive much electoral attention (Aarts, 
Blais, and Schmitt 2005). In this case, evaluation of party leadership is directly linked to the vote 
for a specific party. Negative as well as positive feelings toward candidates/leaders are quite 
important.  
Issue voting is another possible explanation for vote choices in recent literature 
examining electoral behavior (Franklin 1985; Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992). While not 
uncontroversial, issue voting has solicited much support in the literature focusing on the 
developed democracies. Evaluation of voters’ stances on particular issues allows accounting for 
cognition of individual voters as well as accounting for the ever-changing climate of politics. 
Voters, this line of reasoning argues, can and do identify issues that are important in that or the 
other political landscape and cast their vote based on their own position on the issue. Thus, it is 
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not the emotional reaction to the candidate and/or party leader or group identification that drives 
vote choice; it is the individual voter’s rational ability to carefully evaluate her choices based on 
her individual preferences (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). 
The controversies with issue voting analysis arise from several related areas. The first 
problem is the variability of issues. How can we determine the importance of some issues vis-à-
vis others and the role campaigns and media play in making them important? Issues tend to vary 
not only cross-nationally, but also between elections in a single society (Dalton 2000).  
Secondly, it seems that there are far too high expectations placed on voters by proponents of 
issues voting. The voters are expected to be able to identify and make up their own minds about 
the issues as well as identify those politicians/parties that are closest to their own opinions. This 
requires a great deal of time investment as well as political knowledge. Unfortunately, voters do 
not think about political issues as often as or as much as a political scientist would like them to. 
 While all of these theories have certain shortcomings, when analyzed empirically in 
“old” democracies the “new” democracies of post-communist Europe give us an opportunity to 
test these hypotheses in the new context. Previous studies have shown that each of the three 
explanations is applicable to some of the “new” cases. This study tests these theories in the 
context of a new democracy and a seemingly divided society of Ukraine. Moreover, it relies on 
these theories to produce a picture of a sophisticated democratic voter.  
The discussion on voter sophistication has deep roots in the normative discussions of 
democratic theory and empirical political behavior literature.  The normative discussion of voter 
sophistication revolves around the capacity of voters to make “wise” decisions that foster 
democracy and benefit the society at large.  Statesman and philosophers are often concerned with 
the “wisdom” or lack thereof behind collective decision-making. Churchill once said that the best 
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argument against democracy is a short conversation with an average voter.  However, such 
normative concerns do not enter directly into the discussion raised in my analysis.   
The debate within the empirical political behavior literature revolves around the 
mechanisms of sophisticated vote.  The voter’s sophistication is based upon the complexity of 
the judgment and evaluation criteria for vote casting.  The raging debate in political behavior 
literature revolves around these evaluation criteria. Some argue that the more cognitively 
demanding the techniques, such as evaluation of ideological stances and issues, the more they 
qualify as sophisticated (Campbell et al. 1964; MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1995).  
The inquiry undertaken in The American Voter conceptualized sophistication as an 
ideological understanding of issues (Campbell et al. 1964). The study showed, however, that the 
American electorate was not sophisticated.  The analysis showed that voters lacked ideological 
constraints and their decisions varied (even were contradictory to the ideological stances) over 
time from election to election.  However, this analysis came under scrutiny as showing perhaps 
not the level of (un)sophistication but rather a non-ideological side of poorly informed electorate. 
Since then, the concept of a “sophisticated” voter has been revisited and reanalyzed by several 
scholars.   
Some have argued that it is impossible to expect all voters to be well informed about 
every political issue. People do have lives outside politics and certain other activities take 
precedence over voting.  Instead, voters have a special set of issues that they find most important 
and make their judgments based on these issues rather than every possible issue within society 
(Converse 1974; Converse 1964, 1964). Yet, the research has also shown that individuals quite 
often rely on cognitive short cuts, cues, and heuristics such as group identities to make their 
decisions (Richard R.   Lau and David P. Redlawsk 2001). Evaluation of issues and one’s 
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positioning vis-à-vis the candidates, is presumably a more cognitively involved process that 
requires the individual to engage more deeply in the analysis of issue components and self-
reflection than heuristic use.  Thus, a sophisticated voter employs more complex cognitive 
processes.  
Dalton suggested that all of the components presented in the above theories identify 
important predictors of vote choice (Dalton 2006). Moreover, it might be simplistic to focus 
solely on merely one set of predictors. Rather, the historical, cultural, and other social cleavages 
influence vote choice on a different level, yet remain in conjunction with election specific 
predictors, such as evaluation of leaders and issue stances. Following this assumption, I construct 
the “Funnel of Causality” of vote choice which identifies the broad and intermediary 
determinants of voting preferences. 
Figure 1 The Funnel of Causality of Vote Choice 
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In the context of this study I develop a model of sophistication of voters that is closely 
linked to the complexity of the decision making process. While there have been suggestions that 
issue voting is perhaps the most sophisticated of the modes of electoral decision making, there is 
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much debate about the specific basis and causal mechanisms of such processes (Carmines and 
Stimson 1989; Macdonald 1991; MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1995; Rabinowitz and 
MacDonald 1989). Instead of focusing on the specific mode of decision making as more or less 
sophisticated, I suggest that voter sophistication in general is linked to the appropriate use of 
decision making tools. That is, a sophisticated voter is that voter who uses all of the tools 
available to him, and what is more importantly, uses them to derive electoral choices that are 
most representative of his own positions. 
This study is an attempt to test the developmental hypothesis in the case on the new 
Ukrainian voter. Tracing the effects of social cleavages, issues voting, and candidate/leader 
evaluation over the years of democratic development in Ukraine enables one to evaluate the 
sophistication hypothesis as pertaining to new democracies. Does more experience with 
democracy produce more sophisticated voters? My answer is a resounding yes.  
1.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY SYSTEM IN A “NEW” DEMOCRACY 
The new democracies of the former communist bloc provide scholars with an interesting and 
unique opportunity to test the hypotheses dealing with the party system development and 
function. Most of these societies have had very brief or no experience with democracies prior to 
the communist rule and have been undergoing unique social, economic, and political 
transformations since the collapse of the Communist regime. Thus, the new democracies of post-
communist Europe have drawn much attention from the scholars of electoral politics. After the 
collapse of the communist regimes some scholars expressed concerns over the development of 
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electoral politics in these countries. The rate and the process of political party development have 
been under much scrutiny over the past twenty years. 
 The concerns were raised based on a variety of speculations and arguments. On the one 
hand, concerns were raised from the so-called “institutionalist” camp of the discipline. These 
authors have suggested that to properly function, the political parties need organizational 
structure and resources. However, in light of the previously non-democratic regimes that had 
banned any kind of political competition, the new party organizers had very little resources and 
know how to produce functioning parties. On the other hand, others suggested that the problem 
with party formation is more than that of institutional structure alone. The new party organizers 
will find serious challenges from ideational sources as well. The previous experiences with the 
all-encompassing party – that is, the Communist Party – has left a sour taste in the mouths of the 
citizens of the new democracies. As such, the sheer concept of political party would be perceived 
as potentially vicious and be treated with suspicion. Boris Yeltsin’s refusal to create a political 
party to rally around him in the wake of August putsch in 1991 has often been cited as evidence 
of this hypothesis (Sakwa 2008). Simply put, any political party would have a very hard time 
mobilizing support among the population that is suspicious of party as a mere concept. 
Some have argued that due to the long history of authoritarian regimes these countries’ 
citizens lack the necessary experience with democratic process. In the words of Linz and Stepan 
(1996), the political society would have troubles developing due to the flattened landscape of the 
civil society left over from the previous non-democratic regime. The lack of socio-political 
competition among citizens presented serious challenges for the formation of meaningful party 
competition.  Therefore, strong and charismatic leaders were able to forge political parties 
around their own personalities in order to gain political clout. These personalistic parties offered 
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very little in terms of ideological party platform and relied on populist politics in order to boost 
the popularity of their leader.  In similar vein others sought to secure the electorate’s favor by 
promising and delivering various perks and/or material benefits to their supporters.  
The question of whether or not the political parties of these countries would develop 
along clear lines of conflicting political programs is a relevant question not merely for the 
prognosis of democratic development in these countries, but also for a wider study of electoral 
politics. The prognosis of scholarly works published in early 1990s suggested that in post-
communist societies, the development of party systems would be a trying undertaking. The end 
result could vary greatly across countries depending on the kind of electoral system that 
leadership opted for and the political landscape leftover after the initial transition to 
democratization was complete (Kitschelt 1995).  The rules presented by a single member 
plurality electoral system allow for very different forms of competition than those allowed by 
proportional representations.  Similarly, the relationship between the old Communist party 
structure and the new liberalizing forces during the initial transition could dictate the degree of 
freedom granted to the players in the electoral competition as well as electoral and institutional 
resources available to each.  
The expectation that the political parties in these societies would develop along the lines 
of the traditional western matrix of left/right, liberal/conservative scale proved rather 
problematic, as few of these new parties seemed to fall neatly within these categories. The sheer 
array of political parties that sprung by the mid-1990s, including the parties of Beer Lovers and 
parties proclaiming to be against everyone else, created numerous problems for programmatic 
classification.  
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Likewise, the party system of new Ukrainian democracy has been a long work in 
progress. The disintegration of the communist regime in Ukraine was of a peculiar kind. The 
liberalization did not start from the reform of the communist party as in Estonia or Hungary, nor 
was there a strong opposition to the regime from liberalizing alternative sources as in Poland or 
Russia. Although the activities of nationalist-minded civic groups were a major force behind 
regime change (Surzhko-Harned 2010), the collapse of the regime was not brought on by 
cataclysmic forces of popular demand. The regime gave in clumsily, unwillingly, and in spite of 
itself. The Communist party of Ukraine was not banned or discredited; the society did not go 
through the period of lustration.  
The creation of political parties, therefore, was a reactionary activity. The first political 
parties sought first and foremost to build opposition to the remaining institutionalized and still 
strong Communist party. As elsewhere in the post-communist world during the first few years, 
political party formation was a difficult task.  The novelty of political competition as a concept 
meant that both politicians and voters were unsure about the role and necessity of political 
parties. While a host of new parties sprang mostly from the previous social groups, the 
communist party remained strong and continued to dominate the parliamentary elections for 
most of the first decade of independence. One such new party was the People’s Rukh that had 
been formed initially with the blessing of the communist government in late 1980s as a social 
movement supporting Gorbachev’s reformist policies of perestroika and glasnost. However, the 
group gained much political clout due to its firm commitment to independence from the USSR 
and anti-communist sentiments. People’s Rukh and the Communist Party remained two of the 
most popular parties during the 1990s and gained parliamentary seats during each election.   
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The novelty of political competition also meant that parties were formed around very 
narrow and specific interests. Many of them adopted similar positions as each other and varied 
on minute points, thus confusing the voters. For instance, several Democratic and Reform parties 
appeared in early 1990s. On the left, several socialist parties claimed their spot under the sun, 
trying to differentiate themselves from one another and most importantly from the Communist 
Party.  Not surprisingly these parties proved rather volatile and often did not survive through one 
electoral cycle. Many were subsumed by bigger blocs or dismantled completely. According to 
the Central Electoral Committee of Ukraine, there were over 36 parties and electoral blocs 
registered for the 1998 parliamentary elections.  This multitude of parties further bred distrust of 
and dissatisfaction toward political parties on the part of the voters. The presidential elections 
further exemplified this trend. The candidates for the post of the president often ran as 
independents, trying to sharply underscore their political purity by being untainted by the 
association with the “dirty party squabbling.” 
By the late 1990s, however, the political parties in Ukraine began to stabilize. Several of 
the existing parties formed electoral blocs that became rather stable and successfully competed in 
the 2002, 2006, and 2007 (emergency round) elections.  Table 1.1 depicts the summaries of the 
electoral results since first parliamentary election in 1994. It is evident that the Communist Party 
and Rukh held political dominance in the 1990s. However, the support for the Communist party 
declined by 2002 and Rukh was subsumed by the new reformist bloc Our Ukraine, led by anti-
establishment politician Viktor Yushchenko.  By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, 
two other parties had gained political importance and began to dominate the landscape – Bloc 
Yulii Timoshenko (BUT) and Party of Regions lead by Viktor Yunukovich. Both were formed 
shortly before the 2002 elections and have gained prominence since, as Table 1.1 depicts. 
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Table 1-1 Parliamentary Elections Results 1994 – 2007 (Central Electoral Committee of Ukraine) 
 
 
1994 
Party name  % of popular vote 
Communist Party 25 
People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) 8 
Party of Greens of Ukraine 7 
Bloc "Derzhavnist" 7 
Bloc "Center" 11 
Bloc "Agrarians of Ukraine" 11 
Bloc "Reforms" 8 
People's Democratic Party 8 
 
1998 
Party name  % of popular vote 
Communist Party 24.7 
People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) 9.4 
Socialist Party of Ukraine/Peasant Party of 
Ukraine Bloc 8.6 
Party of Greens of Ukraine 5.3 
People's Democratic Party 5.0 
 
2002 
Party name  % of popular vote 
Victor Yushchenko Bloc "Our Ukraine" 23.6 
Communist Party of Ukraine 20 
For United Ukraine Bloc 11.8 
Electoral Bloc Yuliyi Timoshenko 7.2 
Socialist Party of Ukraine 6.9 
United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine 6.3 
 
2006 
Party name  % of popular vote 
Party of Regions 32.14 
Bloc Yuliyi Timoshenko 22.29 
Bloc "Our Ukraine" 13.95 
Socialist Party of Ukraine 5.69 
Communist Party of Ukraine 3.66 
 
2007 
Party name  % of popular vote 
Party of Regions 34.37 
Bloc Yuliyi Timoshenko 30.71 
Bloc "Our Ukraine" 14.15 
Communist Party of Ukraine 5.39 
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While there remain a sprinkling of varied political parties the formation of electoral 
blocks and emergence of the few stable and powerful political parties can be said to be at least 
partially the result of the electoral system put in place in Ukraine. Through the 1990s, Ukrainian 
elections were based on a mixed electoral system, which combined both SMD and PR electoral 
rules. Half of the seats in the Rada, Ukraine’s unicameral parliament, were distributed by 
plurality vote, while the other half was allocated based on the vote for party list. As such, 
Ukraine developed a “two and a half” party system like that in Germany. There are two strong 
parties that dominate the elections and a handful of smaller parties that serve as coalition 
“makers” or “breakers”. Thus in the 1990s the Communist party and the Rukh were the two 
strong parties, with Socialist Party of Ukraine and Green Party serving as small parties necessary 
for the formation of a majority coalition. While strong in the 2002 elections the bloc Our 
Ukraine, also known as Our Ukraine Self-Defense, has fallen out of voters’ graces along with the 
Communist Party. Now, Bloc of Yulii Timoshenko and Party of Regions assumed the role of the 
two dominant parties since the 2006 election.  
 The political parties of the developed democracies can be easily classified along the 
ideological scale of left/right, libertarian/authoritarian extremes. Unfortunately, such 
classification proves more problematic in case of political parties in new democracies. According 
to Kitschelt’s argument, the programmatic parties will have difficulties forming as long as 1) 
there is no economic growth and 2) voters remain unsophisticated.  As a result, clientelistic and 
charismatic politics persist in Ukraine. Ukraine has moved toward a growing market economy in 
the early 21st century. The study of voter sophistication is paramount in determining the future 
development of Ukrainian democracy. Using the empirical results of this inquiry, I seek to show 
that there are reasons for cautious optimism as voters appear to exhibit some sophistication. 
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Kitschelt argues that economic development and voter sophistication have much to do 
with institutionalization of programmatic political parties due to the nature of the conflict 
produced by market economic relations and the ability of voters to act based on their true 
political interests (1992). During the early stages of political and economic transition, where the 
economy is weak and political instability is high, the axis of political competition polarizes the 
political landscape between leftist authoritarians and economically rightist political liberals. The 
public is also polarized between the two camps with the majority leaning towards the 
redistributive agenda of the left in light of weak economic performance and toward political 
authoritarianism in light of political volatility. However, as the economic reforms take place, 
Kitschelt predicts a shift in the axis of political competition.  
In the condition of high economic performance, the political competition axis changes 
dramatically and runs between the leftist market, correcting and cushioning the policies of social 
democrats, and rightist authoritarian tendencies.  Figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 depict these 
developments in Ukrainian political competition.  
Figure 2 Axis of Party Competition in the Weak Economy of the early 1990’s 
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Figure 3 Axis of Party Competition 1998-2004 
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Figure 4 Axis of Party competition since market transition and growing economy (post-2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the early 1990s, the political competition took place along the lines of Kitschelt’s 
argument (Figure 1.2). The Communist party opposed both the political pluralism and liberalism 
and rapid movement toward market reforms. On the other hand, the People’s Rukh of Ukraine 
professed democracy that it perceived as tied to Ukrainian national sovereignty and supported a 
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move toward the market. During the mid-1990s several more parties appeared and joined the 
competition along the axis of party competition. However, the movement toward the market 
started to introduce shifts in the nature of the conflict.  
During this turbulence the formation of programmatic parties is quite difficult. The 
parties form in reactionary manner for the reasons other than formulation of an ideologically 
sound programmatic platform, as discussed above. Thus, we can see a number of centrist, 
charismatic, and clientelistic parties competing with one another for votes (Figure 1.3). The lack 
of programmatic appeals behooves the parties and their leaders to campaign on other basis of 
populist issues.  In 2005, Ukraine has successfully consolidated its market economy and has 
experienced a period of economic growth. Figure 1.4 represents the shift in political party 
competition as suggested by Kitschelt. It is evident from the figure that the political parties of 
Ukraine are not fully aligned with this axis. However, if Kitschelt’s (1992) assumption is correct, 
the changed nature of the political competition and the presence of sophisticated voters should 
contribute to the necessary changes.  
It is with this broader thought in mind that I undertake the analysis of the Ukrainian voter 
in order to understand the process by which the interaction with democratic system increases the 
complexity and therefore sophistication of new democratic voter.  
1.3 THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE UKRAINIAN VOTER: ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY 
SINCE 1991 
Since independence there have been several attempts to analyze Ukrainian political behavior. 
Unfortunately, the studies either include Ukraine as one of the cases among several, thus giving 
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very little attention to the particulars of this society or focus on data other than individual voters’ 
responses. Reisinger et al (1994) include Ukraine as one of the cases in their evaluation of 
political values along with Russia and Lithuania.  These scholars suggest that regional divisions 
are most important in predicting vote choice. Furthermore, they suggest that ethnic and linguistic 
differences are responsible for regional distinctions.   
Evans (2006) includes Ukraine as one of the cases in his evaluation of the social basis for 
electoral behavior in new democracies of the post-communist Europe along with Russia, Poland, 
Czech Republic, and Lithuania.  Regional differences are again cited as the most important 
predictors of vote choice. While Evans doubts that linguistic and ethnic differences are the sole 
explanations of regionalism, he suggests that it is still not clear if “the economic differences 
between [the regions] are as significant as their historical inheritance.” 
 The literature examining Ukrainian voting behavior, therefore, is resigned in focusing 
primarily on regional divisions. These regional divisions in Ukrainian voting are not a new 
development. This trend can be traced to the first competitive election in Ukraine in the early 
1990s.  This phenomenon has attracted much attention from the scholarly community and has 
produced a variety of explanations.  The bulk of these explanations gravitate toward historically 
rooted ethno-linguistic differences between the regions of contemporary Ukraine.  
Ukrainian regions are divided along geographic lines – the West (a region to the west of 
the Dnipro River), the East (lands east of the Dnipro), and as some would argue, the South (the 
Crimean Peninsula and the territory along the shores of the Black Sea).  Figures 1.5 and 1.6 
present a visual representation of the difference in voting preferences among the regions of 
Ukraine. 
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Figure 5 Parliamentary Election 20061 
 
 
Figure 6 Presidential Election 2004 Second Round2 
 
                                                 
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Wahlkreise_ukraine_2006_eng.png Permission is granted to copy, distribute 
and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or any later 
version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-
Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section entitled "GNU Free Documentation License" 
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ukraine_Presidential_Dec_2004_Vote_(Highest_vote)a.png Permission is 
granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, 
Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-
Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section entitled "GNU Free 
Documentation License" 
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Figure 1.5 represents the results of the 2006 parliamentary election. The blue regions 
depict those regions of Ukraine where the Regions Party won the majority of votes. The red 
color represents the regions where Bloc Yuliji Timoshenko (BYuT) secured the majority of 
votes. The orange represents those regions where Bloc Our Ukraine came victorious. Figure 1.6 
depicts the results of the second round of the infamous 2004 presidential election where Viktor 
Yanukovich of the Regions Party battled Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of the Bloc Our 
Ukraine. The images in both figures show very clearly a strong regional effect on Ukrainian 
voting preferences in both presidential and parliamentary elections. Much like the electoral map 
of the United States of America is deemed to be divided into the so-called “red” and “blue” 
states, so it would seem, Ukraine is divided into “blue” and “orange” regions.  
These regional differences, as noted above, are not a new phenomenon. The results of the 
1998 Parliamentary election also show a regional division. The Communist party of Ukraine 
collected most votes in the regions lying east of the Dnipro River, including Kiev and Zhitomir 
administrative districts (at the center of Ukraine), while the People’s Movement of Ukraine 
(Rukh) and the Socialist/Peasant Party shared the success in  the western regions. During the first 
presidential election of 1991, as Clem and Craumer (2005) rightly point out, the regional division 
was apparent. The western regions of Ukraine gave their primary support to the leader of 
People’s Rukh, Vyachaslav Chornovil, while eastern regions of Ukraine supported Leonid 
Kravchuk, who ran as an independent. The presidential elections of 1999 also reflected this 
pattern. According to the election results available through Ukrainian Central Electoral 
Committee, the regional differences between votes in favor of Leonid Kuchma, an independent, 
and his main opponent, a leader of the Communist party, Petro Simonenko, are apparent. 
 28 
Kuchma secured the majority of national votes; however, his largest support came from the 
western regions, while Simonenko came as a favorite candidate in the eastern regions of Ukraine.  
But why exactly do these regional differences exist? There are two related explanations 
that enjoy most support. Among the attributes deemed responsible for these differences, 
linguistic differences (Barrington and Herron 2004; Clem 2005; Ryabchuk 1999; Shevel 2002) 
and ethnic divisions (Bremmer 1994; Gee 1995) are seen as most prominent among the 
contributing factors. Historical, institutional, and cultural reasons have also been called upon to 
explain these regional differences (Abdelal 2002; Flesnic 2003). Some scholars, however, 
suggest that neither of the above factors alone can explain East-West division in Ukrainian 
voting behavior, citing economic and political legacies of the USSR as the main reasons 
contributing to the persistence of regionalism (Kubicek 2000; O’Loughlin 1999).  
However, there is another related explanation as well – the geopolitical policy orientation 
of the party/candidate in question.  Ukraine finds herself in a unique geographic and historic 
position. Being the second largest country in continental Europe and bordering the European 
Union to the west and Russia to the east, Ukraine serves as a buffer zone between these two 
world powers.  Historically, Ukraine is able to independently determine the vector of its 
economic and political orientation for the first time. In translation from old-Slavic language 
“Ukraine” or “Ukraїna” means “a land at the periphery” or “a country by the borderline.” The 
use of this name is first recorded in 1187 as a description of Kiev and Halychina territories at the 
western periphery of the Russian dominion. In the present context the irony is evident, as the 
crucial question remains -- a periphery of what?   Will Ukraine be an eastern border of the 
European Union, or will it continue to be a western periphery of the zone of Russian influence?   
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According to most observes of Ukrainian politics, these are the questions that fuel the 
regional division in Ukraine. The western regions are seen as most supportive of 
candidates/parties who advocate the pro-western vector of Ukrainian development, while the 
eastern regions are supportive of pro-Russian ties and outlook. These allegiances, it is argued, 
are rooted in linguistic and ethnic differences between the western and eastern regions’ 
populations (Clem 2005; Pirie 1996; Ryabchuk 1999). According to the scholars of Ukrainian 
regions, there are three main voting groups in Ukraine – Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians of the 
west, who support pro-western candidates/parties, Russian-speaking Russians of the east and 
south, who support a pro-Russian orientation, and Russophone-Ukrainians of the  east and center 
regions, who often represent the swing vote (Barrington and Herron 2004; Shevel 2002)3
While the discussion of regions in Ukraine as a locus of political behavior is interesting 
and presents a useful delineation of basic cultural and historic dynamics within this society, it is 
limited in scope and undermines a broader understanding of voting preferences among 
Ukrainians. I suggest that there are two main interrelated problems with the regional approach to 
Ukrainian voting behavior as it has been applied in the scholarly literature to date. Both problems 
stem from the fact that the regional approach exclusively relies on aggregate level data, such as 
. The 
events of the hotly contested 2004 presidential election, which culminated in the so-called 
“Orange Revolution”, are often used to illustrate this point. The westward oriented Viktor 
Yushchenko opposed the previous administration’s favorite for presidency, eastward oriented 
Viktor Yanukovich.  The support for the two candidates based on their geopolitical orientation 
reflected the domestic east/west division, as shown in Figure 1.6 above.  
                                                 
3 Ukrainian State Statistics Committee reports that over 17% of Ukrainian population declare themselves ethnically  
Russian, while over 24% of the population declares Russian their native tongue – the so-called Russophone 
Ukrainians. 
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geographic or administrative districts of Ukraine. This kind of data masks large variations of 
individual preferences within particular regions and hence provides too simplistic a view of how 
Ukrainians vote.  
The first problem, stemming from this methodological shortcoming, has to do with the 
fact that the focus on regions leads generally to the conclusion that the sole electorally -relevant 
cleavages in Ukrainian society are those of ethnicity and language. Although the studies of 
regions tell an elegant story about the differences in opinion between Russians and Ukrainians as 
ethnic groups, the conclusions that all of the Ukrainian voting dynamic can be explained by the 
ethnic group affiliation are highly suspect. As Richard Rose (2005) rightfully suggests, “such 
reductionist approach” does not take into account that other social, value, or economic 
differences might influence individual voting behavior. In short, the suggestion that regional 
affiliation predicts individual voting preference is subject to the ecological fallacy, or improper 
extension of the conclusions derived from the aggregate evidence to the individual voter. Simply 
because one region tends to vote “orange” does not imply that this is characteristic of every 
voter, and none of them could have voted “blue.” 
 The second problem with regionally based analysis of Ukrainian voting behavior is 
connected to the first; however, it presents a separate and as great a challenge. The region’s 
approach is static in nature. By focusing on regions as the unit of analysis and ethnicity and 
language as the main explanatory variables, the regional approach cannot explain the changes in 
electoral preferences of Ukrainians over time.   
Paul J. D'Anieri (2006) evaluates the patterns of political behavior of the representatives 
in the Rada in order to illuminate the political cleavages dividing Ukrainian politicians. He finds 
that politicians in the Rada behave very practically and don’t always vote on the basis of their 
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regional, ethnic, or linguistic orientations. D’Anieri finds that politicians often cross regional 
lines in order to work with those politicians closest to them ideologically. I argue that Ukrainian 
voters over time develop very similar pragmatic approach to vote choice. While group identities 
remain important predictors of vote choice, I will show that Ukrainian voters have learned how 
to approach the electoral choices from a broader perspective, which also includes evaluation of 
salient issues and political leaders.  
1.4 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter 2 is devoted to the exploration of the ethno-cultural and socioeconomic cleavages in 
Ukraine. In this chapter I examine the manifestation of socioeconomic and socio-cultural 
cleavages in the Ukrainian electorate. The statistical results support the hypothesis that ethnic 
and cultural divisions are important political dividers. Yet, the impact of the ethno-linguistic 
division is unstable and the results show no notable trends on these cleavages on electoral choice.  
The results also show some support for Kitschelt’s argument that the transition to a market 
economy produces cleavages between winners and losers of the transition.  It seems that during 
the 1990s the socioeconomic status played a role in voting preferences of electorate. However, 
there is again no good evidence that points to the development of trends in socioeconomic class 
voting in Ukraine over the past 20 years.  
Chapter 3 analyses the impact of issue and candidate evaluation on voting behavior. In 
this chapter I analyze the effects of issue stances and candidate evaluation on vote choices in 
presidential and parliamentary election. The results show that both of these factors are highly 
significant in predicting vote choice. This leads me to believe that Ukrainian voters are more 
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individual in their assessment of electoral choices. They rely less on cues from social groups and 
are capable of evaluating their choices on the important issues and candidate traits.  
The correct vote measure is introduced in Chapter 4. This chapter further analyzes the 
political sophistication of Ukrainian voters by taking in a step further. I argue that with 
experience of democracy voters learn how to cast their votes appropriately. My results support 
this assertion. Using the mathematical and theoretical framework of Lau and Redlawsk (1997; 
2001), I construct a correct vote measure and apply in to every presidential and parliamentary 
election in Ukraine since 1991. I find an increase in correct vote over time.  I propose and test 
several hypotheses regarding the differences in correct vote in sub group variations in correct 
vote. I find significant differences in electoral decisions between age cohorts and sexes as well. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to a deeper exploration of this phenomenon. 
The gender relationship remained un-politicized and confined to the realm of private 
domestic relations during the communist regime of Ukraine. However, the democratic process 
allows for gendered grievances to spill into the public political realm. Political, social, and 
economic reforms associated with regime change require a certain level of flexibility and 
aptitude toward learning. Therefore, one can expect that the differences between the political 
preferences of age cohorts should vary.  Chapter 5 focuses on the gender and age cleavages 
structure by reviewing the relevant political behavior literature as well as the historical 
development of gender relations in Ukraine. The results suggest that there are important 
differences between age cohorts in vote choice. The situation with gender, however, is trickier. 
There are no real trends over time to suggest a widening gender gap. However, a presence of a 
new feminist movement in Ukraine that attracts younger women speaks volumes to a possible 
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change in this a-politization of women. I rely on my interview with the leader of FEMEN to 
address several important developments in Ukrainian gender relations and politics. 
In addition to a thorough evaluation of Ukrainian politics, this study sheds light on the 
broader literature of electoral competition. The concluding Chapter 6 outlines the main finding of 
this inquiry and places them with in broader literature of political behavior in the new 
democracies.   By tracing the voter/party relationship over time the study tests the 
aforementioned hypothesis defining the basis of these relationships – social cleavages, issues 
stances, and charismatic leadership evaluation. I suggest that Ukrainian public exhibits a 
complex pattern of voting preference formation.  Voters have defined feelings toward party 
leaders as well as their stances on important issues facing the society both domestically and in 
terms of foreign policy.  They are also acutely aware of the differences between their life choices 
based on their group identities that influence their party choices as well as positions on issues. 
The existing developmental models of electoral linkages are too narrow and ignore voters’ 
capacity to engage in the cognitive learning process during elections.  
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2.0  THE POLITICS OF ETHNO-CULTURAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLEAVAGES 
The examination of the electoral politics in the established democracies around the world reveals 
that political parties often have close connections with certain social groups that serve as social 
basis for these parties’ political activity. This is largely attributed to the historical experiences of 
the social groups with each other and the broader historic-political context. Thus, in the United 
States the Democratic Party has enjoyed the support of African American community due to the 
Party’s activity during the Civil Rights Movements of the 1960’s in the US. In the context of 
British society, the Labour Party could consistently rely on the support of blue-collar workers 
and laborers, while business owners and entrepreneurs throw their support behind the 
Conservative Tories.  
The sociological branch of the study of political behavior suggests that structure of the 
political competition closely represents the structure of social divisions or cleavages in that 
society. That is, the voting preferences of the electorate are motivated by voters’ identification 
with one or the other social group. The social characteristics and social group affiliation, 
therefore, can serve as a good predictor of voting preferences among the citizens.  According to 
this line of argument social cleavages develop as society undergoes major historical 
transformations (Flanagan 1980). Furthermore, as the new cleavages take root within the society 
they serve as important links between the electorate and the political elite of decision makers, 
who in turn reinforce these social cleavages via political competition. Among the salient 
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cleavages that inform and structure the political landscape of democratic systems are ethno-
cultural (ethnicity, language, religion, region) and socio-economic (occupation, income bracket, 
level of education, urban/rural dwelling) cleavages age and gender (Clarke 2004; Evans 2006; 
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Lijphart 1971, 1979; Lipset and Rokkan 
1967).    
Due to the novelty of the political competition in the new democracies several scholars of 
the developing democracies around the world and more specifically post-communist Eastern 
Europe pay special attention to the role of social cleavages on political landscape of these 
societies. These scholars argue that certain cleavages could serve as the basis for political 
competition in these societies similarly to the developed democracies (Birch 1995; Evans 2006; 
G. Evans and S. Whitefield 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1998; Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta 2000; 
Zielinski 2002). These “developmental” theories suggest that new democracies should go 
through the same or similar process of political behavior formation and cleavage based political 
alignments will manifest themselves. Societies that lacked social, economic, and political 
freedoms under previous undemocratic regimes offer very little political fragmentation save for 
their group identification. Therefore, the group based divisions or social cleavages become an 
important tool for both electorates and elites. Group identifications based on such easily 
identifiable characteristics as ethno-cultural and socio-economic differences often prove a useful 
heuristic for the voters and an accessible tool of political mobilization for the elites. 
In this chapter I seek to analyze the role of cleavage based voting in the case of Ukraine. 
It is a transitioning society that has only recently achieved recognition as a market economy4
                                                 
4 On December 1, 2005 José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission and Tony Blair, British Prime 
Minister, during their visit to Kiev as part of the 9th Annual Ukraine-EU Summit, declared that EU recognizes 
Ukraine as market economy. 
. It 
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is also been painted as a divided society plagued by ethno-cultural and historical divisions. Given 
this politico-economic climate, one should expect to find cleavage based politics in this society. I 
begin by reviewing the role of social cleavages in politics as portrayed in the wider literature of 
political behavior. I, then, analyze these cleavages in the context of Ukrainian democracy over 
time in an attempt to uncover the developmental aspects of social group politics.  I rely on the 
individual level survey data collected by IFES researchers in 1994, 1997-2008. This allows me to 
track the developmental changes in cleavages since Ukraine transitioned to democracy in early 
1990’s. The data and the methodological tools used are described in detail in the later part of this 
chapter.  
As the literature review below discusses in detail there is a general debate over the 
influence of the socio-economic cleavages (Achterberg 2006; Brooks and Manza 1997; Brooks, 
Nieuwbeerta, and Manza 2006; Clark 2001; Clark and Lipset 1991, 2001; De Graaf, Heath, and 
Need 2001; Evans 1992, 1993, 1999, 2000; Franklin 1985). Moreover, the scholars of the 
developed democracies find that in the presence of the ethno-cultural cleavages the 
socioeconomic differences yield in political influence (Lijphart 1971, 1979). Given Ukraine’s 
socio-political history I expect to find persistent and strong ethno-cultural cleavages. However, 
given its recent experience with democracy and market economy I also expect to find the 
development of socio-economic cleavages in Ukrainian society as well. The analysis supports 
my general expectations and suggests an existence of numerous cross-cutting cleavages in 
Ukrainian society, which influence the voting behavior of individuals’ overtime unevenly.  
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2.1 SOCIAL CLEVAGES IN POLITICS 
As Toka (1998) rightfully points out the meaning of the word cleavage in the literature is 
often used to mean numerous things. In this study following the work of Franklin and colleagues 
(1985, 2001; 1992) I define cleavage as a group-based politically relevant division within the 
society. Martin Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan’s 1967 classic Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives is often cited as the foundation of the sociological 
model of electoral connection. The authors evaluate the historical developments in Western 
Europe and paint a convincing picture of the intricate relationship between social cleavages and 
party preferences in developed western democracies. They suggest that there is a historical 
connection between the development of political parties and societal divisions. Important group 
divisions occur within the societies in light of traumatic developments that societies undergo 
during their historical experiences. In the contexts of “old” European democracies, the authors 
identify the National and Industrial revolutions as such monumental events.   
The National revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought with them an 
important concept of national identity. This identification, based either on ethnic or a broader 
civic basis, created a division between in and out groups. The distinction was created between 
compatriots, co-nationals and the others. The ethno-linguistic, cultural and religious identities 
informed and solidified such group differences. In many European societies the forging of the 
nation has also coincided with the formation of democratic politics and representative 
governments. The question of ethno-national group identity, in this context, took on the more 
weight and meaning. Who are the people to be included in the polity and nation? This question 
produced the further rift between the ethno-cultural “in” and “out” groups. On the same note the 
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democratic procedure allowed the groups to express their differences though political 
representation in the form of political parties.   
 The Industrial revolution, on the other hand, reformed the relationship between the 
members of the society further along the lines of people’s relationship to the means of 
production. Technological advances in productions techniques lead to the re-evaluation of 
manufacturing practices and ushered in the era of urbanization, industrialization, and capitalism 
with the creation of bourgeois and working classes.  These socio-economic and ethno-cultural 
cleavages have spilled into the political realm and influences the formation of political party 
competition in the countries of Western Europe (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The political conflicts 
between the groups continued to reproduce themselves in the society and served as the legitimate 
basis for electoral competition between the political parties. Moreover, according to the authors 
the groups become linked to political parties representing their interests and remain attached 
until the group conflict is resolved or overshadowed by a new conflict.  
Lipset and Rokkan argue that there are three main stages of development of social 
cleavages – emergence, institutionalization, and eclipse.  As mentioned above the cleavages 
emerge as societal response to major changes within the society and as Flanagan (1980) 
rightfully points out, it is at this stage that social cleavages are more prominent and disruptive. 
The political parties become representative of the social conflict during the institutionalization 
stage. That is, the political parties form along the lines of social division and the social groups 
align themselves with those parties that are most representative of their interests. These 
alignments remain stable until the next shift within the society, which mutes or resolves some 
cleavages and introduces new ones. At this point the process of realignment ensues where the 
significant changes in party attachment takes place, thus altering the political party system (Key 
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1955).  In the new developing democracies one should expect to identify the emergence and 
institutionalization of the cleavages. Thus, one should look for the disruptive clear societal 
cleavages and the emergence of the political actors aligning with these societal demands. 
 The power of the group identification is explained though both rational evaluation of 
tangible political interests and emotional group attachments. On the one hand, group 
identification suggests a degree of political interest congruence between the group members. 
That is, all blue collar workers have certain interests in common and these interests oppose 
sharply the interests of the business owners as a group. Thus, ones’ livelihood and wellbeing is 
connected to the group s/he belongs too. On the other hand, group affinity could be informed by 
a deeper psychological attachment. The members of the same ethno-national or religious group 
are presumed to share deep communal connection that in turn informs their values and attitudes. 
 The social group characteristics can be beneficial to both the electorate and the political 
elites. Group identification can serve as a cognitive short cut for a voter trying to make an 
electoral decision. In making such a decision the voter might employ the following logic—“If 
these people look (talk, live, work, worship, etc) like me, then we must have similar views and 
desires and therefore a similar political outlook”. Thus, an individual does not need to invest 
much energy and time into researching the particular candidate’s/party’s stances. For the elites 
group attachments serve as tools for support mobilization. Thus, according to the sociological 
model social cleavages serve important roles in democratic process and the development of 
electoral politics. Ethno-cultural and socioeconomic cleavages have been identified as the two 
important groups of cleavages. I now turn to the evaluation of these groups of cleavages and 
their influences on electoral behavior as presented by the scholarly literature up to date.  
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2.1.1 Ethno-Cultural Cleavages 
The ethno-cultural basis for vote choice has been receiving much attention in recent 
decades. The studies have focused on the electoral competition in both “old” and “new” 
democracies alike.  The comparative literature on the ethno-cultural basis for vote choice has 
developed in two different, yet complimentary directions. The first addresses the question of how 
does ethnicity determine voting behavior (Featherman 1983; Ferree 2004; Greeley 1974; Landa, 
Copeland, and Grofman 1995). Scholarly work focusing on this question is concerned with 
finding out whether ethnicity matters and the extent to which it does.  The second complimentary 
direction addresses the question of why ethno-cultural differences matters (Chandra 2004; 
Horowitz 1985, 1998; Medrano 1994; Parenti 1967; Wolfinger 1965). Scholars working in this 
direction attempt to formulate theoretical explanations for the reasons behind the power of ethno-
cultural determinants on the formation of voting preferences.  
Almost all of the literature, however, seems to agree that the utility of the use of ethno-
cultural heuristic or cues is very high indeed because such group membership provides an 
individual with valuable political information at a very low cost. As Birnir argues group 
members learn from one another the necessary political attitudes and behaviors. The ethno-
cultural group identification are particularly salient because characteristics like ethnicity, 
language, race, culture and religion are either impossible or very difficult to change or forge 
(Birnir 2007). Moreover, these attributes are easily recognizable unlike other social groups’ 
characteristics. Thus, voters can throw their support behind a candidate based on a set of certain 
familiar characteristics. The analysis of local election in Philadelphia (Featherman 1983) and 
Toronto (Landa, Copeland, and Grofman 1995), for instance, find that recognition of ethnic 
names plays an important role in voter’s decision to support the candidate. 
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Because ethno-cultural cleavages are based on such aspects as ethnicity, language, 
culture and religion the extent of self-interest as the basis for group belonging has been 
questioned (Kinder 1981). It has been argued that the extent to which one’s belonging to a trade 
union, for instance, defines one as a person is incomparable to one’s belonging to ethno-national 
group. The emotional response that is solicited by ethnic belonging is fundamentally much 
stronger and deeper psychologically than a pure calculation of self-interest. Moreover, the nature 
of conflict between ethno-cultural groups often raises deeper psychological issues such as “love 
and hatred” (Horowitz 1998).  The empirical comparative studies have suggested that emotional 
attachments play a greater role in the use of this particular heuristic (Chandra 2004; Ferree 
2004).  Thus, ethno-national group belonging is a powerful political tool in developed 
democracies (Parenti 1967; Wolfinger 1965). 
In the new democracies undergoing the transition the rise in the significance and potency 
of ethno-cultural identities can be expected. Traditionally the concepts of nationhood and 
democracy have been intimately linked and the formation of the nation and democratization went 
hand in hand during the so-called first wave of democratization in Europe and Americas 
(Huntington 1991). The link between the two is both intellectual and practical. The establishment 
of the government that claims to represent the people produces an inevitable question about who 
these people might be and what unites these people in a single polity and state (Riggs 1998). The 
particularly intense rise of ethno-nationalism has been cited as one of the outstanding 
characteristics of the so-called “third” wave of democratization that includes the post-communist 
transition in Europe (Linz and Stepan 1996; Snyder 2000).  
The increase in nationalism in ethnically heterogeneous societies can lead to an increased 
sense of ethno-cultural differences and even conflict. In the literature on democratization one can 
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find an established empirical link between democratization and the rise of ethnic conflict (Basch 
1998; Cordell 1999; Ellingsen 2000; Kohli 1997; Mousseau 2001; Riggs 1998; Smith 2000; 
Snyder 2000; Vetik 1993). In Europe, the rise of ethnic tensions during democratic transition has 
been well documented (Cordell 1999; Snyder 2000). Lieven (1993) and Vetik (1993) in their 
respective analyses of Baltic states’ path to democracy pay special attention to the rise in ethnic 
conflicts in the region. They suggest that there is a complex relationship between the 
liberalization associated with the collapse of the USSR and the rise of ethnic tensions in the 
region. Observations of this relationship are not limited to Europe. Smith (2000) comments on 
the empirical evidence of ethnic conflict and democratization in Africa. His study explicitly tests 
the expected relationship and finds strong support that ethnic tensions rise at the initial stages of 
democratic transition. Linz and Stepan (1996) remark on the connection between ethnic conflicts 
and democratization, or what they call the issue of stateness in the Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation by devoting an entire chapter to this issue.  
It is important to mention that the existence of the empirical link does not suggest that 
democratization causes ethnic differences. The ethnic-cultural cleavages develop through the 
historical interaction of social groups regardless of the regime. In many cases ethnic 
identification are manifested long before suffrage is introduced (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The 
authoritarian regimes however are more efficient in containing the ethno-cultural hostilities (Linz 
and Stepan 1996). Yet, democratization and liberalization on the other hand afford a degree of 
freedom to the population. Freedom of assembly and freedom of speech among others give an 
opportunity to feuding ethnic groups to freely express their negative view toward each other 
(Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007).  If these negative relationships are not ameliorated, the bloody 
conflicts are unavoidable (Snyder 2000), as developments in Yugoslavia have vividly 
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exemplified.  As Huntington points out the rise of nationalism in single-party East European 
Leninist sates was reaction to the failures of the authoritarian regime installed and supported by 
the USSR (1991).  
The rise in ethno-national identities can also be attributed to the fact that such identities 
sometimes prove to be the only salient source of political mobilization. The reliance on 
nationalist rhetoric could be a useful tool in hands of the political elite during the initial 
democratization process, in the societies where the previous undemocratic regime eliminated 
other sources of political pluralism (Surzhko-Harned 2010). The electoral politics in these 
democratizing societies is often characterized by low information and high degree of uncertainty. 
The voters and the elites in these societies lack experience with democratic process. The political 
parties are brand new and therefore do not have a historical record available for voters’ 
evaluation. In such an environment the use of ethno-national heuristic is quite rational on behalf 
of the new voters. In her examination of ethno-linguistic cleavages and their role in electoral 
politics Birnir argues that the reliance on ethno-cultural cues in the new democracies is quite 
high. Moreover, it contributes to the stabilization of party preferences as voters and decision-
making elites align along the ethno-cultural cleavages (Birnir 2007). In the case of Bulgaria, 
Birnir further finds that linguistic identities in particular are more salient in producing lasting 
political linkages between voters and political parties. She suggests that this is largely due to the 
fact that in an environment of low information, linguistic cues are the easiest and least costly to 
follow.  
This brief overview of literature suggests that one should expect to find the manifestation 
and institutionalization of ethno-cultural cleavages in new post-communist democracies.  The 
political manifestation of ethno-cultural cleavage can be attributed to numerous factors, such as 
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the nature of the relationship between the ethno-cultural groups and their experiences and 
treatment under the previous authoritarian regime. There are very few ethnically homogenous 
countries around the world today, and post-communist Eastern Europe is a filled with multi-
ethno-national states. The previous one-party Communist regimes, moreover, often attempted to 
suppress the expressions of ethno-cultural cleavages. Although, the severity of the regime 
repression of the ethno-cultural identities varied, it was based on the Marxist-Lenist assertion 
that nationalism is a bourgeois invention, constructed as justification of class subjugation.  
This cleavage should be one of the first to become politically manifested during the initial 
liberalization and democratization, due to the deep psychological connection between the group 
members and lack of other salient sources for political pluralism. The institutionalization of the 
ethno-cultural cleavage should be expected to follow, as democratization continues and electoral 
politics is introduced in the society. Low information, high uncertainty, lack of other cues, and 
the ease and low cost of ethno-cultural heuristic contribute to the development of electoral link 
between electorate and elites based on ethno-cultural characteristics. 
2.1.2 Socio-Economic Cleavages 
Socioeconomic cleavage is often characterized by the political confrontation between 
socio-economic classes. Yet, class based voting in not an uncontroversial subject within the 
political behavior literature. There is a fierce debate, which has been raging for over a decade 
now between the supporters of the proposition that “class is dead”(Clark and Lipset 1991), and 
those suggesting that the “rumors of its death are highly exaggerated” (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 
1993). As Clarke and Lipset point out in the introductory chapter of their The Breakdown of 
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Class Politics, their suggestion that class is dying in 1991 met serious criticism from the Oxford 
and Berkley scholars (2001).  
Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan identify class as one of the major social 
cleavages that originated with the Industrial Revolution (1967). The basic definition of the class 
based distinction rests on the different life experiences of the workers and the employers, the 
laborers and the owners of the means of production. The political expression of this social 
cleavage became possible though the idea of party interest representation (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967).The laborers and workers organized into the unions that helped to establish the support for 
political parties that represented the interests of the working class. The Russian revolution and 
the emergence of the numerous communist parties around the globe seemed to be a vivid 
testament that class based social distinctions lead to the class based political distinctions.   
The primacy of class cleavages seemed to be solidified in the social sciences in the first 
half of the twentieth century.  Sociologists, though not claiming to subscribe to Marxist doctrine, 
none the less were all too eager to exploit Marxian class distinction as explanation of the social 
phenomena (Clark 2001).  
Studies of class voting suggest that the lower class (workers) were more likely to support 
leftist parties, while the upper class (owners/employers) were more likely to support rightist 
parties. Oddbjørn Knutsen in his review of class as an explanatory variable of vote choice cites 
Nieuwbeerta, 1995 and suggests that the studies of class voting can be grouped into three 
“generations” (2006).  The first generation of the first decades after  WWII sought to explore 
whether there is a relationship between socio economic class and voting behavior. The second 
generation of class voting literature came in mid-70’s. This generation was more 
methodologically advanced than the first one and sought to explore the relationships of class and 
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voting preferences in more detail. The third generation, which emerged in the 80’s, took the 
exploration of class voting to the cross-national level. These researchers also introduced much 
more sophisticated methods to distinguish between the so-called absolute and relative class 
voting as well as argued against the previously used dichotomies of class variable and defended a 
more detailed class classification.  
The conceptualization of class has also undergone fluctuation and alterations. As Clark 
(2001) points out the definition of class can be summarized in three categories as well. First 
meaning of class comes from classical Marxism definition, juxtaposing proletariat and bourgeois 
in capitalist societies based on their relationship to the means of production. The second 
definition has a broader meaning. It includes more detailed distinctions then the Marxian 
definition, stretching beyond production or work related differences. Clark (2001) cites 
Dahrendorf’s inclusion of “conflict groups generated by the differential distribution of authority 
in imperatively coordinated associations.” The third definition is still broader and derives the 
meaning of class from any situation where the equality of a group vis-à-vis other groups is 
compromised. This broad meaning would then include ethnic or sexual minority groups under 
the definition of class.  As Clark rightfully points out the different definition of class might be a 
root of the debate, while these later broad definitions of class make it very difficult to 
conceptualize and examine class in general.  
The shifts in the research questions of each generation of class voting literature as well as 
the shift in the conceptual understanding of social class inevitably lead to the different 
operationalization and measurement of class variables. The two most cited and prominent 
measurement indexes involved in the debate on salience of class are the Alford’s index and 
Goldthorpe’s schema (Clark 2001; Evans 1999). Alford’s index of measurement was first 
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introduced in his 1963 comparative study of class voting in English speaking industrial 
democracies. It is based on the Marxian conception of class and makes a distinction between 
blue-collar and white-collar workers’ party preferences (Alford 1963). This is a relatively simple 
cross tabulation often associated with the first generation of class voting scholarship. This 
measure of class has come under criticism due to its overall simplicity and the subsequent 
generations of scholars introduced more advanced measurements, which relied on more elaborate 
and numerous categories(Jeroen, Achterberg, and Houtman 2007; Lambert and Curtis 1993). 
Goldthorpe’s schema is a response from the Oxford and Berkley scholars, according to Clark 
(2001).  This schema identifies a class of small employers/self-employed, the service class of 
professional and managerial groups who are themselves divided between lower and higher 
income positions, the non-manual workers class, and the working class divided into semi- and 
unskilled and skilled worker categories (Evans 1999).  Evans argues that this schema is more 
useful for its richness and allows for more accurate comparative analysis cross nationally and 
overtime (Evans 2000).  The uses of inferior indexes, according to advocates of class persistence, 
contribute to the biased results that suggest class decline.  
However, class dominance as an explanatory variable of social and political relations 
come under sharp criticism well before the present debate. In 1958 Robert Nisbet suggested that 
class was in decline as an explanatory variable in political and social spheres because of the 
changing dynamic in economic relations (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1993).  This suggestion was 
further supported by empirical studies of Philip Converse (1964) and  Arend Lijphart (1971) who 
have also called into question the explanatory power of class vis-à-vis other variables such as 
religious and ethnic cleavages. The already mentioned seminal work of Alford (1963) has also 
shown similar results suggesting that in the English speaking industrial democracies the 
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importance of class depends highly on the presence of religious and ethnic cleavages that take 
primacy over class.  
The contemporary debate does not seem to be asking if class is in decline, but rather why 
is it in decline or why does it appear to be in decline (Evans 1999).  Besides, the already 
mentioned problem of conceptualization and measurement, Evans (1999) lists five reasons for 
the decline in class based politics in modern post-industrial societies.  
 
1. Because of the “embourgeoisment” of the working class and “proletarianization” of 
white-collar occupations, social class has lost its important as determinant of life 
experiences in these societies. 
2. The significance of class declined because new “post-material” social cleavages 
emerged and replaced the traditional class based conflict. 
3. Voters are able to make more educated, issue based decisions in vote choice, 
because of their higher levels of education. Thus, the reliance on class based 
collective identities declines.  
4. Party preferences are based more on the post-material values that emerge and not on 
the traditional left-right divide.    
5. The decline of the manual working class as percentage of population has led left-
wing parties to focus on the middle-class instead. This led to much mutation within 
the left-wing party platforms and weakening of the class based distinctions.  
 
These reasons suggest that the decline in the influence of class on voting preferences 
might be due to both the real changes within the society as well as to the changes in the behavior 
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of both voters and parties. These changes, produce the process of dealignment or the decline in 
traditional structural cleavages, as well as introduce the process of realignment, with new 
cleavages substituting the old ones (Knutsen 1988). Hence, as some scholars have suggested, the 
emergent “new politics” of post-materialism is the explanation for this occurrence. Ronald 
Inglehart is the scholar most strongly associated with the development of this thesis. He argues 
that in the advanced post-industrial societies the material values have lost their salience because 
the level of development within the society was able to satisfy most fundamental material needs 
of the population as per Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. He concludes that instead the non-material 
values have become dominant. The salience of value-based cleavages is the foundation of the 
new post-material politics (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). 
The decline of class politics, however, is not supported by all in the discipline. Scholars 
focusing on the new democracies in the former socialist bloc have argued that because the post-
communist societies do not share the same experiences of capitalist market economy and 
democratic political system the same observation of cleavage based politics that is observed in 
the developed democracies are not applicable. They further suggest that over time, as economic 
and democratic changes take root in these societies, economic and class cleavages develop and 
become politically relevant. Evans and Whitefield (Evans 2006; G. Evans and S. Whitefield 
1995; 1998, 2006) have argued in numerous publications that the class relationships are new to 
post-communist states. They develop overtime as market economies develop within the societies 
after democratization. The ideological distinctions between the social groups develop and the 
class relations emerge and become salient over time. 
One of the main reasons for this is because the debate of modernization/post-modernism 
does not directly apply in the post-communist context.  The experience of communist regimes in 
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the states of Eastern Europe left an immense imprint on the economic and social development of 
these societies. Unlike western democracies, modernization was a state-directed affair in the 
countries of Eastern Europe. That is, modernization was imposed on these societies by the State. 
This is particularly true of the former republics of the USSR, where the policies like NEP (New 
Economic Politics) were implemented in the 1920’s.  These policies turned the agricultural lands 
of Eastern Europe and Russia into the industrialized states. Because of the command economy 
and the fact that the state owned all of the means of production these societies did not develop 
the traditional class cleavages.  However, this is not to say that there weren’t other basis for 
socio-economic cleavages in these societies. 
In his examination of voting in Russia, Gerber (2000) finds that as privatization policies 
open opportunity to private ownership the views of Russians toward economic policies change as 
well and these influence voters’ preferences. Evans and Whitefield (1999; 2006) examine the 
voting preferences of Russians over time. They also find that the class cleavages are becoming 
more prominent. They attribute this to the learning process among voters. As the economic 
market reforms take shape, persons are able to recognize different life chances available to 
people in different social classes. This recognition leads to learning and translates into voting 
preferences. On the other hand, it is possible that individuals also learn to recognize those parties 
which represent class interest over time, thus, contributing to the politicization of class 
cleavages.  Mateju, Rehakova, and Evans (1999) argue that it was this kind or process that is 
responsible for class realignment in Czech Republic post-democratization. These dynamics are 
also credited with the newly found resurgence of left parties in Eastern Europe (Cook, Orenstein, 
and Rueschemeyer 1999). 
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Based on the arguments of these authors we can expect that socioeconomic cleavages 
develop with time when democracy ages in post-communist societies regardless of the presence 
of other social cleavages. Moreover, tracing the development of class cleavages in the society 
with strong ethno-cultural divisions would further strengthen these theoretical expectations.  
While these class based socio-economic cleavages are predicted by the above 
developmental model as a result of successful transition to market economy, the initial socio-
economic cleavage distinction in the new democracies can come from a very different place. 
According to Kitshchelt the societal socio-economic rift in post-communist states occurs well 
before the transition to the market economy is complete. The very debate over the merits and 
speed of such transition splits the society between the potential winners and losers of the 
transition (Kitschelt 1992, 1995, 2000).  Among the losers of the transitions are those members 
of the society whose job position does not easily translate into the new market economy, thus, 
public sector employees, agricultural workers, unskilled laborers, retirees and pensioners, the 
rank and file personnel of the security forces, and local party apparatchiks are among those 
groups least likely to support rapid economic transition to the fee market. On the other hand, the 
winners of the transition, such as highly trained professionals, intellectuals, skilled workers, 
commercially oriented farmers, technocrats and other administrators, managers of larger 
industrial corporations will be likelier to support such reform. This is so due to the ease with 
which their skills and office placements under the previous regime can be converted between the 
two opposing economic structures(Kitschelt 1992).  
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2.1.3 Hypotheses 
The above literature seems to suggests there in the post-communist new democracies one should 
expect various levels of cleavage manifestation and development. On the one hand it appears that 
the ethno-cultural cleavages existed prior to democratization process and therefore are quite 
influential in the political process of the new democracy. Moreover, as Bernir argues the 
institutionalization of the expressed ethno-national cleavages leads to stabilization of political 
party system.  Thus, we should expect that ethno-national cleavages should be dominant, stable 
and strong in heterogeneous new democracies.  
On the other hand, the socio-economic cleavages develop overtime, due to the population 
initial inexperience with market relations. As mentioned above, we can expect that there are two 
mutually reinforcing developmental trends in the development of the socioeconomic cleavage. 
The first occurs immediately during the market transition and splits the winners and losers of the 
transition into opposing groups. The second develops as the transition to market is completed 
and individuals are able to experience the differences in live choices afforded to them by the 
market relations based on their occupation and life position. Thus, the articulation and 
institutionalization of these cleavages takes place overtime. 
Based on the above overview of literature on social cleavages I derive several general 
hypotheses for a newly democratic heterogeneous society that is transitioning to market 
economy. 
 
 
Overall Impact Hypotheses: 
H1. There is a political manifestation of ethno-cultural cleavages in voters’ behavior 
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Developmental Hypotheses: 
H2. The cleavage between the losers and winners of the transition is strong due to market 
transition 
H3. Ethno-cultural cleavages become firmly institutionalized overtime as political party 
competition stabilizes 
H4. Overtime differences between the socio-economic social classes manifest itself in 
electoral behavior of the citizens 
H5. Socio-economic cleavages become institutionalized overtime to reflect citizens’ 
experience with market economy  
 
In addition to the temporal variation in cleavage manifestation and institutionalization, I 
also expect that context and structure should have important effect on what sorts of cleavages 
appear more prominent. More specifically I expect that cleavages will be manifested differently 
in the context of presidential and parliamentary elections. The societal and political volatility 
associated with presidential elections in new democracies has been well documented in political 
science literature. Linz has explicitly warned against the perils of adopting presidential systems 
in fractionalized new democracies (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1988; Linz and Stepan 1996), 
while many others found empirical support for these assertions in new democracies around the 
world (Diamond 1990; Filippov, Odershook, and Schvetsova 1999; Fukuyama, Dressel, and 
Chang 2005; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich 2003). Given this literature one can argue that 
multiparty parliamentary elections tend to be less adversarial and less confrontational than 
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presidential elections, where two candidates square off against one another. This adversarial and 
polarizing nature of presidential elections could prompt a heightened sense of ethno-cultural 
division.  
 
 
Structural/Context Hypotheses: 
H6. Ethno-cultural cleavages are strong during the presidential elections 
H7. The more adversarial the context and the closer the results of the presidential 
election the more prominent are the ethno-cultural divisions 
 
2.2  CLEAVAGES IN UKRAINIAN SOCITY AND POLITICS 
Ukraine, as a divided heterogeneous society undergoing democratic and economic transitions 
presents an interesting case for the analysis of the developmental hypotheses. Unlike the western 
democracies, Ukraine had a different path of development. The industrial and national 
revolutions occurred in this country at a different time and under very different circumstances. It 
can be argued that the events of 1991, when Ukraine gained its independence for the first time in 
history, were the climax of this country’s national revolution.  The industrial modernization in 
Ukraine occurred during the early days of the USSR, during the state led industrialization. 
However, this kind of industrialization cannot be compared to the industrial revolution of the 
west, because this was a state-led effort confined to the structure of command economy. The 
most notable changes in the economic structure of Ukraine have taken place since the collapse of 
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the USSR as the Ukrainian economy underwent transition to market economy.  Therefore, based 
on the developmental social cleavage literature discussed above, one would expect that new 
social cleavages should develop and become institutionalized over time after the initial step 
toward the democratic and economic transition of 1991.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, Ukrainian society is viewed as a divided society. The main 
divisions observed in every electoral cycle are those between the geographic regions of Ukraine, 
namely east, west, south and center.  The divisions are believed to be linked to the ethno-cultural 
cleavages present in the Ukrainian society. The ethnic and linguistic groups present in Ukraine 
are the ethnic Russians, ethnic Ukrainians, and Russophone Ukrainians(Barrington and Herron 
2004). As was the case with other “third” wave post-communist transitions, Ukraine has also 
experienced an upsurge of nationalism in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. In his memoirs, the 
first president of Ukraine Leionid Kravchuk concluded that the democratic transition in Ukraine 
was largely due to the hard work of the nationalist minded social organizations, such as National 
Rukh, that served as the opposition to the communist regime (Kravchuk 2002). While the 
activism of Ukrainian nationalists was quite evident, the manifestation of Russian identity 
remained subdued (Surzhko-Harned 2010).  Therefore, the obvious manifestation of the 
cleavages at the initial stages of democratization was asymmetrically distributed between the 
groups. The formation of the National Movement of Ukraine or the so-called Rukh, which 
became a political party and took part in the parliamentary and presidential elections in the 
1990’s could serve as a reflection of institutionalization of the ethno-cultural cleavage in 
Ukrainian politics. Here I seek to analyze the individual voters’ preference to test the 
applicability of the developmental hypothesis and test the degree of voters’ reliance on ethno-
cultural group cues in vote choice. 
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The class disparities within Ukraine are under-analyzed. There are relatively few studies 
that seek to flesh out socio-economic differences between Ukrainians. This could be largely due 
to the fact that Ukraine has only recently solidified its market economy or to scholars 
preoccupation with geographic regions as an all-encompassing legitimate source of political 
pluralism. Recently Vlad Mykhnenko (2009) had attempted to evaluate the presence of class 
voting during the Orange Revolution of 2004. He argued that based on the developmental 
hypotheses of Lipset and Rokkan discussed above and the argument of Barrington Moore 
regarding the link between democracy and middle class, the play of social divisions during the 
Orange Revolution should be examined. He suggested that if the Orange Revolution can be seen 
as a true turn to democracy in Ukraine, the middle class should be the class most supportive of 
the Orange coalition. This is a very reasonable hypothesis, unfortunately instead of examining 
the individual level data, Mykhnenko focuses on aggregate regional data to test his theory. While 
he finds that economics played a role in the election, the overall results disprove his hypothesis. 
The regions with a high percent of bourgeois and urban population appear to have voted against 
the Orange candidate. The dependency on regional and aggregate data is fundamentally at fault 
for these results.  In this analysis I seek to evaluate the socio-economic class emergence and 
institutionalization using the individual level data in hopes to produce a clearer picture and test 
the applicability of the developmental hypotheses in the Ukrainian case.  
2.3  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The goal of this chapter is to determine the changes in social cleavages in Ukrainian society as 
they manifest themselves in the voting preferences of Ukrainians. I draw on Evans and 
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Whitefield’s (1995; 2006) exploration of the emergence of class cleavages in Russia and 
Hungary as a guide for variable operationalization of this inquiry.  The data used here come from 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). These are survey data of Ukrainian 
population collected over thirteen years from 1994-2008. These data were combined together 
into a single data set. The respondents in all surveys represent a random sample of population. 
All of the IFES data include 1484 respondents for each year of survey. Unfortunately, 1995 and 
1996 are missing from the dataset. The surveys include questions on the political preferences of 
population, their approval of democratic institutions and of individual leaders of the country. The 
questions also target individuals’ opinions on the important issues influencing the political, 
social, and economic situation in the country. The demographic characteristics of interviewees as 
well as their ethnic and socio-economic positioning are also reflected. 
In determining the emergence of class cleavages in Russia, Evan and Whitefield set out 
to evaluate the likelihood of voting preferences of different social classes for each electoral year 
over the period from 1993-2001. They begin by classifying the respondents into the social 
classes based on the Goldthorpe’s schema, discussed earlier in the paper. This schema identifies 
a class of small employers/self-employed, the service class of professional and managerial 
groups separate between lower and higher, the non-manual workers class, and the working class 
divided into semi- and unskilled and skilled worker categories (Evans 1999). Evans and 
Whitefield’s classification makes distinction between salariate, petty bourgeois, routine non-
manual, and working classes. Then the candidates of the elections (not parties) are classified 
between left, right, center, and authoritarian ideologies. The authors use multinomial logit to 
estimate the likelihood of different classes vote choice between left leaning candidates and all 
others (left used as base outcome), including and excluding demographic controls.  
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In this chapter I follow this analysis pattern to some extent. First, I forgo the 
classification of between left, right, center, and other ideologies. Second, I analyze the support 
for both the political parties and the presidential candidates. As the first step of the analysis I 
focus on the exploration of social cleavages in voters’ choices of political parties. I then turn to 
the analysis of the same cleavage structures during the presidential elections of 1994, 1999, and 
2004.  
Until 2006 Ukraine employed a mixed electoral system where a half of the seats in the 
Rada, Ukraine’s unilateral parliament, were allocated by single member district (SMD) and the 
other half by proportional representation (PR). The utilization of such system, as per the 
expectations of Duverger’s Law yields a multiparty system with two prominent political parties 
and a hand full of smaller parties necessary for the majority coalition formation. In the case of 
the German political system, this scheme for distribution of seats in the legislature has created a 
two-and-a-half political party system. A very similar situation can now be witnessed in Ukraine. 
The two prominent political parties, the Communist Party of Ukraine and Rukh in the 1990’s and 
Bloc Yulii Timoshenko, which joined Our Ukraine bloc in 2004, and Party of Regions in the 
beginning of the new century coexists and must take into account a hand full of smaller parties, 
which make and break coalition governments, as Moroz’s Socialist Party has done several times 
in the last three years.   
The parties analyzed are those that have been the prominent parties of Ukrainian politics 
for last twenty years. They include the Communist Party of Ukraine, which has won seats in 
Rada every time; People’s Rukh, a prominent party of opposition in 1990’s which joined forces 
with Bloc Our Ukraine in 2002; Bloc Our Ukraine, the force behind Yushchenko and the core of 
the Orange forces; Bloc Yulii Timoshenko (BYuT), a block supporting Timoshenko and a 
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former member of the Orange forces; Party of Regions, a party of president Yanukovich and an 
opposition to the Orange forces. The survey data included the question on the preferred political 
party in 1997, 1998, 2001, 2006, 2007, and 2008. The questioner asks the respondents to identify 
those parties that they have voted for the latest parliamentary election or would vote for if the 
election was held that Sunday. 
The population classification is also based on the assumptions of Goldthorpe’s schema. 
Unfortunately, the IFES survey does not ask respondents for detailed explanation of their 
working conditions. That is, there is no way to determine that persons are self-employed.  Instead 
I’m able to classify the population as intellectuals (persons of intellectual activity such as 
scholars and journalists), executives (persons involved at the high executive positions), skilled 
professionals (mid-level executive and professionals), unskilled labor (manual workers), and 
farmers.  These categories depict a spectrum of professions which coincide with the class 
distinction of Goldthorpe’s schema. In plainer terms these categories also provide a distinction 
between the white- and blue- collar occupations. Thus, intellectuals, executives, and 
professionals represent the white collar population, while the workers and farmers are 
representatives of the blue collar electorate. Unemployed individuals and soldiers are used as a 
reference category and defined as “other” in the graphs and figures below. 
The classification along the above categories allows for a more detailed distinction 
between the upper, middle, and lower classes, as well as distinction between the predicted 
“losers” and “winners” of the transitions. The category of executives represents the upper class, 
while intellectuals and professional are the occupations characteristic of the middle class. These 
categories also can be seen as representative of the winners. The workers and the farmers fall 
into the lower socioeconomic class and along with pensioners these are the losers of the 
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transition. In keeping with the expected hypothesis of winner and losers proposed by Kitschelt I 
also include a category of pensioners in this analysis.  
Education level and size of the city are also used in the analysis to account to the 
“winners” and “losers” of the transition. It is expected that those with higher levels of education 
should be likelier to support market relations both intellectually and pragmatically. Free market 
liberalism presents an intellectual alternative to Marxism-Leninism, and therefore, the persons 
with higher education should approve of this ideology more readily. I also expect that the 
citizens in large cities would be more supportive of market reform and be able to adapt to the 
new economic system with more agility than their rural counterparts.  
Based on this distinction we can then speculate that the workers, the farmers, and the 
pensioners of Ukraine will be more likely to support the left parties, while the intellectuals, 
professionals, and business executives should exhibit more support toward the right parties of 
Ukraine. Given the populist nature of the nationalist parties it is possible to speculate that they 
will appeal to the lower classes of population, particularly farmers, who might be more 
susceptible to populist agendas and exhibit more ethnic intolerance.   
The ethno-cultural cleavages are represented by variables depicting respondents’ self-
described ethnicity, language spoken at home, and region of residence. The regions of Ukraine 
are delineated along traditional lines of east, south, west, and center (used as a reference 
category). The analysis also includes variables to control for other potentially important 
predictors of vote choice such as age and gender (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 2003; Lijphart 
1979).  Religion has been identified as another important predictor of vote choice in the literature 
of comparative political behavior (Layman 1997; Lijphart 1979). This analysis takes religion into 
account and includes a measure for Orthodox Christians. 
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The above hypotheses dictate that the analysis must focus on the initial manifestation of 
the cleavages as well as the development of the linkages overtime. Therefore, I explore the 
effects on cleavages on party preference in a two-step analysis. First, I estimate the odds ratios of 
party support using a logistic regression model for each of the political parties in the analysis. 
This allows me to see the overall impact of the social cleavages on party preferences. The second 
step includes the time variation. I’m able to account for temporal changes by including an 
interaction of independent variables with a year count variable in a logistic regression model.  In 
the case of this inquiry all predictors belong to the Level 1 of the hierarchical model, while the 
individuals are clustered in years, a Level 2 predictor. This analysis follows the logic of the 
hierarchical level modeling. As Mishler, Rose, and Munro suggest such model is often used in 
comparative studies to control for effects of country specific variables, however, it is also 
possible to use level modeling to account for time effects (2006). Hence, the model is comprised 
of two levels, the individual level variables accounting for the social group of the respondent and 
higher level time variables, representative of the year the survey was conducted.  
The logistic probability models allow me to work under assumption that the temporal 
influences might be non-linear. The dependent variable is voter’s self-reported support for a 
specific party/block. The models estimate are converted into the odds ratios of a support for 
political party (a dichotomous variable: 1= vote; 0= no vote) based on social cleavage identifiers. 
This is done one at a time for each significant party. For example, let Y (the dependent variable) 
depict the support for the Communist Party. The equation specifies the effects of cultural, social, 
economic, and demographic cleavages on the support of the Communist Party. The models can 
be expressed as follows.  
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Model 1 – Overall Impact 
 
Logit (Y=1)=β0 + β1Ethnicity+ β2Language+ β3Religion + β4Region+ β5Class  
 
 
 
Model 2 –Temporal Variation of Cleavages’ Impact 
Logit (Y=1)=β0 + β1Ethnicity+ β2Language+ β3Religion + β4Region+ β5Class + β6Time + 
β7(Ethnicity*Time) + β8(Language*Time)+ β9(Religion *Time)+ β10 (Region*Time)+ β11(Class * Time) 
 
For the both models the predicted probabilities of vote is calculated as follows 
 
  
 
These models thus represents the fluctuation in the support of the specific political party 
generally and over time given the specific social, class, gender, age, or cultural groups of the 
individual supporters. This allows me to account for the effects of specific cleavages as 
manifested by group identification of individual voters on political party support. The robustness 
of the standard errors is increased by clustering the data by observation years. Age and gender 
are included in the model estimation as controls. In the evaluation of political parties I also 
include a dummy variable depicting parliamentary election in order to control for structural 
political effects.  A basic logistic regression (Model 1 above) is used in the analysis of 
presidential elections. 
The results of the models are first depicted in the form of the tables. I then present and 
discuss the graphs depicting the significant coefficients of the models. Representation of the odds 
ratios in visual form allows for a better comprehension of the cleavages’ impact on voting 
preferences. Lastly, I present graphs depicting the predicted probability of vote for each of the 
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political parties for relevant social group overtime. These figures allow one to tract overtime 
fluctuations and trends visually. 
2.4  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The developmental theory of cleavages based voting discussed above suggests that ethno-
cultural and socio-economic characteristics should come to play an important role in establishing 
the electoral linkages between voters and political elites. The analysis conducted in this chapter 
seeks to evaluate the extent to which individual voters rely on group identities and socio-
economic experiences in casting their votes over time. If social cleavages are indeed important in 
determining vote choice one should find that individual voters’ group identification 
characteristics consistently guide their vote. Moreover, given the institutionalization hypothesis 
one should be able to find the evidence of the alignment process as manifested by stable use of 
social group identities over time.  
The results of the models are presented in three tables in order to facilitate visual 
comprehension of the coefficients. Table 2.1 depicts the results for the ethno-cultural variables. 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 focus on the socio-economic variables as predictors of individual vote choice 
respectively. As mentioned in the previous section the analysis is focus on the five prominent 
political parties of Ukraine from 1990’s to present. The prominent parties of the 1990’s are the 
Communist Party and People’s Rukh, while Our Ukraine, Bloc Timoshenko, and Party of 
Regions are the prominent parties on the 2000’s. The result tables are organized to reflect this.  
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Table 2-1 Ethno-Cultural Cleavages: Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
CPU Rukh Our Ukraine BYuT Party of Regions 
Ethnic Ukrainian .57*** .84 .35** 
 
18.04** .67***  .95*** .43 .49*** .28 
 
.06 .3 .91 26.28 .66 .01 .5 .83 .05 9.61 
Ethnic Ukrainian 
*YR 
 
.97 
 
0.79 
 
.6 
 
.12 
 
.84 
  
.03 
 
0.12 
 
.75 
 
.13 
 
.21 
Russian Language .84*** .71 .53** 0.12*** .77*  .80** 5.87 .20*   8.25 
 
.19 .33 .15 0.04 .11  .09 64.95 .12 94.15 
Russian 
Language*YR 
 
.07* 
 
1.19*** 
 
.77 
 
.79 
 
.82 
  
.04 
 
0.04 
 
.92 
 
.36 
 
.66 
Orthodox Christian .02 .62 .75 0.35*** .85 .99 .12 .02** .37*** .94 
 
.1 .65 .15 0.05 .12 .18 .13 .04 .14 .03 
Orthodox Christian 
*YR 
 
.97 
 
1.10*** 
 
.95 
 
.28** 
 
.02 
  
.05 
 
0.02 
 
.26 
 
.15 
 
.14 
East .34** .67* .49* 0.49** .69* .47 .42*** .04*** .50***  
 
.16 .44 .18 0.17 .14 .5 .06 .03 .35 .83 
East*YR 
 
.97 
 
1.04 
 
.08 
 
.24*** 
 
.91 
  
.02 
 
0.04 
 
.23 
 
.06 
 
.13 
South  .55*** .07 .6 0.23** .73 .04 .40*** .24 .89*** .27 
 
.22 .13 .29 0.16 .19 8.48 .08 .1 .47 8.39 
South *YR 
 
.04*** 
 
1.07 
 
.93 
 
.03 
 
.94 
  
.01 
 
0.08 
 
.56 
 
.29 
 
.17 
West  .47*** .20* .15*** 6.07e+08*** .37*  .98 .00*** .62*** 64.93**  
 
.07 .93 .78 1.18E+09 .25  .13  .24 29.6 
West *YR 
 
.97 
 
0.05*** 
 
.09 
 
.52*** 
 
.75 
  
.04 
 
0.01 
 
.21 
 
.05 
 
.13 
Year of Democracy 
 
.78*** 
 
2.08*** 
 
.22** 
 
.13 
 
.57 
  
.07 
 
0.09 
 
.16 
 
.35 
 
.02 
Parliamentary 
Election 
 
.99 
 
16.50*** 
 
.05*** 
 
.21 
 
.97**  
  
.15 
 
0.76 
 
.33 
 
.2 
 
.62 
Pseudo R 2 
.12 .21 .13 0.20 .07 .14 .06 .10 .07 .08 
N 548 548 570 2570 978 978 978 978 978 978 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2-2 Socio-Economic Cleavages: Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
CPU Rukh Our Ukraine BYuT Party of Regions 
Intellectual Work .55** .24*** .55 .56*** .82 318910.32*** .75 .67 .57**   
 
.14 .08 .8 .53 .26 382063 .16 3.81 .14  
Intellectual 
Work*YR 
 
.10*** 
 
.86** 
 
0.44*** 
 
.87 
 
.59 
  
.04 
 
.06 
 
0.03 
 
.3 
 
.85 
Senior Executive .45*** .44** .77 .37*** .59 88.58 .68* .49 .06 .01 
 
.12 .16 .61 .12 .2 1000.01 .14 .58 .22 .04 
Senior 
Executive*YR 
 
.03 
 
.07** 
 
0.73 
 
.9 
 
.38 
  
.04 
 
.03 
 
0.54 
 
.13 
 
.51 
Skilled Professional .63*** .68 .48 .31*** .9 664.38*** .54*** .03*** .22 .01 
 
.07 .25 .44 .06 .19 1629.78 .08 .03 .18 .05 
Skilled 
Professional*YR 
 
.03 
 
.22*** 
 
0.66** 
 
.20*** 
 
.35 
  
.04 
 
.02 
 
0.11 
 
.08 
 
.42 
Unskilled Laborer .69** .51 .84 .40** .82 233.30*** .58** .02*** .22 .07 
 
.11 .72 .72 .16 .23 101.63 .12 .03 .24 .42 
Unskilled 
Laborer*YR 
 
.96 
 
.26*** 
 
0.71*** 
 
.23** 
 
.21 
  
.05 
 
.06 
 
0.02 
 
.11 
 
.42 
Farmer  .54** .73 .07 .01*** .87 15.55 .72 .56 .59 .01*   
 
.14 .27 .73  .3 139.67 .2 .57 .19 .03 
Farmer *YR 
 
 
 
.81*** 
 
0.82 
 
.04 
 
.30*   
  
.03 
 
.07 
 
0.49 
 
.3 
 
.19 
Year Count Variable 
 
.78*** 
 
.08*** 
 
0.22** 
 
.13 
 
.57 
  
.07 
 
.09 
 
0.16 
 
.35 
 
.02 
Parliamentary 
Election 
 
.99 
 
6.50*** 
 
7.05*** 
 
.21 
 
.97**  
  
.15 
 
.76 
 
3.33 
 
.2 
 
.62 
Pseudo R 2 
.12 .21 .13 .20 .07 0.14 .06 .10 .07 .08 
N 548 548 570 570 978 2978 978 978 978 978 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2-3 Socio-Economic Cleavages (Continued) Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
CPU Rukh Our Ukraine BYuT Party of Regions 
Large City .11* .39 .72*** 0.02*** .67*** .00*** .11* .03 .81*** 3.58 
 
.06 .27 .09 0.01 .13  .06 .16 .04 11.25 
Large City*YR 
 
.03 
 
1.80*** 
 
.55*** 
 
.24 
 
.87 
  
.08 
 
0.08 
 
.32 
 
.42 
 
.45 
Education 
Level .70*** .97 .98 1.89*** .18** .05 .17** .48*** .90*   .01 
 
.04 .11 .12 0.16 .1 .91 .08 .03 .05 .14 
Education 
Level *YR 
 
 
 
0.93*** 
 
.97 
 
.93*** 
 
.99 
  
.01 
 
0.01 
 
.03 
 
.02 
 
.01 
Pensioner .54*** .24*** .22 0 .99 3.77 .82 .07*** .27*   .76*** 
 
.08 .1 .52 (.) .21 0.61 .13 .03 .18 .5 
Pensioner*YR 
 
.14*** 
 
174.62*** 
 
.84 
 
.16*** 
 
.92**  
  
.04 
 
0.59 
 
.12 
 
.03 
 
.03 
Year Count 
Variable 
 
.78*** 
 
2.08*** 
 
.22** 
 
.13 
 
.57 
  
.07 
 
0.09 
 
.16 
 
.35 
 
.02 
Parliamentary 
Election 
 
.99 
 
16.50*** 
 
.05*** 
 
.21 
 
.97**  
  
.15 
 
0.76 
 
.33 
 
.2 
 
.62 
Pseudo R 2 .12 .21 .13 0.20 .07 .14 .06 .10 .07 .08 
N 548 548 570 2570 978 978 978 978 978 978 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The numeric results presented in these tables seem to suggest three broad conclusions. 
First, the results suggest that overall the social group characteristics serve as basis for vote choice 
for individual parties. Second, a close examination of the effects, however, proves no coherent 
cleavage alignments over time. Lastly, the low values of the Pseudo R squared suggests that 
overall the impact of social cleavages on vote choice is rather limited. For a more thorough 
evaluation of results I turn to the graphs depicting the odds ratios of the significant coefficient 
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presented in the above tables. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 represent the bar graphs of the odds ratios of 
the significant coefficients presented in the tables above. 
Figure 7 Social Cleavages - Overall Impact (statistically significant coefficients: odds ratios) 
 
Figure 8 Overtime Changes (statistically significant coefficients: odds ratios) 
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At the first glance the results seem to support the hypothesis regarding the overall 
manifestation of ethno-cultural cleavages. The overall impact of ethnicity and language are most 
striking. They prove to be important overall predictors of vote choice for all of the main political 
parties used in the analysis. This is an expected result. The main opposition to the Communist 
party came from the nationalist movements of ethnic Ukrainian intelligentsia, who supported 
People’s Rukh. The Ukrainian intellectuals perceived the Communist party as a force of ethno-
cultural domination and the extension of the imperial rule from Moscow. They regarded the 
Marxist-Leninst ideology as a sham designed to foster “Russification” of Ukrainian cultural life.  
This cleavage is sustained in the votes cast for Our Ukraine and Party of Regions. People’s Rukh 
has merged with the electoral Bloc Our Ukraine in 2002 parliamentary cycle, while Party of 
Regions is seen by some observers as a successor party to the CPU (Zimmer and Haran 2008). 
Ethnic cleavage also appears to be important in dictating the votes cast for the Bloc of 
Yulii Timoshenko. When Timoshenko entered the political arena she had a more than 
questionable reputation. She has been implicated in several unsavory business practices that 
awarded her an arrest warrant in the Russian Federation. Timoshenko’s nick name the “gas 
princess” alludes to the alleged fortune she was able to amass though illegal manipulation of the 
gas flows on their way from Russia to Europe though Ukraine. Timoshenko’s involvement in the 
gas industry signaled her close relationship to the previous non-democratic elite and regime. She 
was born and grew up in a Russian speaking family, in a Russian speaking industrial town of 
Dnipropetrovsk5
                                                 
5 The city was founded in the later 18th century during the times when Ukraine remained firmly under the rule of the 
Russian Empire. It was names Yekaterinoslavl (praise to the empress Katherine) and later even renamed 
Novorossisk (New Russia). During the Soviet days the city became a booming industrial center highly populated 
with Russian speaking citizens.  
. Her maiden name Telegina also signals her connection to the Russian ethnicity. 
However, since entering the political arena, Timoshenko has made valiant efforts to make herself 
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more in line with the ethnic Ukrainian image. During the 2004 Orange revolution Timoshenko 
aligned herself and her party with the Our Ukraine Block and its leader Viktor Yushchenko. 
During the anti-government demonstration of 2004 Timoshenko addressed the public speaking 
Ukrainian, albeit with a Russian accent. Her Ukrainian image was further reinforced by her 
decision to wear her hair in a tight braid wrapped around her head, which is an iconic hair style 
of a traditional Ukrainian woman. These actions did not go unnoticed and her popularity among 
ethnic Ukrainians solidified. The results of Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1depict that as well.  
 The regional cleavage between east and west also appears to be as prominent in 
determining the vote choice for all of the political parties. The CPU and Party of Regions enjoy 
support among the dwellers of the eastern regions of the country, who in turn do not like BYuT 
Rukh and Our Ukraine; both of which are supported in the west. Thus, the results for ethno-
cultural characteristic support the overall impact hypothesis H1 as well as the overall agreement 
among scholars analyzing Ukrainian politics that the geographic regions play an important role 
in vote choice.  
The results of the overall impact of the socio-economic cleavages are also quite 
intriguing. The level of education, the size of the locale, and pensioner status are statistically 
significant overall predictors of vote choice for all parties. Overall, the hypothesis is supported in 
the sense that large city dwellers and highly educated persons are more likely to support market 
oriented Our Ukraine and BYuT, than the Party of Regions, which enjoys support from 
pensioners and less educated persons. The results for the CPU, however, are a bit surprising. The 
city dwellers seem to be supportive of the CPU while the pensioners are not. These results show, 
however, that the there is an overall cleavage between the “losers” and the “winners” of the 
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market economic transition, that is just as important in the overall impact on vote choice as the 
ethno-cultural divisions.  
The class identifiers based on adjusted Goldthorp index appears not at all important in 
determining the vote choice for the Rukh and Our Ukraine bloc. Managers and intellectuals both 
appear to vote against the Communist Party. On the other hand the CPU is also disliked by 
famers, laborers and professional classes, who also appear to dislike BYuT.  The lack of 
statistical significance among the class identifiers for all of the political parties seem to suggests 
that this particular cleavage is not yet fully developed in Ukrainian society. However, the 
distinction between the “losers” and “winners” is much more strongly manifested in the political 
preferences of Ukrainians. These results give credence to expectations outlines in H2. 
Deciphering the presence and institutionalization of the ethno-cultural and socio-
economic class cleavages overtime presents its own challenge to which I turn next by examining 
the graph in Figure 2.2 and the predicted probability graphs presented in Figures 2.3 – 2.8. 
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Figure 9 Linguistic Differences in Vote Preferences Overtime (Predicted Probabilities) 
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Figure 10 Regional Variations in Vote Choice Overtime (Predicted Probabilities) 
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Figure 2.3 suggests that over time ethnicity and language are not at all as important as 
one could have expected them to be. Only the Communist party appears to be able to lay a true 
claim to have aligned itself with the Russian speakers over time. The impact of ethnicity, 
however, is statistically insignificant for all parties. The lack of statistical significance of 
language as predictor of vote choice is truly surprising. Figure 2.3 depicts the predicted 
probabilities of voting for each of the political parties based on the linguistic group overtime. 
One can see that there are no consistent time trends for any of the parties, save the People’s 
Rukh; however, the impact of this cleavage is very small. As discussed above Birnir finds 
language to be among the most salient cleavages instrumental in development of electoral 
linkages and voter stabilization. This seems to be not the case for Ukrainian parliamentary 
parties.  
The examination of overtime stabilization of regional trends suggests a firm alignment of 
eastern voters with the Communist party and western voters with People’s Rukh and Our 
Ukraine. Figure 2.4 depicts the predicted probabilities trends for all the regions among all the 
parties and provides a visual depiction of the odds ratio coefficients of Figure 2.2. The predicted 
probability graphs show some shifts in support among regions for BYuT and Party of Regions. 
The both parties seem to have enjoyed equal support from eastern and western regions of the 
country in the early 2000’s, however, overtime the split between the regional supports of these 
parties widens.  However, the regional impact coefficients do not seem to be statistically 
significant for Party of Regions and BYuT. Perhaps we can expect future regional alignments in 
the future. Thus, the developmental hypothesis H3 is somewhat justified by present 
institutionalization of regional cleavages for some parties, yet there are no clear ethno-linguistic 
attachments as expected by the broader literature 
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Figure 11 Socioeconomic Differences in Vote Choice Overtime: Occupational Status (Predicted Probabilities) 
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Figure 12 Overtime Voting Trends in Various Locales (Predicted Probabilities) 
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Figure 13 Educational Level Differences in Vote Choice Overtime (Predicted Probabilities) 
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Figure 14 Vote Choice Overtime Variations among Pensioners (Predicted Probabilities) 
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There is very little consistency or trending among the various class groups effects on vote 
choice for the prominent parties. Figures 2.5 -2.8 depict the predicted probabilities for the 
support of political parties based on occupational status, city size, level of education, and 
pensioner status respectively.  
The CPU seems to be enjoying a significant overtime support from the intellectuals. 
However, as Figure 2.5 shows the support of the intellectual did not increase drastically, rather 
the support for the CPU has decreased immensely among other class groups. Rukh seems to have 
picked up overtime support from all of the other groups save the intellectuals, whose support has 
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declined. As the graph in Figure 2.5 shows, the increased support among farmers is most drastic. 
Our Ukraine, which absorbed Rukh in 2002, shows a similar overtime decline in the support of 
the intellectuals. There is also a decline in vote choice for Our Ukraine among professionals and 
skilled labor. This suggests intellectuals’ dissatisfaction with the performance of Our Ukraine, 
rather than institutionalization of class cleavage.  
 BYuT, on the other hand seems to have picked up the overtime support from laborers 
and professionals. However, as Figure 2.5 shows, this increase is rather miniscule compared to 
the other groups’ trend lines. While Figure 2.5 shows strong support for Party of Regions from 
the unskilled labor this trend in statistically insignificant. However, there has been a significant 
increase in support of the Party of Regions from the farmers.  
BYuT appears to be the only party that has secured strong support of the city dwellers 
overtime. While it has lost the support of persons with higher levels of education, as did Rukh. 
Among pensioners the overtime support has increased to CPU and BYuT, while it declined for 
the Party of Regions. Yet, as the Figure 2.8 depicts the decrease in pensioner support for the 
Party of Regions appears to be a result of increase in support among non-pensioner, rather than a 
sharp decline in pensioner support, the same is true for pensioner support of BYuT. Therefore, it 
seems that only the CPU can claim to have solidified that support. However, there is a general 
decline in CPU vote overtime. The shrinking distance between pensioner and non-pensioner 
supporters of BYuT and Party of Regions might suggests a closing cleavage between the “losers” 
and “winners” of the transition. The Party of Regions might be appearing a successor party to the 
communists, however, the data give very little support for cleavage institutionalization. Thus, the 
results show that there is evidence to support the developmental hypothesis H4, suggesting the 
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overtime manifestation of class cleavage. However, H5 suggesting institutionalization of class 
cleavages is not fully supported by these data.   
I now turn to the evaluation of the social cleavages impact of vote choice of presidential 
elections. As stated above a basic logistic regression model represented by equation of Model 1 
above is used in these analyses. As the candidates varied across election I analyze each 
presidential election separately. Unfortunately, this does not allow me to get at time effect 
statistically, however, the temporal developments are non-the less visible. The models employ 
the same measurement for the cleavages in the above analysis of the voter’s choice of the 
political parties. In 1994, however, IFES questioner did not include a question concerning 
respondent’s occupational status, thus this measure of class is eliminated. Table 2.4 depicts the 
results of the logistic regression models. Figure 2.9 depicts the graphs of the odds ratios of the 
statistically significant coefficients. 
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Table 2-4 Social Cleavages in Presidential Elections Logistic Regression (odds ratios) 
 
1994 1999 2004 
 
Kravchuk Kuchma Simonenko Kuchma Yushchenko Yanukovich 
Age 1.04 1.27*** 1.24** 0.80*** 1.13* 0.98 
 
0.07 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Female 0.92 0.97 0.89 1.18 1.17 0.96 
 
0.13 0.13 0.2 0.23 0.17 0.15 
Ukrainian Ethnic 2.01*** 0.70**  0.79 1.09 2.56*** 0.42*** 
 
0.47 0.12 0.2 0.26 0.44 0.07 
Russian Speaker 0.50*** 1.49**  1.92** 0.71 0.18*** 8.70*** 
 
0.11 0.26 0.62 0.2 0.03 1.9 
Orthodox  0.57*** 1.39*   1.52* 0.73 0.81 1.32 
 
0.11 0.25 0.36 0.16 0.12 0.22 
Large City 1.03 1.16**  1.55*** 0.69*** 1.29*** 0.96 
 
0.09 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.11 0.09 
East 0.62** 1.31 3.65*** 0.43*** 0.60*** 1.87*** 
 
0.13 0.23 1.16 0.12 0.12 0.39 
South 1.49 0.8 1.53 0.87 0.63** 1.59**  
 
0.38 0.18 0.54 0.27 0.14 0.37 
West 3.34*** 0.41*** 0.58 2.29**  1.23 0.59**  
 
0.69 0.08 0.26 0.82 0.23 0.13 
Education Level 0.97 1.18**  0.98 0.96 1 0.9 
 
0.09 0.1 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.09 
Intellectual 
  
0.68 0.46 0.98 1.04 
   
0.47 0.26 0.34 0.4 
Senior Executive 
  
0.71 0.76 1.11 1.16 
   
0.45 0.42 0.37 0.41 
Skilled Professional 
  
2.35** 0.31*** 0.66 1.32 
   
0.97 0.12 0.17 0.36 
Unskilled Labor 
  
3.38** 0.20*** 0.55* 1.31 
   
1.64 0.09 0.17 0.44 
Farmer 
  
2.73* 0.30**  0.58 1.13 
   
1.66 0.17 0.23 0.48 
Pensioner 1.02 0.68*   
  
0.70* 1.1 
 
0.24 0.14 
  
0.15 0.26 
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.0647 0.1014 0.1463 0.1699 0.1879 
N 1126 1126 526 526 1179 1179 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 15 Social Cleavages and Vote Choice in Presidential Elections:  Significant Coefficients of the Logistic 
Regression (odds ratios) 
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The results suggest that ethno-cultural and socio-economic cleavages manifest 
themselves during voters’ decisions in presidential elections. However, their impact varies 
somewhat over elections and over presidential candidates. In 1994 election the decision to vote 
for or against Kravchuk seems to have been firmly rooted in voters’ ethno-cultural group 
identities both ethno-linguistic and regional. Being a Russian speaker, orthodox Christian, and 
easterner significantly reduced the probability of voting for Kravchuk, while being a westerner 
and a Ukrainian ethnic significantly increases this probability. Ethno-cultural cleavage is also 
important in choosing Kuchma. However, class cleavages as measured by educational level, city 
size and pensioner status is also manifested in voter’s decision to elect Kuchma who ran on a 
more progressive and reformist platform then ex-communist party ideology chief Kravchuk. 
The 1999 election presents a very similar picture. Both sets of cleavages prove important 
predictors of voter’s choice for both candidates. The class cleavage along occupations status and 
city size is evident. Professionals, laborers and farmers strongly support the Communist Party’s 
leader Petro Simonenko. On the other hand, belonging to these professions also significantly 
reduces the likelihood of voting for Kuchma. Thus, it would appear that Kuchma secured the 
vote of the market oriented “winners” of the transition and lost the support of the economic 
“losers”. The ethno-cultural distinction between east and west as well as Russophones and 
Ukrainian ethnic is also present. However, the comparison between the1994 and 1999 elections 
show that Kuchma failed to secure the support of the Russian speaking easterners in the 1999 
election, rather they flipped to support the Communist candidate.  
The 2004 election is marked in history by the Orange Revolution that followed the 
dispute over the electoral fraud allegations. Thus, the second round of the election between 
Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovich was particularly polarizing and contentious. IFES 
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were collected after the revolution, therefore, tap into the leftover passion of the event. One can 
see a sharp and strong cleavage between linguistic and ethnic groups, as well as between regions. 
Yet, the class cleavage can also be seen. The probability of voting for pro-market Yushchenko is 
significantly low among unskilled labor and pensioner. It is also high among city dwellers and 
the young. The presence and strength of ethno-cultural cleavages in presidential elections 
supports the expectation of H6 and H7, however, it is important to recognize that both class 
cleavages although to the lesser extent are also manifested.  
 The results presented in the above analysis support some but not all of the proposed 
hypotheses. The results suggest that ethno-cultural cleavages have a real and important impact on 
vote choices of Ukrainian public. However, the ethno-linguistic cleavages seem to have been 
institutionalized among the parties of the 1990’s and lost their potency in the 2000’s.  There also 
seems to be overtime development of socio-economic cleavages. The results show a strong 
manifestation of the cleavage between the “losers” and the “winners” of the economic transition. 
However, there is little evidence to suggest an existence of a deep institutionalized cleavage 
between socio-economic groups. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Social group identification can serve as important heuristic for vote choice. Although the 
literature documents a decline in the salience of group identification as a predictor of vote choice 
in developed democracies, this behavioral pattern is particularly expected among the voters of 
the developing new democracies. Because the voters have very little or no experience with 
democratic process and the political system is highly unstable, the voters can be expected to turn 
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to the easiest, most accessible heuristics in order to make an electoral decision. The ease of the 
ethno-cultural group identification and the salience of the socio-economic characteristics seem to 
lend themselves very well to the formation of the electoral linkages between electorates and 
decision making elites.   
The ethno-cultural cleavages present the useful cognitive short cut at a very low price. 
Therefore, in a heterogeneous society the reliance of ethno-cultural cues by both elites and voters 
can be expected. As Birnir showed and argued convincingly the stabilization of vote is highly 
assisted by the presence and use of linguistic differences between groups(Birnir 2007). The 
socio-economic cleavages can also serve as important links between electorate and political 
parties. These differences can develop in two related ways. On the one hand in the post-
communist states making the transition from command to market economy the cleavages can 
form between the so-called losers and winners of the transition (Kitschelt 1992, 1995, 2000). The 
winners are those who can more easily adapt to the free market relations due to their age, 
occupation, or previous status under the old regime. The losers are those who will most 
definitely suffer losses to their well-being. On the other hand, when the market transition is 
achieved the differences in life choices would lead to a more traditional class division in the 
society (G. Evans and S. Whitefield 1995; Evans and Whitefield 2006). 
This chapter sought to analyze the presence and institutionalization of social cleavages in 
the case of Ukraine in order to test the applicability of the developmental hypotheses to the 
divided societies undergoing democratic and economic transitions. The results presented in this 
chapter suggest that while social group identification seems to be important for predicting the 
vote for a certain party at a certain point of time, there is very little evidence to suggest 
developmental trends of institutionalization. Regional divisions seem to be the only cleavages on 
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their way to institutionalization, while ethno-linguistic set of ethno-cultural cleavages are less 
potent contrary to the expectation of the developmental hypothesis. While socio-economic 
differences between “losers” and “winner” of the transition are evident, there is little evidence to 
suggest overtime institutionalization. Furthermore, the results suggest that there are important 
differences between electoral contexts and ethno-cultural divisions are more likely to be more 
prominent during the volatile presidential elections. Yet, the low values of the R² for all the 
models might be a signal of the low predictive value of social cleavages on voting preferences of 
Ukrainians.  
I argue that this is evidence that social group based politics is only part of the developing 
electorate of the new democracy. While the groups can and do provide useful heuristics, they tell 
only a very small part of the story. The populations of the new democracy, specifically Ukraine, 
learn though the process of democracy and utilize more complex methods in electoral decision-
making. Thus, social group identification is only a small part of this process. The following 
chapters are devoted to the development of this argument. 
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3.0  LEADERS, ISSUES AND VOTERS: CAMPAING SPECIFIC EFFECTS  
While social group attachments prove to be influential in determining vote choice and thus 
provide a good start for electoral competition, they tell only a party of the story. The proponents 
of the psychological models of vote choice have long argued that electoral politics is not 
confined to the rivalry between social groups. Rather the elections “revolve around the issues 
and candidates of the campaign” (Dalton 2000).  In his challenge to the conclusions reached by 
the authors of The American Voter (1964), V. O. Key retorts with a proposition that “voters are 
not fools” and are concerned with issues of public policy, personality of candidates, and 
government performances (Key and Cummings 1966). 
 This chapter analyses the influence of evaluation of issue stances and individual political 
leaders on vote choice in the new democracy of Ukraine. I argue that both of these components 
prove quite important in vote casting.  As the previous chapter has shown although there are 
important ethno-cultural and class cleavages in Ukrainian society, they tell only part of the story 
about voters’ electoral choices. The citizens’ evaluation of individual politicians and issues 
influence their vote choice on par with or even more than social group attachments. The presence 
of these evaluations suggests that voters’ abilities stretch beyond the boundaries proposed by the 
sociological development models of voting behavior in new democracies.  
 The argument is developed in the following way. First, I evaluate the position and 
specificities of evaluation of issues stances and individual political leaders in the broader 
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literature on political behavior and outline the important arguments as related to Ukrainian 
politics. The methodological approach used in the analysis is spelled out next. Each of the 
available elections since 1994 is examined in detail with special attention paid to voters’ 
evaluations of issues and leaders. A brief conclusion summarizes the key findings and their 
implications for the research question at hand.  
3.1 ELECTION SPECIFIC PREDICTORS OF VOTE 
The field of study of electoral behavior in established democracies has long been convinced that 
long term factors, such as partisan attachments, play a pivotal role in determining vote choice. 
The stability of partisanship was foretold by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) as tied to social linkages 
between parties and social groups.  Once the initial alignment has taken place, the relationship 
between parties and social groups will become “frozen” over time, until the next set of 
cataclysmic events produce new notable cleavages or else the conflicts underlining the old 
cleavages are reconciled with time and a process of realignment ensues producing new partisan 
linkages. 
 However, as the electoral cycles have shown, there is very little reason to believe in the 
static nature of electoral linkages. On the contrary the electoral process proves to be much more 
dynamic in nature, suggesting that other election specific factors might be at play. These more 
immediate factors include the evaluation of election specific issues as well as individual political 
leaders. While partisan and social attachment might paint a broad picture of the society, the 
evaluation of issues and candidates provide a more specific sketch.  
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 Dalton groups the evaluation process in to the three broad categories: position, 
performance and attributes (2006). The evaluation of the policy positions speaks to voter’s 
capacity to identify the salient issues, formulate a position regarding these issues, and evaluate 
her own position vis-à-vis the position of the competing elites. Such issues as social spending or 
foreign policy provide good examples of the evaluation of policy positions of political leaders. 
The voter is assumed to be capable of analyzing his/her own position on whether the state should 
provide generous support for the unemployed or support the next military involvement abroad 
and chose those parties that closely resemble his/her own views.  
The rise in issue voting in the case of developed democracies has often been correlated 
with the decline in partisan attachments and has sometimes been lamented as an evidence of 
partisanship decline, as more and more voters seem to be “going it alone”, rather than relying on 
ideological or party cues in voting. The rise in issue voting has been explained by some as a 
consequence of the rise of post-materialism in the post-industrial settings. As the populations 
moved along the path of industrialization to post-industrial societies the near universal education 
and heightened levels in quality of life have contributed highly to resolution of some of the “old” 
social conflicts and introduced new sets of values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Thus, 
environmental issues and other issues regarding the quality of human life have entered the 
political realm in addition to the traditional issues of economic prosperity, social equality, and 
foreign policy.  
 The ability of voters to identify and evaluate the salient issues, presumably, requires quite 
a bit of cognitive capacity. This paradigm presumes a high level of political knowledge and 
interest. However, as it is well accepted now by most political scientists, to our great normative 
disappointment perhaps, that most citizens do not give politics as must attention as we might 
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desire. The debate over the un-informed citizen has impacted the discussion of issue voting as 
well. In their seminal work The American Voter the authors argue that American citizens 
questioned over a period of time about their positions on issues showed a general lack of political 
knowledge and exhibited low levels of attitude stability overtime (Campbell et al. 1964).  This 
led them to believe that individual voters are rather unsophisticated because they are unable to 
engage in the cognitive activity of issue identification and evaluation.  
 The critics of this glum picture of voters have since argued, however, that it’s foolish to 
believe that all voters will be interested and knowledgeable about all aspects and nuances of all 
the issues involved in a particular electoral cycle. Rather the voters, acting quite rationally, 
identify those issues that they find most important and acquire that information that is most 
relevant to these chosen issues (Converse 1964). These “issue publics” are not confined to one 
specific issue, however. Empirical evidence suggests that the majority of voters identify two to 
three issues that they follow closely and use as basis for electoral judgment (Clarke 2004; 
Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Krosnick 1990; Petty and Krosnick 1995). Thus, not all 
issues are as important as others and they change from election to election.6
 The evaluation of the performance speaks to a voter’s ability to assess the success of the 
political party and/or individual leader. The evaluation of success might respond to the 
effectiveness of the leadership in pursuing the set agenda or relative satisfaction of the voter with 
the said performance. The economic performance of government de jure is tightly tied into the 
evaluation of incumbents. Relying on such retrospective evaluation the voters can punish or 
reward the candidates/parties based on the overall economic situation (
  
Benton 2005; Fiorina 
                                                 
6 The literature dealing with issue voting delves deeply in to the effect of media and campaign strategies on the 
framing of the issues and priming of voters. However, this is not the main focus of the research undertaken here and 
therefore is not mentioned in the detail.  
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1981). The Democratic Party’s loss of the US congressional majority in the mid-term election in 
the fall of 2010 could be seen as an example of the public punishing the Democrats and by 
extension President Obama for their perceived poor handling of economic crisis in the country.  
However, performance evaluation need not always be retrospective. Some scholars have 
forcefully argued that voters engage in the retrospective voting only when the incumbency is 
present. In the case of its absence voter employ prospective, or anticipatory judgments about 
future elite performances (Lewis-Beck 1986; Niemi and Weisberg 2001).  
 Closely related to the two above categories is the judgment based on evaluation of 
individual candidates’ attributes. Here the voters might focus on such aspects as perceived 
trustworthiness of the competing elites to deliver on their promises. The perception of candidates 
and parties as trustworthy are particularly interesting and important and might be shaped by a 
number of factors. The voters might look for more specific characteristics that they find valuable 
in a good politician or a leader, such as his/her positive personality traits (whatever they might 
be) and a capacity to lead. Some scholars have focused on the specifics of candidate 
personalities, behaviors, appearances, even facial expression during debates as means to 
determine what is more important in a voter’s evaluation of the candidates (Milton  Lodge, 
Kathleen M. McGraw, and Patrick  Stroh 1989; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1995; Marcus 1988). 
 
 The evaluations of attributes are sometimes perceived as the least sophisticated of the 
three judgment criteria, presumably because it does not take much cognitive capacity to form a 
liking or a disliking toward a candidate (Dalton 2006). This emotional response can be triggered 
by such trivialities as a bad haircut, an unfortunate choice of tie, or an air of inapproachable 
elitism. However, as Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk (1986) argue, the use of the evaluation 
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of attributes is quite rational and mostly used by a more sophisticated bunch of the voters who 
try to distinguish the proper leader based on all possible parameters available to them.  
 Evaluation of individual leaders and candidates as a predictor of vote choice has for the 
most part been a prerogative of the research of the presidential elections. The relative simplicity 
of the presidential elections lends itself to the evaluation of candidates more readily than the 
messy parliamentary elections. However, recent research has shown that even in the 
parliamentary election the evaluation of leaders, more specifically of the future and an incumbent 
prime ministers has been on the rise (Aarts, Blais, and Schmitt 2005; Kraus and Nyblade 2005). 
The 2005 parliamentary elections to the German Budestag proved quite trying to the image of 
the future Chancellor Angela Merkel and the British public has carefully scrutinized the new 
leaders of Liberal Democratic and Tori parties in Britain during the 2010 election.   
In this chapter I adopt this classification of issue position and evaluation of individual 
leaders. Whenever possible, I seek to focus on the key dimensions of position, performance and 
attribute factors as manifested in the case of Ukrainian political landscape. The questions 
included in IFES survey questionnaires allow me to analyze some of the important economic, 
political, social, and foreign policy issues in the majority of Ukraine’s presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Moreover, the questions sought to tap into citizens’ evaluation of the 
individual political leaders’ performances, trustworthiness and reliability. In the following 
paragraphs I will show that electoral decisions of Ukrainians extend beyond the social group 
attachments and personal socio-economic position. The voters use a broader range of tools in 
their decision making, which include election specific variables such as salient issues and 
evaluation of political leadership. 
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3.2 ISSUES AND PERSONALITIES IN UKRAINIAN POLITICS 
Since the collapse of the USSR and Ukrainian independence of 1991, the society has faced a 
slew of problems created by the collapse of the command economy and Ukraine’s transition 
toward democratic governance. Linz and Stepan suggested that the post-communist states of 
Eastern Europe faced a double transition both in economics and politics (1996). The government 
of the day faced difficult issues regarding the necessity and speed of impending reforms. 
However, in addition to the economic, social and political reforms associated with the post-
communist transition, Ukraine had an uneasy task of state and nation building. These tasks of 
transition and state and nation building, which have often competed with one another, have 
shaped the political landscape of Ukraine for the last twenty years.  
 The ethno-federal structure of the USSR perpetuated and enabled the dissolution of the 
Union along the ethno-national lines. Thanks to Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin’s Nationalities 
Policy of the early years of the USSR the titular republic were created along the ethno-national 
divisions of the former empire. Thus, the collapse of the USSR produced 15 new states along the 
lines of the titular republics. For Ukraine the project of nation-state building became the most 
important project in the wake of liberalization of the Soviet regime under Gorbachev. Although 
the existence of the Ukrainian nation has a long documented history the national independence 
and statehood alluded it for centuries; from the first attempts to build an independent state by the 
ran-away peasants turned fighters, the Cossacks, in the steps of Dnipro river to an unsuccessful 
attempt to build a state in the first two decade of the 20th century (Lieven 1999; Prizel 1998). The 
modern Ukrainian state has come into existence under the direct tutelage and supervision of the 
Soviet federal state. Moreover, some historians argue that Ukrainians received a very different 
(read “preferential”) treatment from the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
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due perhaps to the long history of interdependence between the Slavic nations. Ukrainians served 
at the top echelons of the CPSU leadership on par with Russians, a privilege denied to most 
ethnic groups. To say that the relationship between the Ukrainian state and the federal structure 
of the USSR was complicated is an understatement.  
 As the USSR showed signs of instability in the mid 1980’s, the Ukrainian nationalist 
civil society sought to push for independence following the lead from the independence  
movements under way in the Baltics and Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic itself (Kuzio 
and Wilson 1994; Wilson 1996).  The break from the federal structure of the USSR, thus, was 
primarily motivated by the movement for national self-determination rather than democratic 
transition and economic reform per se (Åslund 2009). The economic and social ills of the 
Communist era were attributed more to the imperial relations with the center than to the 
communist ideology. The republican Communist party retained tight control over the Ukrainian 
state. Moreover, as Andres Aslund insightfully notes, Ukraine’s leadership “were renowned as 
the most orthodox Marxist-Leninist in the Soviet Union” when it came to the economic matters 
(2009). As a result the collapse of the communist regime in Ukraine was quite awkward and 
uncertain. The existing communist leadership was able to retain its privileged position shed their 
Communist appearance and maneuver quite easily into the new independent liberal elite.  Leonid 
Kravchuk a former Communist Party ideology chief turned himself into liberalizing nationalist, 
seized the opportunity of changing tides and rode them to presidency of the new state (Wilson 
1996). 
 Over the next few years after independence the national project overshadowed all other 
reforms. The rejuvenation of Ukrainian national identity via the restoration of long ignored 
aspects of the national history and language became the priority of the new state. Although 
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Russian speakers were not precluded from public activity, Ukrainian became the official national 
language.  
The neglect of economy, however, led to the devastating results of hyperinflation, 
deficits, and social disparity. By 1994 it was becoming evident that reforms were necessary and 
an independent7
During the early days of independence the nation-building project dictated an “arms-
length” policy toward Russia that has been masterfully executed by Kravchuk, who took on his 
nationalist role with vigor.
 politician Leonid Kuchma successfully challenged Kravchuck in the 1994 
presidential elections. Kuchma’s reform program included combating inflation, the liberalization 
of prices and the privatization of state properties. However, these reforms produced greater 
social inequality and public disillusionment with the market economy.  The Ukrainian economy 
has also suffered blows due to the unwise trade policy and government’s handling of its assets on 
the international market. The prices of Ukraine’s exports remained quite low compared to the 
international market prices resulting in the huge net losses. 
8
                                                 
7 Kuchma ran as a candidate no affiliated with any political party. This was a common occurrence in the post-
communist societies, where the public suspicion of political parties as a concept precluded the formation of political 
party structure behind the candidates.  
 Under Kuchma Ukraine assumed a position of a buffer zone between 
Europe and Russia. The turn toward economic and political reforms at home was coupled with 
the attempt to find a direction of the foreign policy. The unfortunate experiences with the flailing 
economy and unstable political regime made some citizens wary of independence and nostalgic 
for the days of the USSR. On the other hand, the reformers advocated closer alliance with the 
West out the fear of the loss of state sovereignty and reversal of the market economic reforms. In 
foreign policy, Kuchma masterfully navigated between the Europe and Russia, pandering to both 
8 At one of the initial meeting of the heads of states in the forum of Commonwealth for Independent States, 
Kravchuk refused to speak Russian. 
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sides by reaching a deal on as extended stay of the Russian fleet at the Black Sea and the 
negotiations with the European Union and NATO.  These ambivalent foreign policy maneuvers 
and economic concerns brought by Kuchma’s reforms were central Petro Symonenko’s 
challenge of Kuchma during the 1998 presidential election. A leader of the Communist Party, 
Symonenko, clearly stated his intentions to ally Ukraine closer with Russia and address the 
socio-economic inequality within Ukrainian society. 
By the end of the decade the Kuchma regime was regarded as kleptomaniac because of 
its ties with business elite of oligarchs, a few wealthy Ukrainians who were able to make 
fortunes either through privatization schemes or in the energy trade by facilitating the gas 
transport from Russia to the rest of Europe (Kuzio 1997, 2005).  The most controversial of the 
privatization schemes was perhaps the privatization of Ukriane’s largest steel factory 
Krivorizhstal in 2004.  
The level of corruption during the Kuchma regime increased dramatically in both 
business practices and politics culminating in the so-called Kuchmagate of 2000, when the 
president was accused of ordering the assassination of the prominent journalist Georgy 
Gongadze. Although not officially charged until 2011, Kuchma was implicated in the scandal by 
the tape recordings of the discussions regarding the planning of Gongadze’s murder which were 
leaked to public by a former presidential security agent. While Kuchma denied the allegations 
his popularity declined precipitously. The 2002 parliamentary election was filled with anti-
Kuchma sentiments.  
  The 2004 presidential election featured a faceoff between a myriad of candidates, from 
independents to the communists, however, there were three interesting leaders emerging on 
Ukrainian political arena. One of them was Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of the electoral bloc 
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Our Ukraine which formed in opposition to Kuchma in 2002. As the former Prime Minister 
under Kuchma between 2000 and 2002 Yushchenko led a fierce battle against corruption and 
introduced a host of economic reforms that propelled Ukraine toward the consolidation of a 
market economy in 2005. His opponent in the election was Viktor Yanukovich a leader of yet 
another new entity Party of Regions. While the early years of Yanukovich’s life remain a matter 
of mystery, there have been reputable reports of gang activities and jail sentences in his youth. 
His rise to power occurred in 1990’s when, through connections, he secured a governor’s post of 
Donetsk where he remained until 2002 and formed a close friendship with Ukraine’s richest man 
Renat Akhmentov (Åslund 2009).  While Kuchma was not entirely ready to leave the post, he 
gave lukewarm support to Yanukovich, no doubt under pressure from the powerful patrons. The 
third notable figure was the controversial and charismatic Yulija Timoshenko, who headed the 
electoral Bloc of Yulii Timoshenko (BYuT).   
 Yushchenko and Yanukovich faced off in the second round of the election. The official 
results bestowed the victory on Yanukovich, however, the elections were deemed fraudulent by 
international observers and many Ukrainian citizens, who took to the streets demanding a fair 
election. Yuliya Timoshenko, who sided with Yushchenko during the Orange Revolution, 
passionately campaigned for an extra round of elections. Her fairy speeches glorified the 
protesters who set up camps in main squares of major cities all over Ukraine and condemned 
Yanukovich and Kuchma for manipulating electoral procedures. The extra round of election took 
place in December of 2004, the “Orange coalition” became victorious and Yushchenko became 
Ukraine’s 3rd president. 
Unfortunately, the “Orange coalition” comprised of BYuT and Our Ukraine, was not 
successful during Yushchenko’s presidency. Timoshenko and Yushchenko found each other 
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bickering over the priorities and their implementation. A cerebral and liberal Yushchenko did not 
fare well in collaborations with passionate and populist Timoshenko. The end of the Orange 
revolution and the euphoria it inspired came in 2010, when Yunokovich successfully ran for the 
post of the president defeating Timoshenko. 
 In the following pages I evaluate each presidential and parliamentary election since 1994 
through 2008 in order to sketch out the role of issues and trust in political leaders in the voting 
preferences of Ukrainian voters. I focus on the policy positions, which encompass the domestic 
economic, political and social issues as well as issues of foreign policy, the performance issues 
revolving around the voters’ approval of incumbents, and perceived leaders’ trustworthiness. 
During the 1990’s the pressing issues of the day included the transition to the market, the level of 
social equality, and Ukraine’s foreign policy. However, with consolidated market transition of 
early 2000’s the issue focus shifted to domestic political and social problems, while Ukraine’s 
foreign policy remained an important subject. I expect to see this pattern to be reflected in the 
results below. While I expect that ethno-cultural and socioeconomic divisions continue to play an 
important role in voting behavior, they constitute a part of the voter’s decision making process 
and inclusion of issues and leaders’ evaluation enriches the overall picture of voting behavior in 
Ukraine.  
3.3 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The goal of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of election specific factors on vote choice. 
Thus, the analysis is centered on the elections. Since independence Ukraine has held 4 
presidential (1994, 1999, 2004, and 2010) and 5 parliamentary (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007) 
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elections. The IFES survey data allows me to evaluate 6 out of these 9 elections. The data on the 
earliest parliamentary election is not available. While there is an IFES survey for the 2002 
electoral cycle, unfortunately, the question asked in the survey did not address voters’ electoral 
choice. The question in this survey asked the respondents to name those parties that represented 
them best. Obviously, this type of question is very different from naming of the party/candidate 
that person voted for or will vote for if elections were held at the time of the interview. Given 
this inconsistency I do not include the 2002 election in this sample.  
A logistic regression is used in this analysis. This model allows me to calculate odds 
ratios of vote for a specific party/leader at a given election as a result of social divisions, 
positions on salient issues and evaluation of leaders. The electoral choice is a dichotomous 
variable (1 = vote cast; 0= no vote cast) which lends itself nicely to such analysis. The model 
used here is 
Logit (Y=1)=β0 + β1X1+ β2X2+ β3X3 + β4X4 
 
where log likelihood of  Y =1 is a function of ethno-linguistic cleavages (X 1), socio-
economic cleavages (X2), issue position (X3), and evaluation of individual politician (X4) 
 
The predicted probabilities of vote is calculated as follows 
 
  
 
In the case of each election and each candidate/party I employ three models. The first 
model depicts the log odds rations for the ethno-cultural social cleavages of ethnicity, language, 
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and region. Model 1 also includes the income level and education level as socio-economic class 
identifiers.  Model 2 includes all of the above plus the salient issues. Model 3 improves on 
Model 2 by including the evaluation of political leaders as predictor of vote. This is done in order 
to see that changes in the predictive value of attachments to the social groups with and without 
the issue and candidate consideration. Age and gender are used as control variables in all models.  
The position issues are divided into the domestic issues and foreign policy issues, with 
domestic issues revolving around economic reform, social equality and domestic politics and 
society. For each election I’ve identified salient issues in at least two of these categories as 
allowable by the IFES survey data. I shall evaluate the impact of issue stances in accordance 
with these categories.  
The performance and attribute issues are measures by evaluation of the incumbent’s job 
and the perceived trustworthiness of the political leaders. IFES survey has queried the respondent 
about the levels of trust and confidence s/he has in a particular politician each year of the survey. 
The exact wording of the questions for each survey year is provided below.  
 
1994 “If you can, name the political figure in whom you have the most trust” 
1998 “In general, would you say that Leonid Kuchma has done his job as President well 
enough to deserve re-election, or would you support someone else for President” 
1999 “I am now going to ask you about several government bodies and individuals.  For 
each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them.” 
2004 (2005-2006) “And in your opinion, how effective are these institutions and leaders 
in carrying out the duties that are their responsibility?” 
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2007 “Please tell me how much confidence do you have in c. president Viktor 
Yushchenko d. prime minister Viktor Yanukovich e. Yuliya Tymoshenko” 
2008 “Please tell me how much confidence do you have in c. president Viktor 
Yushchenko d. prime minister Yuliya Tymoshenko e. former prime minister Viktor 
Yanukovich” 
 
These questions tap into the individual’s evaluation of leaders’ performance. In each 
election year the political leaders were evaluated retrospectively based on their past 
performances while in office and their accomplishments. Thus, these questions go beyond an 
assessment of the basic attributes of the individual politicians, but rather ask voters to engage in 
cognitive evaluation of the politicians’ work, which is more cognitively sophisticated that a mere 
“gut reaction”. 
 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 depict the correlation between the variable addressing leader 
evaluation and vote choice for presidential and parliamentary elections respectively. 
 
Table 3-1 Correlation between Trust in Leader and Reported Vote (Presidential Elections) 
Trust Vote 
 1994 Kuchma  Kravchuk  
Kuchma 0.2718 -0.0913 
Kravchuk -0.1194 0.2195 
   1999 Kuchma Simonenko 
Kuchma 0.6699 -0.6133 
Simonenko -0.6956 0.7758 
   2004 Yushchenko Yanukovich 
Yushchenko 0.4059 -0.373 
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Table 3-2 Correlation between Trust in Leader and Reported Vote (Parliamentary Elections) 
 
Vote 
  Trust 
   
2006 Our Ukraine BYuT 
Party of 
Regions 
Yushchenko 0.2892 0.0978 -0.2424 
Timoshenko 0.2355 0.3024 -0.3485 
Yanukovich -0.2965 -0.2023 0.4846 
    
2007 Our Ukraine BYuT 
Party of 
Regions 
Yushchenko -0.1631 -0.1012 0.1827 
Timoshenko 0.0585 -0.624 0.3401 
Yanukovich 0.097 0.2641 -0.4974 
 
The correlations are provided here in order to address a legitimate concern as to what 
extent do the measure of the leadership evaluation tap into the intended vote of the respondent. 
While this is an ever-present danger of social science research, the low correlations between the 
variables give some confidence regarding their independence. As the tables show the correlations 
between all of the trust variables and all of the vote variables, save the 1999 election, are 
insignificant and quite low.  
 The results of the analysis are presented in the following way. Each election is analyzed 
individually in chronological order. The results of the logistic regression models are converted in 
to odds ratios and presented in the table form, where Model 1 includes just the effects of social 
cleavages, Model 2 includes the effects of cleavages and issue positioning, and Model 3 includes 
the effects of cleavages, issues, and evaluation of individual political leaders. The independent 
variables are measured on the different scales; therefore, a meaningful cross-group comparison is 
impossible with odds ratios. In order to show a relative predictive power of each set of vote 
determinants the coefficients are standardized around the standard deviation of predictors. The 
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results of the statistically significant coefficients of Model 3, thus transformed, are then depicted 
in the form of the bar graphs.  
3.4 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
3.4.1 1994 
After becoming the first president of an independent post-Soviet Ukraine in the election of 1991, 
Kravchuk faced a host of problems in domestic and foreign policy. A former party apparatchik 
and ideology chief Kravchuk was ill positioned to be the post-communist reformer. Instead he 
focused on the immediate needs of nation and state building. He focused on the revitalization of 
Ukrainian language and culture; in the foreign relations he focused on distancing Ukraine from 
Russia and establishing friendly relations with the West, which he achieved primarily due to his 
decision to de-nuclearize Ukraine. The political frictions between the president and his prime 
ministers led Kravchuk to resign. The second round of the emergency presidential election of 
1994 featured Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma.  
In the election of 1994 the neglected economy became an important issue alongside the 
unresolved national and foreign policy issues. Kuchma, who had served as Prime minister for a 
very short time under Kravchuk, emerged as a person strongly in support of the economic 
reform. However, as some have pointed out he too lacked the necessary knowledge to implement 
a meaningful and lasting reform (Åslund 2009).  
The IFES data allow me to identify the questions dealing with most of these position 
issues as well as assess voter’s perception of trustworthiness of the candidates. The questioners 
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asked the respondents to weigh in on their opinion on the pace of economic reform, the merit of 
command economy, state welfare program, the relationship with Russia, and the necessity of 
making Ukrainian the official and mandatory language.  
Table 3-31994 Presidential Election: Logistic Regression Analysis (Odds Ratios) 
 
Kravchuk Kuchma 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Age 1.07 1.42*** 1.47*** 1.14*** 1.05 1.02 
 0.05 0.18 0.19 0.05 0.14 0.14 
Gender (Male) 1.04 0.51* 0.54* 1.08 1.61 1.56 
 0.15 0.19 0.2 0.14 0.62 0.6 
Education 
Level 0.98 1.35 1.39 1.13 1.31 1.25 
 0.09 0.3 0.31 0.09 0.3 0.29 
SES 1.14 0.71 0.74 1.11 1.02 1.07 
 0.15 0.24 0.25 0.13 0.37 0.39 
Ethnic 
Ukrainian 3.40*** 2.65 2.46 0.63*** 0.84 0.83 
 0.74 2.54 2.35 0.1 0.83 0.81 
East 0.58** 0.66 0.66 1.31 0.86 0.82 
 0.12 0.43 0.44 0.23 0.53 0.52 
South 1.36 4.00* 4.78** 0.94 0.59 0.56 
 0.36 2.88 3.49 0.21 0.43 0.42 
West 3.09*** 3.80*** 4.22*** 0.43*** 0.30*** 0.31* * 
 0.61 1.73 1.99 0.08 0.14 0.14 Guaranteed 
Employment 
 
1.17 1.22 
 
1.6 1.64* 
  
0.28 0.3 
 
0.47 0.48 
Guaranteed 
Healthcare 
 
0.79 0.77 
 
0.75 0.79 
  
0.2 0.2 
 
0.21 0.23 
Pace of 
economic 
reform 
 
1.03 1 
 
1.1 1.16 
  
0.2 0.2 
 
0.24 0.26 
State Run 
Economy 
 
0.82 0.84 
 
1.87 1.85 
 
 
0.34 0.36 
 
0.82 0.82 
Close Ties to 
Russia 
 
0.17** 0.17** 
 
2.12 1.98 
 
 
0.14 0.15 
 
1.49 1.39 
Mandatory 
Ukrainian 
Language 
 
1.22 1.14 
 
1.24 1.23 
  
0.5 0.47 
 
0.52 0.52 
Trust 
Kravchuk 
  
9.31* 
  
0.41 
 
  
10.78 
  
0.45 
Trust Kuchma 
  
1.33 
  
1.77 
   
0.64 
  
0.83 
Pseudo R2  0.12 0.17 0.19 0.05 0.10 0.11 
N 1100 181 181 1100 181 181 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3 depicts the results of the logistic regression models for both candidates. It is 
important to note the changes in pseudo R squared between the three models for each of the 
presidential hopefuls. The addition of issue stances to the social cleavages increases the 
explanatory power of the model and the value of the pseudo R squared from 0.12 to 0.17 and 
from 0.05 to 0.10 for Kravchuk and Kuchma respectively. The pseudo R squared is further 
increased by the addition of voters’ evaluation of the leaders. This suggests that the main 
expectation of this chapter is supported by these findings so far. During the presidential election 
of 1994 the Ukrainian citizens used all the tools available to them in making their electoral 
choice. I now turn to the evaluation of the statistically significant predictors of vote choice. 
Moreover, the inclusion of voters’ evaluation of issues and leaders causes a decline in statistical 
significance of the odds ratios of most ethno-cultural variables. Residing in the western regions 
of Ukraine remains a strong predictor influencing the likelihood of electing Kravchuk and 
reducing such likelihood for Kuchma.  
Figure 16 Presidential Election 1994 (statistically significant coefficients) 
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Figure 3.1 depict the standardized statistically significant coefficients of Model 3 for both 
Kuchma and Kravchuk.  Notwithstanding the influence of regional cleavage, the evaluation of 
the leaders and issue states prove to be very influential. More specifically, the issues of domestic 
socio-economic policy and foreign policy influence voters’ decision. Those persons who believe 
that employment should be guaranteed by the state are significantly more likely to support 
Kuchma. Voters who supported economic competition were more likely to vote for Kuchma in 
1994. Those individuals who believe that Ukraine should pursue closer ties with Russia are more 
likely to disapprove of Kravchuk, who pursued a more independent course for the new Ukrainian 
nation. Thus, in the 1994 presidential election Ukrainian voters took into consideration the socio-
economic and foreign policy when casting vote for the two candidates. The retrospective view of 
Kravchuk proves to be more important than the rest of the factors.  The voters who approve of 
Kravchuk were very willing to reward him for his policies with another term in office as did 
those who supported his decisions to move away from the Russian sphere of influence. 
 The standardized odds ratios predicting the likelihood of vote for the both candidates 
based on issue and candidate evaluation are either very close to or greater than the social group 
identifiers. This suggests that the voters in 1994 were quite capable of evaluating candidates and 
the issues stances accordingly. These finds provide support for my earlier expectation that 
election specific factors are taken into account by voters. 
3.4.2 1999 
Kuchma’s reform programs that focused primarily on curbing the inflation, price stabilization, 
and extending privatization, unfortunately, did not succeed.  The experience with market reform 
made many citizens weary as the new measures bred more social inequality. More specifically, 
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the voters questioned the value of rapid reforms or the so-called “shock therapy,” which was a 
popular approach among politicians to the economic restructuring in the early 1990’s.  While 
successful in Poland, the Russian attempt to implement fast economic reforms proved disastrous.  
Russia slid into a terrible economic crisis in 1998 and many observers blamed it on the attempted 
“shock therapy.” After the 1994 election the Communist Party had supported president Kuchma. 
However, Kuchma’s failed economic policies led the Communists to withdraw their support in 
1999.   
Petro Simonenko and the Communist party campaigned on the strong anti-market 
platform. Their campaign resonated with the pensioners and other groups dependent on the state 
subsidies.  The Communist Party of Ukraine, one of the very few communist parties in the 
former-Soviet bloc that survived the transition and collapse of the USSR without being 
disbanded, served as a relic of the past and provided hope to the skeptical and disillusioned 
population who refused to accept the collapse of the USSR as an irreversible fact. Moreover, the 
Communists voiced opposition to foreign influences in the country and supported closer ties with 
Russia and Belarus that would resemble the previous Union.   
Meanwhile Kuchma has adopted a much more pragmatic approach to the foreign 
relations of his country. During his first term in office he managed to steer between the West and 
Russia without making concrete commitments to either. Kuchma managed to come to a 
settlement with Russia over the Black Sea Fleet. However, that settlement did not bring Ukraine 
or Crimea any closer into the sphere of Russia’s influence. Kuchma had also made headway in 
dealing with the West, through negotiations and cooperation with the European Union and 
NATO.   
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The IFES surveyors tapped into the salient issues of Ukraine’s 1999 election by asking 
the respondent’s position on the merits of the command economy, the value of private property 
as citizens’ right, the need for rapid economic reforms, and the necessity of foreign investment 
for the country’s development. Their judgment about the performance and attribute judgments of 
candidates are measured by the degree of perceived trustworthiness. 
Table 3.5 depicts the results of the logistic models for the support of Kuchma and 
Simonenko in the second round of the 1999 presidential elections. Here too one can see an 
increase in predictive power of the models as reflected in increased pseudo R squared with 
inclusion of election specific factors. While social cleavages remain important predictors, the 
inclusion of new variables in models 2 and 3 reduce that statistical significance of these 
coefficients, suggesting that social group identifiers move further down the causal chain in 
explaining voters’ choices.  As the results of the Model 2 show vividly, the issues of market 
transition, both its overall merit and pace of the reform as well as the issue of foreign investment 
are quite salient along side of social cleavages for both Kuchma and Simonenko. 
 The candidate evaluations prove to be very strong predictors of vote choice in 1999 as 
well as in 1994. As Figure 3.2 shows, the evaluation of the political leaders’ shows significant 
influence over the support as well as disapproval of the candidates. Attitudes toward the 
command economy, private property and the need for foreign investment also prove important 
for voters. The standardized odds ratios of these predictors appear as influential and regional and 
ethnic divisions.  
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Table 3-4 1999 Presidential Election: Logistic Regression Analysis (Odds Ratios) 
 
Kuchma Simonenko 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Age 0.86** 0.94 0.98 1.22*** 1.11* 1.12 
 0.04 0.05 0.1 0.06 0.06 0.12 
Male 0.89 0.68** 0.51** 1.13 1.50** 2.00* * 
 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.25 0.6 
Education Level 1.12 0.89 0.86 0.80** 1.03 1.05 
 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.1 0.19 
Income level 1.32*** 1.23** 1.28 0.76*** 0.80** 0.79 
 0.11 0.12 0.22 0.07 0.08 0.14 
Russian 
Language 0.70** 0.73 0.87 1.62** 1.35 1.99 
 0.12 0.16 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.86 
Ukrainian 
Ethnic 0.98 0.84 0.63 0.92 1.09 1.87* 
 0.15 0.15 0.2 0.15 0.21 0.65 
East  0.59*** 0.55*** 0.91 2.20*** 2.75*** 2.36* * 
 0.11 0.12 0.35 0.43 0.66 1.01 
South 0.62** 0.61** 1.02 1.96*** 2.18*** 1.39 
 0.12 0.14 0.4 0.41 0.55 0.61 
West 2.11*** 2.12*** 3.44** 0.49*** 0.49** 0.44 
 0.46 0.58 1.65 0.13 0.16 0.25 
State Economy 
 
0.53** 0.75 
 
1.93*** 1.52* 
 
 
0.06 0.15 
 
0.23 0.33 
Pace of Reform 
 
1.32** 1.32 
 
0.72** 0.81 
 
 
0.17 0.32 
 
0.09 0.2 
Foreign 
Investment not 
necessary 
 
1.28*** 1.22* 
 
0.80*** 0.87 
 
 
0.08 0.13 
 
0.05 0.1 
Private 
Property 
 
0.98 1.24 
 
1.03 0.70** 
  
0.09 0.2 
 
0.1 0.12 
Trust Kuchma 
  
35.00*** 
  
0.04*** 
   
10.99 
  
0.01 
Trust 
Simonenko 
  
0.03*** 
  
57.43*** 
   
0.01 
  
19.5 
Pseudo R 2 0.08 0.17 0.64 0.11 0.20 0.67 
N 1170 958 806 1170 958 806 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 17 1999 Presidential Elections (statistically significant coefficients) 
 
The lack of commitment toward Russia and friendly relations with the West had their 
consequences for Kuchma by the time of the 1999 election. Kuchma lost the support of the 
Russian speaking population of Ukraine.  However, the support he received from the western 
regions was rather lukewarm, as the graph in Figure 3.2 vividly portrays. Voters residing the 
west strongly opposed Simonenko and his Communist party, therefore, they cast their votes for 
Kuchma grudgingly, opting for a lesser of two evils.  
These results indicate that in 1999 the Ukrainian voters engaged in retrospective 
evaluation of both political leaders and their positions on issues when casting a vote. The 
regional cleavage between east and west remained strong. 
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3.4.3 2004 
Kuchma’s second term in office was nothing but disastrous. The policy of asymmetrical 
bargaining with wealthy oligarch brought nothing but additional corruption. The political 
corruption followed.  In March 2001 a number of protesters took to the streets demanding 
Kuchma’s resignation. The protests coincided with the anniversaries of the birth and death of the 
great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, and were meant to send a strong political message of 
disapproval to the president from the cultural civil society. Kuchma’s regime reacted with police 
crack downs and detentions. In an attempt to deprive the population of the public space for 
demonstration the main city street Khryshchatyk and the attached Independence Square were 
closed for renovation. However, the anti-Kuchma sentiments grew ever more as the presidential 
election of 2004 approached. 
  By 2004 Ukrainian economy was well on the way to the full market economy. Many of 
the reforms responsible for this change had been implemented by Viktor Yushchenko during this 
short term as Prime Minister between 2000 and 2002.9
 However, a chorus of Yushchenko’s critics voiced their disapproval of the former Prime 
Minister. They opposed Yushchenko’s avid pro-Western attitude and even more specifically, his 
pro-American position. Yushchenko has had experiences with American business thought his life 
time. Moreover, his wife Kateryna Chumachenko is an American-born Ukrainian from Chicago, 
 After his deposition Yushchenko gained 
further popularity and his electoral bloc Our Ukraine did quite well during the 2002 
parliamentary election and it became a part of the official opposition to the government.  
                                                 
9 Yushchenko was fired from the post after receiving a vote of no-confidence orchestrated by the faction of the 
oligarchs and the Communists, both of whom, interestingly opposed his economic policies favoring the state 
presence in business and preservation of opaque business practices.  
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who enjoyed a successful career in the numerous offices of the US government including the 
White House and the State Department before her marriage to Yushchenko. These connections to 
the US bred a host of conspiracy theories about Yushchenko’s true allegiances and his vision for 
Ukraine.  
 Opposite Yushchenko in the second round of 2004 election ran a former governor of 
Donetsk, Vikrot Yanukovich. Supported by powerful oligarchs like Renat Akhmetov, 
Yanukovich and his Party of Regions ran on a populist centrist platform. Preservation of closer 
economic and political ties with the Russian Federation, where president Putin enjoyed the peak 
of his popularity, were one of the main features of Yanukovich’s campaign. However, the rest of 
the campaign lacked structure and clear messages, according to the observers (Åslund 2009; 
Aslund and McFaul 2006). 
 The allegations of fraud after the November 21 electoral count declaring Yanukovich’s 
victory led to a massive wave of popular protests and demonstrations which became known as 
the Orange Revolution. After a month of protests the second round re-run took place on 
December 26 granting Yushcneko victory and the presidency. 
Unfortunately, IFES date does not allow me to tap into many important aspects of the 
2004 election, primarily because the questioners were more concerned with the events of the 
Orange Revolution, rather than more mundane questions of policy stances and even candidate 
evaluations. However, I’m able to test the significance of the some important issues such as the 
pace of the economic reforms, the necessity for development of business, democracy and reform 
in health care, and the US support for Ukrainian development. These issues tap in to the 
important social and political domestic issues as well as a question of Ukraine’s foreign policy 
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toward the US. I also include citizens’ perceived trustworthiness of the former Prime Minister 
Yushchenko. 
Table 3-5 2004 Presidential Election: Logistic Regression Analysis (Odds Ratios) 
 
Yushchenko 
  
Yanukovich 
  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Age 1.13*** 1.18*** 1.20*** 1.19*** 1.1 1.1 
 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Male 0.89 0.9 0.95 1.02 1.04 0.97 
 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 
Education Level 1.19** 1.17 1.19* 0.99 0.97 1 
 
0.1 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.1 0.11 
Income level 1.19* 1.07 1.05 0.84* 0.88 0.87 
 
0.11 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.1 0.11 
Russian Language 0.8 1.08 1.1 1.46* 1.03 1 
 0.16 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.26 0.27 
Ukrainian Ethnic 2.74*** 2.27*** 2.12*** 0.58*** 0.61** 0.63** 
 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.11 0.14 0.15 
East  0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 18.37*** 16.34*** 17.40*** 
 0.02 0.02 0.02 4.27 4.3 4.85 
South 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 7.91*** 8.39*** 9.10*** 
 
0.03 0.03 0.03 2.05 2.5 2.85 
West 1.47* 1.21 1.09 0.37** 0.46* 0.62 
 
0.31 0.29 0.29 0.15 0.19 0.26 
Necessity of 
Democratic 
Development 
 
1.15 1.12 
 
0.9 0.9 
 
 
0.13 0.14 
 
0.12 0.13 
Necessity of 
Business 
Development 
 
1.09 1.07 
 
0.86 0.88 
 
 
0.15 0.15 
 
0.12 0.13 
Pace of Economic 
Reform 
 
0.81* 0.87 
 
1.14 1.06 
 
 
0.09 0.1 
 
0.12 0.12 
Modernization of 
Health Care 
 
1.13 1.06 
 
0.97 0.98 
 
 
0.12 0.12 
 
0.11 0.12 
US Assistance 
 
1.50*** 1.49*** 
 
0.60*** 0.62*** 
 
 
0.17 0.18 
 
0.08 0.08 
Trust Yushchenko 
  
2.66*** 
  
0.42*** 
 
  
0.49 
  
0.09 
Pseudo R 2 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.42 
N 1243.00 980.00 937 1243.00 980.00 937 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.5 depicts the results for the logistic models.  As in the analyses of the two 
previous elections, inclusion of citizens’ evaluation of salient issues and political leaders 
increases the pseudo R squared between the models. Moreover, the inclusion of these election 
specific variables pushes the odds ratios predicting vote choice based on ethno-cultural 
identifiers toward 1 for both candidates. Yes, regional differences remain very strong in this 
highly contested election. The residents of the eastern and southern regions are particularly 
adamant in their support for Yanukovich and dislike for Yushchenko as depicted in Figure 3.3. 
Figure 18 2004 Presidential Election (statistically significant coefficients) 
 
In addition to ethno-regional determinants, education level plays an important role in this 
elections outcome. People with higher levels of education were likelier to support Yushchenko. 
Among issues support for US developmental aid proves important for the voters and packs a 
significant predictive punch as a determinant of the vote choice for both candidates. The 
predictive power of the evaluation of issues of foreign policy and former Prime Minister are 
about the same, higher than ethnic identifiers, yet, lower than regional affiliations. 
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Overall, the evaluation of presidential election, leads me to believe that I’m justified in 
my expectation that inclusion of election specific variables enriches the picture of voting 
behavior of the Ukrainian voters.  
3.5 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS10
It has been widely acknowledged that parliamentary elections present a more challenging 
electoral environment for the voters.  A multitude of less known and less publicized candidates, 
the multiple parties and issues all make it more difficult to collect and process the necessary 
electoral data. In the case of Ukraine, this process is made even more difficult by the fluctuating 
electoral laws and the ever changing party supply (
 
D'Anieri 2006; Zimmer and Haran 2008).  
 Since the first popular free election in 1989, Ukrainian electoral laws changed three 
times.  The 1994 parliamentary election was held by plurality rule of “first past the post” in the 
single member districts. In this case the voters were faced with a choice of a single representative 
among several candidates in their electoral districts. By 1998, however, the rules had changed. 
The 1998 and 2002 parliamentary elections were held by a mixed system. Half of the seats were 
assigned by SMD the other by proportional representation. This made voters’ decision making 
process a bit more complicated, because, now they had to familiarize themselves with the 
candidates and also the political parties running on the second PR ticket.  After the Orange 
Revolution the electoral system and the constitutional arrangements were further altered and the 
                                                 
10 Due to IFES data limitation the 2002 parliamentary election is excluded from the analysis. 
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2006 election as well as an emergency 2007 parliamentary election took place by proportional 
representation only. Given the primacy of the Prime Minister in the post-Revolutionary system, I 
should expect voters to give more stock to the evaluation of the political party leaders or the 
would-be Prime Ministers.  
3.5.1 1998 
Addressing the 1998 parliamentary election, IFES surveys asked the respondents to express their 
opinions regarding the merit of state run economy and the necessity of rapid economic reform. 
The survey has also asked the respondents to evaluate the job of the president Kuchma.  
Table 3.6 depicts the results for the three prominent political parties of the 1998 electoral 
cycle, the Communist Party of Ukraine, the National Rukh, and the Party of Greens. The pseudo 
R squared for these models also increases, albeit less drastically as in presidential elections, with 
the addition of evaluation of issues and Kuchma’s job as the president. However, the predictive 
power of social cleavages remains unaltered by the inclusion of new variables. Language, 
ethnicity, the level of income, and regions remain strong predictors of vote choice, particularly 
for the CPU and Rukh.  
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Table 3-6 1998 Parliamentary Elections and Campaign Effects - Logistic Regression 
 
CPU Rukh Greens 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Age 1.43*** 1.42*** 1.43*** 1.12 1.20* 1.19* 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.75*** 
 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.07 
Male 1 1.16 1.18 1.61** 1.45 1.39 0.86 0.81 0.8 
 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.2 0.2 0.21 
Education 
Level 0.92 0.94 0.97 1.17 1.11 1.09 0.96 0.89 0.83 
 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Russian 
Language 1.35* 1.41* 1.48* 0.55* 0.40*** 0.44** 1.44 1.68 1.56 
 0.24 0.29 0.32 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.46 0.6 0.57 
Ukrainian 
Ethnic 0.85 0.8 0.8 4.24*** 4.67*** 4.41*** 0.86 0.78 0.74 
 
0.13 0.14 0.15 1.79 2.33 2.23 0.22 0.22 0.21 
Income Level 0.82** 0.83** 0.78** 1.31* 1.31 1.34* 1.44** 1.37*   1.40**  
 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.23 
East  1.38 1.35 1.46 0.68 1.1 1.1 1.12 1.2 1.26 
 0.28 0.32 0.37 0.26 0.47 0.49 0.35 0.42 0.45 
South 2.61*** 2.59*** 2.62*** 0.74 1.08 1.15 0.45** 0.53 0.51 
 
0.53 0.63 0.66 0.32 0.55 0.59 0.17 0.22 0.22 
West 0.91 0.84 0.9 2.34*** 2.06* 2.29** 0.95 1.09 0.95 
 
0.2 0.23 0.26 0.7 0.77 0.88 0.36 0.45 0.4 
State 
Economy 
 
1.70*** 1.77*** 
 
0.66** 0.64** 
 
0.67**  0.69**  
 
 
0.21 0.23 
 
0.12 0.12 
 
0.12 0.13 
Pace of 
Reform 
 
0.82* 0.87 
 
1.59* 1.46 
 
0.94 0.92 
 
 
0.09 0.1 
 
0.4 0.38 
 
0.22 0.22 
Approval of 
Kuchma's Job 
  
1.16** 
  
0.95 
  
0.91 
 
  
0.08 
  
0.1 
  
0.08 
Pseudo R 2 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.09 
N 1484 1152 1070 1484 1152 1070 1484 1152 1070 
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Figure 19 1998 Parliamentary Election (statistically significant coefficients) 
 
 
 
However, the stances regarding the command economy prove to be quite important as 
well. For CPU supporters the support of command economy increases the likelihood of vote 
more than the linguistic or regional affinity of the voter. The same trend is seen with regard to 
the Rukh and Green votes. The harsh realities of the economic crisis of the 1998, which followed 
the crash of Asian stock markets, brought into the sharp focus the ongoing debate between the 
proponents and opponents of the transition to the market economy. Moreover, the nostalgia for 
the past economic stability and social security grew higher. Thus, as these results vividly show 
the population engaged eagerly in the consideration of this salient domestic issue during the 
electoral choice in 1998 parliamentary election.  
Interestingly the evaluation of Kuchma’s job as the president yields no statistically 
significant results for any other party but the Communist Party.  Although, in all elections 
Kuchma ran as an independent and unaffiliated with any political party, this result is not very 
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surprising. The Communist Party, for the most part supported Kuchma’s decisions in the Rada 
compared to the rest of the political forces.  
3.5.2 2006 
After the 2004 Orange Revolution the political society was faced with the turbulent struggle of 
power between three political powers – Yushchenko, Timoshenko, and Yanukovich. In 2006 this 
struggle was personified further through the electoral struggle for votes between Our Ukraine, 
Bloc Yulii Timoshenko, and Party of Regions.  
The constitutional reform that was reached as a compromise in the midst of the Orange 
Revolution rearranged the powers of the president and the Prime Minister, giving more power to 
the later. The amendment took force on January 1, 20006 and the post-Revolutionary Ukraine 
was supposed to resemble a parliamentary-presidential system with a more empowered Prime 
Minister. Unfortunately, the hasty reform did not clearly specify the power relations between the 
presidents and the Prime Minister and the power struggle between the President, the Cabinet, and 
the PM ensued.  
 Timoshenko, a crucial ally of Yushchenko’s during the revolution, became his first Prime 
Minister. Unfortunately, the alliance did not survive the test of the political power struggle. The 
strife between the President and the Prime Minister led to Timoshenko’s removal only five short 
months after she assumed premiership. After the deposition Timoshenko took to campaigning for 
the 2006 election plainly stating her ambitions to return as the country’s PM.  
On the other hand, the leader of the Party of Regions did not give up his political 
ambitions. After the defeat in December of 2004, Yanukovich disputed the results of the election 
and stalled the establishment of the new government.  In 2006 he made his intentions to run as 
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opposition to both Yushchenko and Timoshenko widely known. Their fierce and alas fruitless 
struggle that led to the collapse of the government was regarded by citizens as incompetence.  
 The society as a whole struggled with the aftermath of the Orange events. As Aslund 
(2009) writes “[t]he hangover was as heavy as the Orange Revolutions had been gorgeous.” The 
instability within the governing organs, the bickering of the politicians, and the populist reforms 
of Timoshenko all led to disillusionment and worry.   
 IFES surveys attempted to tap into the wide variety of the issues. The voters were asked 
to evaluate their stances on the power distribution between the presidents and the parliament. In 
the wake of the Orange revolution many worried about the lasting national unity within Ukraine, 
IFES surveys also ask for the voters’ opinion on this matter. Among the societal issues the 
respondents were asked to evaluate the necessity of the NGO’s in the country. The widespread 
belief following the Orange Revolution was that such organization were funded with foreign 
moneys and sought to destabilize the society and ruin the country.  The merit of US 
developmental aid was once again a hot topic given Yushchenko’s alleged connection and his 
eagerness to join western organization such as NATO and WTO. Thus, the Model 2 includes 
these social and political domestic issues as well as foreign policy issues. Model 3 also includes 
the confidence levels expressed by the citizens with regard to the president, former PM 
Timoshenko and Viktor Yanukovich, leader of the Party of Regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120 
Table 3-7 Electoral Behavior during the Parliamentary Election of 2006 
 
Our Ukraine BYuT Party of Regions 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Age 1.07 1.14 1.2 1.03 0.89 0.97 1.16*** 1.19 1.22 
 
0.05 0.13 0.16 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.14 0.16 
Male 0.9 0.65 0.85 0.83 0.65 0.94 1.09 1.64 0.97 
 
0.12 0.24 0.35 0.14 0.25 0.41 0.15 0.61 0.41 
Russian 
Language 2.09** 2 2.99 0.69 0.55 0.62 1.09 0.26 0.14*   
 0.68 1.83 3.22 0.23 0.52 0.64 0.52 0.27 0.17 
Ukrainian 
Ethnic 2.79*** 2.06 1.62 1.49 1.23 1.41 0.50*** 0.56 0.62 
 
0.68 1.24 1.13 0.41 0.78 1.03 0.08 0.25 0.31 
Education 
Level 0.92 1.08 1.03 1.14 1.14 1.31 1.1 0.72 0.66 
 0.07 0.24 0.26 0.11 0.28 0.36 0.09 0.17 0.17 
Income level 1.06 1.16 1.16 1.15 0.67* 0.64* 0.9 1.03 1.19 
 0.08 0.25 0.31 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.21 0.27 
East  0.38*** 0.8 0.67 0.20*** 0.18** 0.22** 5.45*** 3.97*** 4.23*** 
 
0.07 0.53 0.5 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.99 1.96 2.36 
South  0.17*** 0.45 0.39 0.42*** 0.31 0.28 4.73*** 2.15 2.49 
 
0.06 0.32 0.33 0.13 0.24 0.26 1.04 1.18 1.49 
West 0.59 1.16 0.41 2.00** 0.76 0.55 0.41* 1.05 3.13 
 
0.19 1.13 0.46 0.69 0.78 0.62 0.2 1.09 3.77 
State Support 
of Pensioners 
 
0.92 0.96 
 
0.86 0.89 
 
1.15 0.95 
 
 
0.37 0.45 
 
0.37 0.41 
 
0.44 0.41 
NGOs are 
necessary 
 
1.26 1.2 
 
0.65 0.59* 
 
0.93 0.85 
 
 
0.32 0.35 
 
0.17 0.18 
 
0.23 0.23 
Ukraine is 
United 
 
1.59*** 1.58** 
 
0.70** 0.73* 
 
0.92 0.96 
 
 
0.25 0.28 
 
0.11 0.13 
 
0.13 0.16 
President to 
be more 
powerful 
than 
Parliament 
 
8.32*** 4.13*** 
 
2.35* 1.39 
 
0.19*** 0.51 
 
 
3.82 2.12 
 
1.1 0.74 
 
0.08 0.24 
US aid for 
Democracy 
 
0.81 0.78 
 
1.79** 1.38 
 
0.82 0.86 
 
 
0.17 0.19 
 
0.44 0.36 
 
0.16 0.18 
US aid for 
Economy 
 
2.48** 2.51** 
 
0.46** 0.58 
 
0.7 0.78 
 
 
0.94 1.03 
 
0.17 0.23 
 
0.25 0.34 
US aid for 
Society 
 
0.57 0.47* 
 
1.83 1.77 
 
1.44 1.36 
 
 
0.22 0.2 
 
0.72 0.76 
 
0.54 0.6 
Trust 
Yushchenko 
  
2.78*** 
  
0.50** 
  
0.78 
 
  
0.75 
  
0.14 
  
0.2 
Trust 
Timoshenko 
  
0.7 
  
9.47*** 
  
0.46 
 
  
0.35 
  
5.82 
  
0.26 
Trust 
Yanukovich 
  
0.15*** 
  
0.48 
  
6.63*** 
 
  
0.08 
  
0.25 
  
3.06 
Pseudo R 2 0.10 0.28 0.40 0.10 0.16 0.25 0.19 0.35 0.44 
N 1259 242 236 1259 242 236 1259 242 236 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 20 Parliamentary Election 2006 (statistically significant coefficients) 
 
 The results of the models are presented in the Table 3.7. Again, the inclusion of 
additional variables increases the pseudo R squared for all political parties. This further increases 
the confidence that the main expectations of this chapter are supported statistically. Moreover, 
the effect of ethno-linguistic divisions moves further down the causal chain when issues and 
candidate evaluation is introduced.    
As Figure 3.5 shows, the evaluation of the party leaders proves to be quite strong 
predictor of the vote choice. Yet, domestic social and political issues on perceived divisions 
within the society and the debate on constitutional powers of the president are quite important for 
Our Ukraine and BYuT voters. BYuT voters also seem to be influenced by their attitudes toward 
the necessity o the NGO’s. The very important and salient issue of the sharing of power between 
President and Parliament seems to be the most important, rivaling other domestic policy issues 
and most importantly rivaling the effect of ethno-cultural and social attachments for the voter of 
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Our Ukraine. For these voters the issues of US foreign aid to Ukraine are also important in 
decision making.  
 Another important finding presented in this table is the variation of issue importance 
between the three parties. While issues are important for BYuT and Our Ukraine voters, the 
voters of Party of Regions seem to have voted entirely base on their attitudes toward the leader 
of the party and their residence in the Eastern regions of Ukraine. The PR system was introduced 
in order to help the institutionalization process. This might be a suggestion of the first attempt of 
institutionalized issue ownership by the political parties. However, more research is need before 
concrete conclusions are reached.  
 
3.5.3 2007 
The new parliament elected in 2006 saw a powerful return of the Party of Regions with plurality 
of votes, Bloc Timoshenko came in second, while Our Ukraine came trailing in last, signifying 
voter’s dissatisfaction  with Yushchenko’s reign. This decline is particularly noticeable among 
the supporters of BYuT, as the previous results vividly shown.  
Unfortunately, the new parliament showed that the political instability of 2005 was far 
from over. The 2006 parliament failed to produce a working coalition between March and 
August of 2006. The president disbanded the legislative body and called for new elections.  
 The IFES survey focusing on the 2007 election features some of the same questions as in 
the election of 2006. Respondents weighed in with their views regarding Ukraine’s unity, the 
necessity of NGO’s, and power distribution between the two branches of government. These 
position questions are also supplemented by  voters’ views regarding Ukraine’s membership in 
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the European Union and NATO as well as their views regarding the future of Russian Black Sea 
Fleet. Yushchenko’s turn to the West produced a back lash from Russia, which was further 
exacerbated in the winter of 2006, when Russian supplies of gas to Ukraine stopped following 
the failure of the two governments to negotiate content of the gas prices. The demand of higher 
price for Russian gas caused a re-evaluation of the relationship between the two countries once 
again and some called for withdrawal of Russian fleet from the Black Sea. Model 2 includes 
these domestic and foreign policy considerations. Model 3 includes the reported confidence of 
the voter’s in three political leaders.  
 The results presented in Table 3.8 show a dramatic increase in pseudo R squared between 
the three models for all three political parties. Yet, it is the incorporation of the evaluation of 
leaders that produces more changes in models. Thus, the confidence levels in party leaders still 
proves to be quite instrumental in predicting vote choice. As Figure 3.6 depicts, the evaluation of 
Timoshenko’s job as Prime Minister is particularly important for the votes cast for all parties.  
Among the issues it is interesting to note a decline in the saliency of the constitutional 
arrangements compared to the 2006 election. Moreover, there is a significant decline in support 
for the Party of Regions among those who support stronger parliament. The important role EU 
support plays in predicting vote for Our Ukraine is also noteworthy. The ethno-linguistic 
divisions’ looses statistical significance with the introduction of issue and leaders evaluations 
proving again the lack of institutionalization of these divisions and voters’ ability to look past the 
social division and engage in more sophisticated modes of electoral judgments. Yet, regional 
cleavage remains strong with Western regions supporting Our Ukraine and disliking Party of 
Regions, which in turn is supported in the East and South. 
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Table 3-8 Campaign Effects during the Parliamentary Election of 2007 
 
Our Ukraine BYuT Party of Regions 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Age 0.95 0.74 0.61** 1.04 1.01 1.01 0.92 0.93 0.9 
 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.08 
Male 1.03 0.63 0.28* 0.79 0.96 1.19 1.06 1.14 1.21 
 0.49 0.39 0.21 0.13 0.21 0.33 0.19 0.25 0.31 
Education 
Level 0.45 0.26 0.14* 0.84 1.34 1.35 0.7 0.75 0.55 
 0.32 0.24 0.16 0.19 0.4 0.52 0.2 0.27 0.23 
Income level 1.11 0.81 0.74 0.88 0.95 0.99 0.87 0.85 0.85 
 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.12 
Russian 
Language 0.59** 0.26*** 0.22*** 1.09 1.13 1.16 0.9 0.9 0.83 
 
0.16 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.1 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.1 
Ukrainian 
Ethnic 
   
2.44*** 1.87* 1.41 0.69* 1.06 1.23 
 
   
0.7 0.67 0.64 0.14 0.28 0.36 
East  
   
0.37*** 0.36** 1.2 6.81*** 6.98*** 6.91*** 
    
0.11 0.15 0.68 2.07 2.75 3.22 
South  3.52* 9.74** 18.86** 0.36*** 0.28*** 0.6 4.12*** 4.48*** 3.77*** 
 
2.66 9.86 23.59 0.1 0.1 0.29 1.15 1.61 1.57 
West 3.14* 2.45 3.41 1.38 1.76** 1.55 0.18*** 0.24*** 0.36*   
 
1.88 1.79 2.78 0.29 0.48 0.55 0.08 0.12 0.2 
NGOs are 
necessary 
 
1.25 1.4 
 
0.97 1.03 
 
0.96 0.95 
  
0.32 0.44 
 
0.09 0.12 
 
0.08 0.09 
Parliament to 
be more 
powerful 
than 
President 
 
0.61 0.85 
 
1.25 1.08 
 
0.88 0.74**  
  
0.24 0.38 
 
0.17 0.21 
 
0.12 0.11 
Ukraine is 
United 
 
0.97 0.95 
 
1.03 0.98 
 
0.89* 0.88*   
  
0.16 0.18 
 
0.06 0.08 
 
0.06 0.07 
Join EU 
 
3.65** 3.20* 
 
1.28 1.11 
 
0.9 1.03 
 
 
2.39 2.11 
 
0.21 0.22 
 
0.14 0.18 
Join NATO 
 
1.41 1.93 
 
1.24 1.16 
 
0.91 0.87 
 
 
0.61 1.02 
 
0.2 0.24 
 
0.19 0.21 
Russian Fleet 
must leave 
 
3.72* 3.11 
 
1.22 1.25 
 
0.79 0.83 
  
2.95 2.44 
 
0.22 0.29 
 
0.13 0.16 
Trust 
Yushchenko 
  
3.11*** 
  
0.83 
  
0.74 
 
  
1.07 
  
0.13 
  
0.14 
Trust 
Timoshenko 
  
0.42** 
  
4.61*** 
  
0.71**  
 
  
0.15 
  
0.69 
  
0.1 
Trust 
Yanukovich 
  
0.64 
  
0.58*** 
  
2.66*** 
   
0.21 
  
0.08 
  
0.32 
Pseudo R 2 0.05 0.22 0.36 0.10 0.12 0.41 0.16 0.18 0.33 
N 596 395 394 881 576 572 881 576 572 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 21 2007 Parliamentary Election of 2007 (statistically significant coefficients) 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Social divisions prove to be salient predictors of the vote choice from election to election. 
However, they only tell part of the story, as the voters also consistently rely on the evaluation of 
issues and leaders. “Voters are not fools” and even in the new democracies are capable of more 
complex cognitive processes than prescribed by the sociological developmental model. As the 
above analysis suggests, despite the complicated nature of electoral environments of presidential 
and parliamentary elections the Ukrainian voters navigate the slew of information in a savvy 
manner.  
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 What is more, the prominence of linguistic and ethnic divisions as predictors of vote 
choice among Ukrainians seems to be declining from 1994 to 2007. The values of the pseudo R 
squares for all the election improve for Models 2 and 3 compared to Model 1 as well. This also 
can serve as a confirmation of the predictive power of issue and candidate consideration as 
compared to the social identifiers alone. However, the regional divisions remain strong despite 
the ambiguity of ethno-linguistic predictors.  
 So far, I’ve argued that the sociological developmental model of vote choice is 
insufficient in explaining the development of the political behavior among voters in the new 
democracies, and more specifically in the case of Ukraine. This chapter sought to show 
statistically the likelihood of votes cast for one or the other candidate/party based on sociological 
factors as well as more sophisticated modes of the elections specific considerations. The results 
support the claims the there is more to Ukrainian voters than ethno-cultural divisions. 
Evaluations of salient domestic and foreign policy issues, as well as retrospective evaluation of 
political leaders play an important part in each electoral cycle as well. During the 1990’s the 
importance of Ukraine’s relations with Russia and Ukraine’s transition to market economy were 
very salient and present in presidential and parliamentary elections. The completed transition to 
market, however, changed the focus a bit making domestic social and political issues of 
constitutional powers more prominent. The foreign policy concerns still remain important.   
In the following chapter I take this argument further to show the progress of voter 
sophistication over time and examine how really all of the determinants of vote choice matter 
when it comes to casting a ‘correct’ vote. My expectation are that over time, voters learn to cast 
votes with more precision based on all the decision making tools available to them, including the 
social group affiliations and election specific issues.  
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4.0  LEARNING BY DOING? VOTING “CORRECTLY” OVERTIME 
The Ukrainian public has been characterized as generally “passive” (Kuzio and Wilson 1994). 
What is more, it is a society that is generally perceived as divided further complicating the 
uneasy process of democratic consolidation. In the new democracies, such as Ukraine, the 
evaluation of the developing voters’ capacity should go further and move beyond the analysis of 
voting patterns and determinants of vote choice.  While voting is an essential part of democratic 
process and arguably one of the core civic duties of democratic citizens(Dalton 2000; Norris 
2002), the mere act of voting is only a part of the story in functioning democracies. A 
sophisticated democratic citizen must be able to vote in a way that is most representative of 
his/her views (Campbell et al. 1964). Thus, for democracy to function properly voters must be 
able to cast their votes “correctly” (Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Lau, Redlawsk, and Andersen 
2008). Therefore, there seems to be a direct link between voter’s ability to make a correct 
decision and voter’s sophistication. 
Up to this point I’ve argued that there is more to Ukrainian electorates’ democratic 
development than suggested by the sociological developmental models of political behavior. The 
ethno-cultural and socio-economic group identification seem to be influencing individual voters’ 
electoral choices, however, the reliance on these social group cues on the formation of the 
electoral links over time is suspect. It appears that Ukrainian voters’ choice is also informed by 
their stances on issues and evaluation of individual political leaders. These finds support my 
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argument that voters are a bit more complex and therefore more sophisticated, than previously 
expected.  This chapter takes the analysis of voter sophistication further. It is devoted to the 
evaluation of the “correctness” of the vote choice in all of the free and fair presidential and 
parliamentary elections the Ukrainian public participated in since the independence of 1991. I 
expect that over time as Ukrainian public gains experience with democratic electoral process the 
degree of correct voting increases as compared to the beginning of 1990’s when the citizens had 
no direct experience with democratic system. I also hypothesize that the “correct” vote is 
informed by more than mere ethno-cultural attachments. 
The issue of voter sophistication receives attention in the normative discussions of 
democratic theory and empirical political behavior literature.  The normative discussion of voter 
sophistication revolves around the capacity of voters to make “wise” decisions for sustainability 
of democracy and betterment of the society at large.  Statesman and philosophers are often 
concerned with the “wisdom” or lack thereof behind collective decision making. Churchill once 
said that the best argument against democracy is a short conversation with an average voter.  
However, such normative concerns do not enter directly into the discussion raised in my 
analysis.  Following the empirical debate on voter sophistication, I take it for granted that each 
vote is the same and counts equally regardless of its normative content.  
The debate within the empirical political behavior literature revolves around the 
mechanisms of sophisticated vote.  The voter sophistication is based upon the complexity of the 
judgment and evaluation criteria for vote casting.  The raging debate in political behavior 
literature revolves around these evaluation criteria. Some argue that the more cognitively 
demanding the voters’ techniques, such as evaluation of ideological stances and issues, the more 
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they qualify as sophisticated (Campbell et al. 1964; MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 
1995).  
The inquiry undertaken in The American Voter conceptualized sophistication as 
ideological understanding of issues (Campbell et al. 1964). The study showed, however, that 
American electorate was not sophisticated.  The analysis showed that voters lacked ideological 
constraints and their decisions varied over time from election to election.  However, this analysis 
came under scrutiny as showing perhaps not the level of (un)sophistication but rather a non-
ideological side of a poorly informed electorate. Since then the concept of “sophisticated” voter 
has been re-visited and re-analyzed by several scholars.   
Some have argued that it is impossible to expect all voters to be well informed about 
every political issue. People do have lives outside politics and certain other activities take 
precedence over voting.  Instead, voters have a special set of issues that they find most important 
and make their judgments based on these issues rather than every possible issue within society 
(Converse 1974; Converse 1964, 1964). Yet, the research has also shown that individuals quite 
often rely on cognitive short cuts, cues and heuristics such as groups identities to make their 
decisions (Richard R.   Lau and David P. Redlawsk 2001). Evaluation of issues and ones 
positioning vis-à-vis the candidates, is presumably a more cognitively involved process that 
requires the individual to engage more deeply in the analysis of issue components and self-
reflection than heuristic use.  Thus, a sophisticated voter employs more complex cognitive 
processes.  
The correct vote measure is designed to evaluate not merely the methods used in voting 
decision but also to evaluate their usage. In other words I’m concerned not only with which one 
of these components of vote choice matters but also how they matter. I conceptualize “correct” 
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vote as a vote cast for those representative decision makers who best represent the interests and 
views of the voter, whatever they might be. Like a matching game, the measure is a way to 
evaluate the degree of compatibility between the voters and candidates/parties.   
 In order to determine the correct vote I construct a measure of correct voting relying on 
the previous work on Richard Lau and David Redlawsk. The first section of this chapter 
addresses the nuances of the correct voting measure and its applicability to the IFES data, used in 
this research project. The measure is then applied to the survey data available for each of 
Ukraine’s presidential and parliamentary elections since 1994. The results suggest that overall 
the correctness of votes cast increased. Moreover, there are some important differences in the 
percentage of correct votes cast in presidential v. parliamentary elections.  
Given that Ukraine is perceived as a divided society and the expectation that social group 
cues will be pivotal as heuristics in vote choice, in my evaluation of Ukrainian voters I construct 
two measures; I call them comprehensive and naïve11
                                                 
11 In calling them so, I do not make a normative judgment about the quality of the vote. Rather the names refer to the 
complexity of the decision making process associated with each measure.  
. Given that the evaluation of issues and 
candidates, as well as social group identification are all seen as important in determining vote 
choice the comprehensive measure includes all of these components. The comprehensive 
measure seeks to show the percent of supporters who voted correctly based on all of the 
components of voting decision. Due to the aforementioned importance that is given to ethno-
cultural social identifiers in Ukrainian public, the “naïve” measure measures the percent of 
correct (compatible) vote among supporters based solely on their group identification. These 
results are compared to the comprehensive measure’s results to show the superiority of the 
comprehensive measure of correct vote. The social characteristics effect on correct vote and 
inter-social group variations are also explored.  
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4.1 MEASURING “CORRECT” VOTING 
In their 1997 and 2001 works, Richard Lau and David Redlawsk construct a measure of correct 
voting in the context of American electoral system and test their measure using the ANES data in 
presidential elections in the United States.  According to the authors correct vote casting depends 
on voters’ ability to evaluate several important components. One can place these components 
into three categories 1) evaluation of stances on the issues; 2) general candidate evaluation; and 
3) social group(s) endorsement.  When all the components are combined in a single measure the 
candidate with the highest score should receive the vote. The exploration of the correct vote is 
thus a logical next step for the present inquiry. The application of correct measure to the curious 
case of the Ukrainian voter allow us to explore not merely which of the determinant of vote 
choice are at play but also their effectiveness when used by the public , and the changes in 
“correct voting” over time. 
4.1.1 Evaluation of Issues 
Issue voting has been cited as one of the more sophisticated strategies to decision making. Indeed 
it requires a great deal of cognitive capacity. First, the voters must determine their own position 
on important issues dominating the political agenda of the society. Secondly the voters must 
evaluate the position of each candidate vis-à-vis their own position on each of the important 
issues. Analyzing the issue evaluation in correct vote measure, Lau and Redlawsk  rely on the 
directional model of issue voting proposed by Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989). 
According to the directional theory of issue voting, voters perceive issues in dichotomous 
manner – yes or no, agree or disagree. The in-between gray scale variations are less important 
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when evaluating the issue and candidates stances on the issue.  According to the directional 
model of voting, voters evaluate their affinity for the candidate based on the direction of the 
issue only, that is, whether a candidate is or is not on the same side of the issue as the voter. 
Formally the directional effect of the issue as developed by Rabinowitz and MacDonald(1989) 
can be expressed as 
 
uij= (cj – n)*(vi –n), 
 
Were n represents the neutral point, vi is the issue position of the voter i and cj denotes the 
issue position of the candidate j. Thus the utility of voter i to support candidate j is calculated by 
multiplication of the distance between the neutral point and candidate and voters positioning. If 
the candidate and voter are on the same side of the issue the effect of the issue is positive, if they 
are one the different sides the effect of the issue is negative. What matters is determining what 
side of the issue one takes. Therefore, this model is opposed to spatial model of issue voting that 
suggests that voters painstakingly evaluate their self-placement on the ideological spectrum and 
then cast their vote for the candidate closest to them. The utility of voter i in the spatial model 
can be formally represented as 
uij= - (vi –cj)2         
 
The scholars of voting behavior are locked in the dispute over the utility and applicability 
of the directional versus proximity models of issue voting (MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and 
Listhaug 1998; Westholm 1997). The proximity model suggests that the voter is going to 
favorably view those candidates whose issue stances are closest to his/her own.  The directional 
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model on the other hand stipulates that voters perceive issues in dichotomous manner – yes or 
no, agree or disagree and voters cast their vote for that candidate who is on the same side of the 
issue as they are. Over the years, several scholars have weighed in on the debate on the utility of 
proximity versus directional models with the attempt to either validate one of the other model 
(MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1998), provide an unbiased test of the two vis-à-vis each 
other (Lewis and King 1999), or provide an alternative or rather a more sensible unified model to 
satisfy the methodological and theoretical concerns of each (Merrill and Bernard 1999). 
The proponents of the proximity model criticize the directional model for several 
interrelated shortcoming. There are two criticisms in particular are most relevant to the concerns 
at hand. The first issue is methodological and lies in the suggestion that the directional model 
tends to over-predict the percentage of vote cast in favor of the candidate (Westholm 1997). The 
second issues is theoretical and suggests that under the assumptions of the directional model the 
more extreme candidates are more preferred then the more moderate ones (Merrill and Bernard 
1999; Westholm 1997). These concerns could be quite salient given that voters often oppose the 
more extremist views and favor a more moderate political agenda. However, these criticisms 
seem to apply most in those cases where the political competition is taking place under stable 
conditions with clearly defined ideological dimensions. What is not clear, however, is whether 
the voters do indeed vote proximately all the time. 
 In a recent article in Electoral Studies, Shane P. Singh argues very convincingly that 
despite the elegance and intuitive value of the proximity method the voters do not always chose 
to utilize it in their decision making process. Examining the use of the proximity voting from a 
comparative perspective of cross-national analysis, he suggests that a host of individual and 
context specific characteristics might lead voters to abandon the proximity strategy (Singh 2010). 
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For instance the electoral system might have important implications for voter’s ability to rely on 
proximal evaluation of candidates. The plurality system might work as disincentive for proximal 
voting because of the fear of “wasting a vote” the voters might choose to vote insincerely. Much 
also depends of the strength of party attachments.  
The number of parties and their ability to clearly place themselves on the policy 
dimensions can also be influential on proximity evaluations (Singh 2010). The fewer the number 
of political parties and more clearly they are defined ideologically the better are the chances of 
proximal evaluations on behalf of the voters (Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Wessels and Schmitt 
2008). On the other hand, the increased number of political parties that have no clear ideological 
distinctions make is quite hard to voters to identify which party is the closest or more proximate 
(Singh 2010). Singh’s evaluation of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data 
supports this hypothesis strongly. The fewer the choices and the clearer they are marked the 
higher is the likelihood of proximal voting. 
The important upshot of the debates seems to suggest that for a number of reasons the 
dispute is not near its end. However, there are some important lessons to be learnt for the 
discussion. Testing of the two models side by side suggests that on the one hand there are 
limitations to both models and on the other the empirical data does not produce significant 
differences between them (Lau, Redlawsk, and Andersen 2008; Lewis and King 1999)12
                                                 
12 Lau and Redlawsk boldly state that “extensive experimentation with each approach has never produced an 
instance where it mattered beyond the third decimal place which method one employs.” 
. I do not 
wish to weigh heavy on either side of the above debate quite yet; however, it seems to me that 
the purposes of this study would be best served by the application of directional model. 
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Following  Lau and Redlawsk  in the measure of correct voting I rely on the directional 
model of issue voting proposed by Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989). My reasons for relying 
on this method are dictated as much by the above debate as well as the practical limitation of 
data used in this inquiry. First, since the Ukrainian party system is still quite young and as 
discussed in Chapter 1 is not yet stabilized along the dimensions of the political dimensions, I 
believe that the use of proximity model in this case might be premature. Secondly, the IFES 
surveys like many others have adopted the dichotomous way of measuring voters’ self-placement 
on a given issue. The respondents are often asked to evaluate their feeling toward a specific issue 
on a 5 point scale.13
1999
  The data does not allow me to speculate with confidence on the broader 
policy stances beyond the answer given by a respondent on the yes- and no- basis about a 
specific issue. Lewis and King bluntly suggest that such thermometer measures and other issue 
questions are generally ill suited to test either model ( ), yet, for the purposes of the study 
and accepting the data constraints, the directional model seems to be more logically suitable 
notwithstanding the theoretical and methodological issues discussed above. The use of 
directional model to calculate the directional effect of the issue produces values that are 
compatible with the use of other questions included in the complete measure of correct vote. The 
values produced by the model can easily be rescaled to vary from 1 to -1. These values can be 
combined with other dichotomous variables used in the measure, such as ethno linguistic and 
regional identity variables, which are binary in nature. The results produced by the use of 
proximity model do not lend themselves to such rescaling.  The utility of vote according to the 
                                                 
13 The issues addressed in the IFES survey are quite dichotomous. As specified in Appendix II the issues used in this 
study’s correct vote measure do not logically lend themselves for proximal placement and rather presuppose that the 
respondents will have a yes or no response to the question.  For instance the questions like “Should Ukrainian be the 
national language?” or “Do you approve of the pace of the economic transition?” do not really leave much room for 
in between considerations.  
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squared Euclidean logic of the proximity model is a distance between the voter and the 
candidate. Thus, a larger number suggests a longer distance and less likelihood of vote. The logic 
behind rescaling is less clear than with directional model. 
In accordance with the above, for all the relevant issues in this analysis, where possible, I 
use the 5 point scale or a variation of it. The respondents’ answers range from strongly support, 
support, oppose, strongly oppose and don’t have an opinion.  I treat the “don’t know” category as 
a neutral point for most of the stances on issues to intensify the polarity of the issue positions. 
The neutral position on the issue is coded as 3 on the 5 point scale with other options on 
increasing and decreasing side of 3. Where a 5 point scale is not available and voters are asked to 
give their opinion as yes and no, the values are recodes 1 and -1 respectively.  IFES data 
provides a range of issues relevant for each of the elections under analysis. The important 
electoral issues vary for each election. However, all issues fall into one of the three important 
categories: 1) domestic social affair, such as the healthcare and language reform; 2) economic 
policy; and 3) foreign policy.  The issues used and the brief variable content are summarized in 
Appendix II. 
Determining candidate stance on the issues is a bit trickier. Lau and Redlawsk (2008) in 
their evaluation of the US presidential elections have a luxury of a specific question that asks the 
respondents to assign a value to the candidate position on the issue using the same scale. 
Unfortunately, IFES surveys do not include such questions. Therefore, I rely on the method used 
in the earlier work of Lau and Redlaws (1997) and assign candidate’s positions based on my own 
subjective evaluation of the candidate’s programs.  While such subjective measure might be 
problematic, the nature (i.e. the simplicity of the scale,) allow me to assign the positions with 
confidence. Evaluation of candidates’ electoral programs, campaign promises as outlined in the 
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media provide enough information to be able to confidently suggest that a candidate is opposed 
or supportive of a certain measure.  Table 4.1 depicts 1994 issues specification, as an example. 
Please see Appendix II for the details of issues and positions assignments.14
Table 4-1 1994 Presidential Elections Measure of Correct Vote 
  
 
IFES 1994 Kuchma Kravchuk 
Job of President Kuchma approve/disapprove 
  
Trust Kuchma yes/no 
  
Trust Kravchuk yes/no 
  
    
State Economy reduce/return -1 -1 
Move to free economy 3 points/ quick-slow 1 -1 
guaranteed employment 5 point scale 2 1 
guaranteed health care 5 point scale 4 2 
    
Ukraine FP is better directed Russia/Both/West 1 2 
    
Ukrainian spoken as official language yes/no no yes 
    
Group Affiliation 
 
Russian ethnic Ukrainian ethnic 
  
Russian speaking Ukrainian speaking 
  
east west 
  
south 
  
Using the above formula the effect of each issue was calculated for each respondent in 
the dataset.  When a 5 point scale ranging from 1-5 was employed the directional effect 
coefficient was rescaled to range between + 1 and -1.  On issues where the response categories 
                                                 
14 The IFES survey keep the answer category to the questions regarding the economic, domestic, and foreign 
security issues confined to no more than 5 options. As mentioned in the text above, these responses were recorded in 
the following way:  1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. No opinion 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree, 
or a variant of this scaling on appropriate responses.  The candidates’ positions on the issues were assigned in the 
similar way. For instance, in 2004 one of the issues facing the nations in realm of the foreign policy had to do with 
the seeming increased financial assistance from the US government to the NGO’s and other social groups within 
Ukraine, through USAID. IFES questioners asked the respondents to identify their feelings to the US governments 
assistance and its influence on their country. The answers ranged on the 5 point scale -- 1. Very positive. 2 
Somewhat positive 3. No opinion. 4. Negative. 5. Very negative. The candidate placement along this scale was 
determined by examining their campaign stances. Viktor Yushchenko, a hailed pro-western candidate was assigned 
a value of 1, while his opponent Viktor Yanukovich, a self-proclaimed pro-Russian candidate, was assigned a value 
of 4.  
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were dichotomous the values of 1 and -1 the similar formula was used, however, the values were 
not rescaled, as they already ranged between +1 and -1.  
4.1.2 Candidate Evaluation 
Voters’ reactions to candidates often shape the decisions to support or not to support a certain 
candidate. These evaluations can be based on numerous conscious and subconscious factors. 
Some scholars have focused on the specifics of candidate personalities, behaviors, appearances, 
even facial expression during debates as means to determine what is more important in voter’s 
evaluation of candidates (Hall 2009; Milton. Lodge, Kathleen M. McGraw, and Patrick Stroh 
1989). Negative as well as positive feelings toward candidates/leaders are quite important. 
Liking a candidate can sway one’s decisions. However, acute dislike can be a very powerful 
deterrent.   
 While inclusion of such evaluations do seem to be an important component of the 
measure, it is not always possible due to data limitations. The first of two measures developed in 
1997 by Lau and Redlawsk included the evaluations of candidates’ personalities and 
appearances. The authors were able to include such information because they used an 
experimental design that allowed them to ask the respondents directly to evaluate the two 
candidates in a fictitious election. However, the second measure constructed in the same study is 
based entirely on the ANES survey data and does not include such information. Instead authors 
use the evaluation of incumbent’s job performance, where applicable, as the measure of 
candidate evaluation. This of course, poses its own problems as it seems that the measure of the 
correct vote for the challenger candidate avoids the candidate evaluation component.  
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 The IFES survey data used in this analysis also does not allow me to include the specific 
evaluations of the candidate’s appearances and personalities either. Fortunately, the surveys do 
ask respondents to evaluate the performance of the incumbents, as well as express their trust in 
candidates. The trust questions taps into the psychological and personal evaluations of the 
candidate and provides a good measure of candidate evaluation that I include in my measure of 
correct voting. What is more, the inclusion of this variable allows for the candidate evaluation 
component to be included in a measure of correct voting for all the candidates. Both the 
incumbent job approval and trust variable values are coded 1 and -1 to signify approval and trust 
respectively. 
4.1.3 Candidate-Social Group Linkages 
Social group(s) endorsement holds a special place among the factors contributing to the electoral 
decision of a voter. Candidate-social group links can prove a useful heuristic or a cognitive short 
cut to decision making and can influence voters’ decisions on several interrelated levels. 
Knowing that certain groups support the candidate can save the individual voter time and effort 
in evaluating that candidate’s issue stances, for instance. In this case voters defers to the trusted 
group, like a political party, labor union, religious group (Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk 
2001) or as Birnir argued to an ethnic or linguistic group,  in decision making (Birnir 2007).   
 A sense of a social group membership can also serve as a useful tool in decision making 
process. By identifying oneself as a member of one or the other social group a voter can make a 
quick decision about a candidate with the same or opposing group identity. This identification 
produces a dichotomous “one of us” versus “one of them” mentality that can inform the decision 
maker on the candidates’ stance on issues as well as drive the overall evaluation of the candidate 
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into positive or negative light. As discussed in Chapter 2, Martin Seymour Lipset and Stein 
Rokkan suggest that social cleavages inform and often shape the developments of domestic 
politics in a given system.  Ethnic, racial, socio-economic, and religious social cleavages have 
been cited as important predictors of vote choice among electorate. 
In the Ukrainian case party affiliation is unlikely to be used as a useful heuristic because 
the political parties are relatively new.  The strong political party attachments akin to those in the 
Western democracies have not had a chance to develop in this society. Instead the literature on 
Ukrainian voting identifies regional and ethno-linguistic divisions as the most important social 
group affiliations informing the electoral choice. The political preference of the Western and 
Eastern Ukrainian have differed from the inception of the democratic process in the early 1990’s 
and continue to manifest themselves to this day.  The divergent views of Russophone and 
Ukrainian speakers, as well as ethnic Ukrainian and Russian populations have also been cited as 
major contributors in determining vote choice in Ukrainian elections.  Thus, in my measure of 
correct vote I include respondents’ ethno-linguistic group affiliation along with region of 
residence. These values are coded in binary code with 1 representing respondents’ self reported 
affiliation with the group 0 otherwise. Because the ethno linguistic and regional divisions 
coincide in Ukraine, the candidate-group links were based on the electoral results by region 
provided by the Central Electoral Committee of Ukraine.  
 
Using the 1994 presidential election as an example the correct measure is calculated 
combining the issue, candidate and group affiliation components to produce the following 
measures. 
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Strong ties with West + Ukrainian as State Language +   support for state command 
economy +    pace of economic reform +  guaranteed employment + guaranteed health care + 
Trust Kravchuk + Ukrainian speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + west – Russian speaker – Russian 
ethnic – south –east 
Correct vote for Kravchuk 1994 
 
Kuchma Job approval +  stronger ties with Russia -Ukrainian as State Language + 
support for state command economy + pace of econ reform + guaranteed employment +  
guaranteed health care+ trust Kuchma + Russian speaker + Russian ethnic + east + south –
Ukrainian speaker – Ukrainian ethnic – west 
Correct Vote for Kuchma 1994 Measure 
 
The “naïve” measure for both includes only the regional, ethnic and linguistic identities ( 
+ for groups supportive of the candidate; - for those who do not) 
4.2 ELECTIONS CONSIDERED 
Since the initial transition to democracy in 1991 Ukraine has had four presidential and five 
parliamentary elections.  The IFES surveys were conducted in Ukraine since 1994 almost each 
year, thus allowing me to focus on each of these elections with the exception of 1994 
parliamentary election and 2010 presidential election where data is not available.  
The first Ukrainian president Leonik Kravchuk was elected in 1991 shortly following 
Ukraine’s declaration of secession from the USSR. However, in 1993 Kravchuk resigned and 
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emergency presidential elections were held in 1994. According to the Ukrainian constitution 
adopted under Leonid Kuchma in 1996 the term of presidential office is 5 years.  Thus in this 
analysis I focus on 1994, 1999 and 2004 presidential elections.  
The electoral system of Ukraine allows for a multitude of candidates to run for the office 
and the president is elected by simple majority. Thus, often a winner is determined by the voters 
in two rounds of elections, when no candidate secures the majority during the first round. The 
two candidates who secured the most votes in the first round proceed to face each other in the 
second round. In this inquiry for the reasons of parsimony and due to data availability, i.e. the 
questions asked by IFES surveys, I focus primarily of the candidates and votes cast in the second 
round of the elections.  
The elections to the Ukrainian parliament or Supreme Council (Verhovna Rada) take 
place every four years. The first multiparty parliamentary election in Ukraine took place in 
March of 1990. This election was a result of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Union-wide reform of 
perestroika. The elections were for the first time open to independent candidates and parties 
other then the Communist Party of Ukraine. This election was considered relatively free and 
arguably marked Ukraine’s first step to liberalization and democratization. It was this particular 
council that passed the declaration of Ukraine’s independence in August of 1991. 
Parliamentary elections have taken place in Ukraine every four years with the exception 
of the current Rada, which was elected during a special out of turn elections in 2007. The 
parliament elected in 2006 was dissolved by the president Viktor Yushchenko due to 
irreconcilable differences between himself and the cabinet of ministers chaired by his former ally 
and Prime Minister Yuliya Timoshenko. This analysis focuses on three parliamentary elections 
1998, 2006 and 2007.   
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Unfortunately, as discussed in the previous Chapter, the 2002 parliamentary election is 
excluded for the analysis due to data limitation. The IFES survey questions do not tap into an 
important question of electoral party vote choice. Instead the questions asked respondents to 
identify the political party they felt best represented their interests. The answer to this question is 
not the same as identifying the political party the responded voted for. As asked the question is 
more likely to reveal voter affinity for the party at worst and party identification at best. In the 
new democracy like Ukraine these affects are not always the same as the vote.  In the context of 
this particular election this is even truer. The electoral results show that Our Ukraine bloc 
dominated the election and received the most votes. However, according to the IFES 2002 
survey, used here the Communist party enjoyed most support among respondents.  
Since the first parliamentary election there have been several changes to Ukraine’s 
electoral law. Before the 1998 constitutional reform the parliamentary seats were distributed 
according to the single member district procedure. This system was adopted with hopes to 
facilitate political pluralism in the wake of one party rule. The plurality system was most 
advantageous for independent candidates, who could rely solely on personal recognition by the 
voters and did not need the coherent and stable party support. But this system proved detrimental 
to political party development as numerous short lived personalistic parties sprung up.  
The reform of 1998 introduced a mixed electoral system where one half of the seats to the 
450 member parliament would be elected by SMD and the other half by proportional 
representation. As Zimmer and Haran rightfully state the introduction of this system forced many 
independent candidates to form centrist parties that differed very little in terms of policy 
positions (2008). Finally the most recent electoral system change of 2006 put an end to the 
mixed system and introduced closed list proportional representation as the only way to allocate 
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Rada seats.  All of these changes provide a fascinating context for the evaluation of correct 
voting among electorates.  
4.2.1 Hypotheses 
The main premise of this inquiry is that with time and democratic experience voters are 
capable of making more accurate electoral choices while using all of the cognitive tools in their 
arsenal. I am also interested in determining the contextual differences of correct vote, such as the 
differences between correct votes case in presidential versus the parliamentary election. With 
this though in mind, I develop the following set of hypotheses, which I test empirically in a 
subsequent section of this chapter. 
 
H1. Voters are expected to vote with more precision over time. (Increase of correct vote 
overtime) 
H2.  In their electoral decisions voters are expected to rely on all of the factors available 
to them. Thus, the comprehensive measure of correct vote should reveal higher level of voter’s 
accuracy.  
 
Ukraine is a semi-presidential democracy; therefore, presidential elections are often seen 
as more important elections that require more attention from the electorate. I therefore expect 
that voters pay more attention to these elections in every respect.  
 
H3. The vote is cast with more precision in presidential elections. 
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However, as discussion in Chapter 2, the presidential elections also prove to be 
polarizing. The adversarial nature of the presidential election can contribute to the increase is 
social conflict. Therefore, one can expect that the vote cast on the basis of group identity is 
higher during the presidential election. I expect this to be particularly true in the case of 2004 
presidential election which resulted in the infamous Orange Revolution that pitted voters against 
one another. Yet, it is important to note that overall I expect that the comprehensive correct vote 
is always higher, as per H2. 
 I also expect to find other context specific variations in correct vote. The retrospective 
evaluation of the political leaders, specifically the incumbents, plays an important role in voting 
decision. I expect that the correct vote based on comprehensive evaluation is higher for the 
incumbents, than challengers.  
 
H4. The percent of comprehensive correct vote is higher for the incumbent 
4.2.2 Results 
Table 4.2 depicts the overall percent of correct vote for both sets of elections as derived via 
comprehensive and naïve measures of correct vote. The correct vote for each party/ politicians in 
each election is calculated among the self reported supporters (those individuals who reported 
voting in favor) of the said party/politicians. The overall accuracy is a mathematical average of 
the percent of correct votes cast for the parties/candidates. Figure 4.1 depicts these percentages in 
a form of a line graph in order to visually track the fluctuations in correct vote in Ukraine. 
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Table 4-2 Overall Accuracy of Vote (Average Percent among Supporters) 
 
Comprehensive  Naïve 
Presidential 
  1994 69 55.50 
1999 75 49.50 
2004 84 82.50 
Parliamentary 
  1998 76.33 68.00 
2006 79.67 70.33 
2007 79.00 73.67 
  
 
Figure 22Percent of Correct Vote Overtime (All Elections) 
 
 
Overall the results support the above hypothesis H1 suggesting that overtime Ukrainian voters 
learned to cast votes with more precision. Despite the year to year (election to election) 
fluctuations, there is a general upward trend across all of the elections. The experience with the 
democratic process contributes to the voters’ ability to vote with more precision.  
Moreover, the correct vote cast using the all of the components of vote choice 
(comprehensive) yield higher percent of correct vote consistently across all of the elections as 
Figure 4.1 shows. Thus, H2 is also supported by the empirical evidence. This suggests that 
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Ukrainian voters make more accurate decisions evaluating candidates and issues than relying on 
identity heuristics alone.  
Although, there is also general increase in the accuracy in voting based on group 
affiliation, as measured by naïve measure of correct vote, the percent predicted by this measure 
is consistently lower and the trend line is much more volatile across years and elections. This 
suggests that it is difficult to speak of overtime learning in the case of voting based on the cues 
of social groups, as this type of voting seems to be more prone to electoral contexts and 
campaign influences. 
 Figures 4.2 and 4.3 depict the graphs of the overall percent of correct vote overtime in 
presidential and parliamentary elections respectively.  
Figure 23 Percent of Correct Vote in Presidential Elections 
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Figure 24 Percent of Correct Vote in Parliamentary Elections 
 
 
As expected there are differences between the percentages of correct voting for 
presidential candidates and those for political parties in parliamentary elections. It appears that 
the accuracy of the presidential vote has increased more dramatically than the vote for 
parliamentary elections over the years. Moreover, the public seems to be voting more correctly in 
the presidential elections in general. This finding supports the above hypothesis H3.  
The comprehensive measure yield higher percent of correct vote. Yet, the percentage of 
correct vote driven by identity heuristic is still relatively high among Ukrainian public. There is a 
sizable increase in correct use of identity heuristic in presidential elections between 1994 and 
2004. In 1999 election the percentage of votes cast correctly using a comprehensive evaluation 
increased, while the identity based correct vote decreased.  These results are not surprising as 
stated above.  
 In the parliamentary elections the percentage differences between correct votes cast with 
identity heuristic only and a more comprehensive evaluation are considerable smaller and more 
consistent than in presidential elections. This might be a result of the perceived lack of 
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importance of the parliamentary election as compared to the presidential election. Thus, the 
voters are reluctant to invest too much time and energy into detailed evaluation of parties and 
instead rely on other cues to guide their vote.  
 
Table 4-3 Percent of Correct Vote among the Supporters (Presidential) 
 
% Supporters Voting 
Correctly(Comprehensive) 
% Supporters Voting 
Correctly(Naïve) 
1994 
  Kuchma  54 41 
Kravchuk 84 70 
   1999 
  Simonenko 65 51 
Kuchma  82 48 
   2004 
  Yanukovich 84 82 
Yushchenko 84 83 
 
 
 Tables 4.3 and 4.4 bring a little more detail to the variation in correct voting between the 
parliamentary and presidential election and depict the correct vote for each party/candidate.  
These numbers give us an interesting insight into the context specific effects on correct vote. For 
all the parties/candidates the comprehensive evaluation produces more correct vote than identity 
vote alone, further reinforcing the expectations of H2.  The results for the correct vote in the 
presidential election (Table 4.3) also support the expectations of the H4. In the 1994 presidential 
election the percent of comprehensive correct vote is higher for the incumbent Kravchuk at 84 % 
than the challenger Kuchma’s 54% of correct vote among supporters. A similar picture appears 
in 1999 election, where incumbent Kuchma’s supporters voted with 82% overall accuracy, while 
65% voted correctly for the challenger Simonenko. 
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Table 4-4 Percent of Correct Vote among the Supporters (Parliamentary) 
 
% Supporters Voting 
Correctly 
(Comprehensive) 
% Supporters Voting 
Correctly (Naïve) 
1998 
  Communist Party 85 65 
People’s Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) 86 71 
Party of Greens of Ukraine 58 
 
   2006 
  Our Ukraine 97 92 
Party of Regions 47 28 
Block Yuliji Tymoshenko 95 91 
   2007 
  Party of Regions 74 75 
Block Yuliji Tymoshenko 83 76 
Our Ukraine 80 70 
 
 The results thus far have supported my main hypotheses. The Ukrainian public is 
learning from the experience of the democratic process and casts votes with more precision 
overtime. Moreover, the comprehensive measure of correct vote yields higher percentages of 
correct vote in all of the elections, for all of the parties and candidates. Thus, Ukrainians are 
consistently relying on the complex models of decision making, which utilizes all of the tools 
available to them. And what is more, overtime they are learning to make their electoral decisions 
more accurately.  
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4.3 WHO VOTES CORRECTLY? 
I now turn to an attempt to sketch out a sociological portrait of the accurate voter. First, I 
hypothesize about the possible demographic and social characteristics which might enable voters 
to cast votes with more precision. I then turn to the evaluation of these hypotheses empirically. 
Via cross referencing the reported vote and the predicted vote correct vote, a correct vote 
variable is constructed for each party/candidate across every election. Thus, the variable 
prescribes 1 to those persons who have voted correctly in a given election and 0 to those who did 
not. The data sets are then pooled in order to evaluate the effects of demographic and social 
characteristics on correct vote overtime. Given the dichotomous nature of the variable I fist apply 
the logistic regression model to the data in order to sketch an overall portrait of the correct voter. 
I then turn to the evaluation of correct vote in sub-groups overtime. The predicted probabilities 
of correct vote overtime are graphed and examined. This process is done for both the 
comprehensive and naïve measures of vote choice. 
4.3.1 Hypotheses 
Age, gender, and income could be seen as important characteristics enabling the ability to vote 
correctly. Voting is a costly undertaking; it requires time and resources to obtain the necessary 
information and a certain level of political knowledge in order to process the information. It 
could be argued that the more time, resources, and political knowledge one possessed the likelier 
s/he is to voter with more precision. One can expect that income level would be a salient 
contributor to voting correctly. Obtaining political information is a costly enterprise; therefore, 
those persons with higher levels of income should be more likely to cast their votes correctly. 
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H1. Persons in higher and middle income brackets are likelier to vote with more 
precision.  
Related to this reasoning I expect that persons with higher education levels will vote with 
more precision using the comprehensive measure. However, persons with lower education levels 
shall rely on the heuristic cues to cast votes.  
 
H2. Persons with higher education levels will vote with more precision using the 
comprehensive measure. 
H3. Persons with lower education levels shall rely on the heuristic cues to cast votes.  
 
Women have traditionally occupied an inferior social position in most societies. Confined 
to their traditional reproductive and nurturing roles women often lack the necessary tools to cast 
correct votes (Inglehart and Norris 2003). 
 
H4. Men are likelier to vote correctly then women 
 
Age on the other hand can be double edged sword in the new democracies. It can be 
argued, that older persons generally are likelier to vote with more precision. It has been shown 
that in the developed democracies the more mature publics are likelier to turn out to vote and 
have an intricate understanding of politics (Dalton 2000). This is due to many factors; however, 
the amount of political knowledge acquired from the experience with the democratic governance, 
I believe, is the key.  Thus, one would expect that the young would be likely to vote with less 
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precision while the more mature voters will vote more accurately. In the developing post-
communist democracies age presents an extra challenge. The more mature generations in the 
case of post-Soviet states more specifically lack experience with democratic governance. 
Moreover, these generations are heavily integrated into the previous non-democratic regime and 
ideology, than are their younger counterparts. Thus, it is unlikely that the older age groups, or the 
early-Soviet generation, as I call it, will be the more accurate ones. 
 
H5. Persons who belong to the early -Soviet generation are less likely to vote correctly. 
H6. Persons belonging to the early-Soviet are likelier to rely on the naïve vote 
 
 However, one should not expect that the young generations of the post-communist era 
shall show consistent reliance on comprehensive approach. These are persons born after 1975 or 
so. They grew up with very little political and social experience of the Soviet system. I expect 
that a post-communist generation like all younger persons all over the world lack political 
knowledge and motivation to participation.  
4.3.2 Regression Analysis 
The dependent variable is based on the comprehensive measure of correct vote described above. 
The correct vote is combined over the presidential and parliamentary elections in a pooled data. I 
employ the two step analysis in order to evaluate the overall impact of social characteristics on 
correctness of vote and also in account of temporal variations.  
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The logistic regression model includes the generational cohorts15
The first important finding of this analysis supports one of the previous hypotheses 
regarding the context of election. It appears that presidential elections increase the likelihood of 
correct vote significantly. The odds of correct vote increase for both comprehensive and naïve 
measured. However, the comprehensive correct vote is much higher. The other results support 
some but not all of my hypotheses. Figure 4.4 depict the odds ratios of the statistically significant 
coefficient in visual form of a bar graph. 
 (the post-Soviet 
generation is used as reference category), gender, income levels (upper bracket is used as 
reference), and education levels (elementary education is used as reference).  I also include the 
variables taping into the ethno-linguistic and regional differences.  The model also includes a 
dummy variable depicting presidential election. Table 4.5 depicts the results of the regression in 
odds ratio form.  
Compared to the post-Soviet generation, the odds of correct vote using naïve measure are 
significantly higher for the early Soviet generation. However, it also appears that this likelihood 
is also increased for the middle, Soviet generation. Moreover, this generation, seems to be 
generally voting less correctly with comprehensive measure.  As expected, men tend to vote with 
more precision than women. However, there is not effect of gender on the use of the naïve 
measure.  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Early-Soviet generation is classified as those born before 1954 and consequently spent most of their adult lives in 
the Soviet system. Soviet generations are those born during 1955 – 1974. Post-Soviet generation is presumed to be 
born after 1975. 
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Table 4-5 Who Votes Correctly? 
 
Comprehensive  Naïve  
   
Early Soviet Generation 1.05 1.41**  
 
0.18 0.24 
Soviet Generation 0.62*** 1.43**  
 
0.1 0.24 
Gender 1.17** 1.1 
 
0.09 0.08 
Russian Language 1.34*** 1.1 
 
0.13 0.11 
Ukrainian Ethnic 1.04 1.08 
 
0.09 0.1 
West 1.69*** 2.60*** 
 
0.19 0.31 
South 1.45*** 1.30*   
 
0.17 0.17 
East 1.01 2.20*** 
 
0.11 0.25 
Secondary 0.98 1.11 
 
0.1 0.11 
Vocational 0.74** 1.50*** 
 
0.11 0.22 
Higher Education 0.83 0.89 
 
0.11 0.12 
Lower Income 0.83 0.58**  
 
0.22 0.14 
Middle Income 0.85 0.73 
 
0.23 0.18 
Presidential Elections 4.41*** 1.27*** 
 
0.36 0.11 
Pseudo R 2 0.10 0.03 
N 3568 4086 
chi2 506.79*** 160.62*** 
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Figure 25 Who Votes Correctly? (Statistically Significant Coefficients) 
  
 
There appears to be no consistent significant effect of income levels. However, the persons in the 
lower income bracket seem to vote less precise with naïve measure. Persons with vocational 
education appear to vote less correctly with the use of comprehensive approach. Yet, they vote 
significantly more correct with the use of groups cues. 
Among the ethno-cultural characteristic language and region present the most interesting 
results. The results suggest that Russian speakers vote correctly significantly more with the use 
of comprehensive measure. This is a very interesting result.  The regional effects on correctness 
of vote are also interesting. Persons living in the South and West of the country appear to vote 
with more precision. The naïve correct vote is also higher in West, and East. Yet, compared to 
the comprehensive measure, the correct vote is less in South with the naïve measure.  
Based on these analyses the picture of the correct and sophisticated voter in Ukraine 
seems to be shaping up in a form of a younger Russian speaking male. On the other hand, the 
unsophisticated voter belongs to the older age cohorts and technical/vocational education. I now 
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turn to the evaluation of correct vote overtime by evaluation of the predicted probabilities of 
correct vote across the years. Here I seek to evaluate the learning curve among the demographic 
groups to add more fluidity and clarity to the picture. 
4.3.3 Correct Vote Overtime 
In evaluating the correct vote among the sub-groups of Ukrainian population I analyze 
both measure of correct vote in order to track the fluctuations in sub-group behavior and their 
reliance on identity heuristic. Income level, gender and age groups are considered in this 
analysis. Income level grouping is based on self reported socioeconomic standing (before 2002) 
and self-reported income level (after 2002)16 of the respondent by the interviewer. IFES data 
allows me to divide these respondents into three categories upper, middle, and lower17
 
.  The 
gender categories are self explanatory division between male and female respondents. The three 
age categories are comprised of three age cohorts. Early-Soviet generation is classified as those 
born before 1954 and consequently spent most of their adult lives in the Soviet system. Soviet 
generations are those born during 1955 – 1974. Post-Soviet generation is presumed to be born 
after 1975. 
Income Levels and Correct Vote 
The graph of the predicted probability of correct vote overtime by income level is 
depicted in Figure 4.5  
                                                 
16 The questions asked individual respondent to place themselves in on the following categories – have enough to 
save money, have just enough to get by, barely have enough, and don’t have enough.  
17 In the case of post 2002 IFES questions the categories are devise as follows : upper = those who can save, middle 
= those you have just enough, and lower = those who barely have enough and those who do not.  
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Figure 26 Predicted Probability of Correct Vote Over Time By Income Level 
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The figure includes two graphs, one for each of the measured of the correct vote. The 
predicted probability of the correct vote with the comprehensive measure is higher across the 
income levels. Moreover, there is a general decline in naïve correct vote among all the groups 
overtime. However, there are some important differences between the sub-groups.  
The predicted probability of comprehensive correct vote is highest for the persons in 
higher income bracket in the early days of democracy. This supports the earlier hypothesis 
regarding income level effect to some extent. In the days of early democratic instability, it seems 
that the persons with more resources were able to vote correctly using all of the information 
available. However, over time this effect is reduced drastically. What is more, the upper class 
seems to be relying more on the heuristic voting as compared to the other groups, however, there 
is decline overtime.  
The graph suggests that lower income class was least likely to use comprehensive correct 
vote in the early days of democracy, however, it is this class that has shown the most remarkable 
growth in comprehensive correct vote overtime. The lower class is also the least likely to cast 
votes naively. Moreover, there is consistent decline overtime in correct vote by naïve measure 
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for lower and middle classes. Thus, there are seems to be important differences between income 
level classes in correct voting overtime. The lower class appears to have benefited the most from 
the experience with democratic process and learned how to vote with more precision using the 
comprehensive approach. 
 
Gender  
The effect of gender on the predicted probabilities of correct vote as measured by both 
measures overtime is depicted by the graphs in Figure 4.6. 
 
 
Figure 27 Overtime Changes in Correct Voting among Genders 
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The figure depicts a general increase in correct vote among both genders. The predicted 
probability of correct vote is higher with comprehensive measure. The increase in predicted 
probability of correct vote is more drastic overtime more among females. This suggests that 
women are learning fast from their experience with democratic process.  
 
Age Groups 
The overtime age differences in correct voting are shown by graphs in Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 28 Overtime Changes in Correct Vote among Generations 
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It appears the overtime the early-Soviet and Soviet generations are learning to cast votes 
with more precision using the comprehensive measure. The increase among the soviet cohort is 
particularly sharp as compared to the early –Soviet age cohort. The younger generation appeared 
to be the most likely to vote correctly in the early elections, however, this ability drastically 
declined overtime.  Yet, the naïve correct vote is lowest among the members of the post-Soviet 
cohort. This suggests that the previous two generations are more likely to be committed o the 
group cues. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
A sophisticated voter should be able to cast a vote in accordance with his/her political views. 
Analysis of voter sophistication must therefore go further than evaluation of determinants of vote 
choice. This chapter sought to evaluate the correctness of voting among individual Ukrainian 
voters.  The results lead me to a few conclusions about correct voting in the new democracies in 
general as well as the particular context of Ukraine. Overall, it seems fair to say that as 
democracy ages the population learns how to vote more accurately in accordance with their 
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preferences. This is a good sign for democratic transition and consolidation as well as an 
important finding in the context of new democracies. When compared to a comprehensive 
measure of correct vote, the naïve measure that relies entirely on social groups characteristics 
proves inferior.   
In Ukrainian contexts in appears that the electoral system and nature of the elections have 
much to do with the political choices of individual voters. The results support a hypothesis that 
the more salient presidential elections are more likely to enjoy higher percentages of correct 
voting.  
The learning process is taking place unequally. While the middle age cohort of the Soviet 
generation learns more quickly, the youngest cohort exhibits sharp decline in the use of 
comprehensive measure and an increase in naïve correct vote. This might be explained by the 
general disinterest in politics that young persons world over tend to exhibit. These age effects, 
however, would be important to trace as more data become available. The lower income class is 
the fastest to learn and cast votes correctly with the use of all available information. However, 
the upper class tends to be more prone to vote correctly with the use of identity heuristic. 
Women have always held an inferior position in the society, political mobilization of 
gender could be a first step toward the manifesting democratic political culture on the new 
democracy. Yet, as the analysis here has shown, women exhibit a high level of learning in 
casting correct vote. I expect that there are some important differences between younger and 
older generations of women, which might be quite important to the development of the 
democratic process in Ukraine. Next chapter turns to these analyses. 
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5.0  THE OTHER  “LOSERS”: AGE AND GENDER 
The effects of gender and age on political behavior in the new democracies have received some 
(albeit unequal) attention as compared to other factors. A majority of studies pay relatively little 
attention to the role of age and gender on their own merit. Age and gender have long been noted 
as significant predictors of political behavior in developed democracies. Much can be speculated 
about a person’s political views and engagement based on their gender and age, due to both the 
life cycle and generational effects. The established literature on comparative political behavior 
finds without fail that older persons are more likely than their younger counterparts to hold 
conservative views, be interested in politics and participate in political activities diligently 
(Dalton 2000; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Niemi and Weisberg 2001). This could be a product of 
inter-generational differences in experience with politics. Additionally there is a life cycle effect, 
as people get older their interest in politics is increased due to their higher levels of integration 
within the society and deeper understanding of the political processes and their implications. A 
considerable gender gap in political views and modes of political participation has also been 
documented in the comparative literature (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 
2005). In general women have been noted to move away from their more traditional conservative 
stances and rely on non-traditional means of political participation to convey their messages and 
achieve their goals (Inglehart and Norris 2003). 
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 In this chapter I seek to unpack the effects of age and gender relations on electoral 
behavior in a new democracy. I argue that these social characteristics have an important effect on 
the development of political behavior of new democratic electorates in their own right. Political, 
social, and economic reforms associated with regime change require a certain level of flexibility 
and aptitude toward learning. The older cohort therefore should be disadvantaged and limited by 
its experience with the previous non-democratic regime. The empirical results presented in the 
previous chapters have demonstrated that there are notable differences in the correct vote cast 
among voters of different age groups. This could be seen as a result of political learning where 
the younger cohorts (of middle aged and young population) process the information and cast 
votes unburdened by the previous regime’s socialization. I also expect to find notable changes in 
political party preferences among the elderly population due to its previous experience with the 
communist system and the impact of the transition. Kitschelt’s argument regarding the winners 
and losers of the transition is extended to take age and gender into consideration. 
The gender gap in political behavior of the new democracies is a somewhat under 
theorized. In the post-communist context much literature is devoted to the explanation of the 
political passivity of the female citizens and a return to traditional gender roles and outlooks 
among the populations in general (Hrycak 2001; Johnson and Robinson 2007; Lavrinenko 1999; 
Marsh 1996; Zherebkina 2002, 2003).  However, it is unclear why the impact of gender should 
remain static overtime as democracy ages. While gender relation remained un-politicized during 
the communist regime, under the democratic rule one might expect to find sharper differences in 
gender (Johnson and Robinson 2007). As the safety net of social welfare guaranteed to women 
under the communist regime disintegrates and cultural acceptance of female inequality spills out 
unchecked into the workforce, where laws no longer guarantee equality in the public sphere, one 
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should expect to find gendering of political issues (Aidis et al. 2007; Johnson 2007; Zhurzhenko 
2001, 2001).  Moreover, one should expect a shaper contrast between the political behaviors of 
different generations of women. The younger cohorts, who grew up in independent Ukraine after 
the collapse of the USSR, are free from the Soviet legacy of the “superwoman” and a more likely 
to value individualism and gender equality.  
  The title of Ivan Turgenev’s timeless novel Fathers and Sons has long been 
synonymous with intergenerational conflicts that arise in all societies. In this chapter I seek to 
expand the potential ground of conflict from “fathers and sons” to “mothers and daughters” in 
order to further examine the degree of “normalization” of politics in this new democracy. This 
chapter sets out to uncover the differences between the preferences of Ukrainian voters based on 
age differences as well as gender relations in Ukrainian politics and society. I begin by outlining 
the role of age and gender as well as potential intergenerational and gender conflicts in Ukrainian 
society. The hypotheses are analyzed using the IFES data. Qualitative method of in-depth 
interview is also used to detail emerging feminist thought as exemplified by the young feminist 
movement FEMEN18
5.1 THE OTHER “LOSERS” OF THE TRANSITION 
 
The discussion of age and gender differences in voting behavior and electoral preferences 
presented in this chapter is primarily framed as an extension of Kitschelt’s theory of “winners 
and losers” of the transition (1992, 1995, 2000). As discussed in Chapter 2 Kitshchelt suggests 
                                                 
18 The author personally interviewed the leader and creator of FEMEN, Anna Hutsol on September 6th 2010. Ms. 
Hutsol, gave permission to use her interview for this academic work. The interview was conducted in Russian and 
translated by the author.  
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that the socio-economic cleavage in new post-communist democracies develops between the 
“losers and winners” of the transition (1992, 1995, 2000). Kitschelt identifies winners as those 
persons whose occupational status and professional training under the communist system can put 
them in the advantageous position during the transition to a market economy or easily translate 
into the competitive environment of free market. The losers of the other hand are those whose 
livelihood will be highly likely to suffer under the new market relations. Kitschelt’s argument 
focuses primarily on the occupation and profession of the individuals. Although he does define 
pensioners and other persons on fixed state provided income as “losers”, he does not identify 
them specifically as – elderly, children, and women. The argument presented here, however, 
extends beyond the intergenerational and dichotomous gender differences. Due to learning and 
varying life experiences, I expect that there is a fair amount of variation within both genders 
based on age; however, in this chapter I specifically focus on the females. 
5.2 AGE IN UKRAINIAN POLITICS 
When the USSR was on the brink of extinction following the failure of the military coup in 
Moscow in August of 1991, 31 percent of Ukrainian population was over the age of 50 nearing 
the retirement age19
                                                 
19 Under the soviet system the retirement age was set at 60 for men and 55 for women. The retirement age 
provisions did not change in Ukraine until 2010. Thus, during the years of transition many more persons were 
becoming dependent on state for income, by 2001 the percent increased to 32.3. (Source : State Statistic Committee 
of Ukraine) 
 and 28.4 percent of the population was under 19. Thus, about 50 percent of 
Ukrainian population was in some way dependent on the state income and services simply by 
virtue of their age alone. The persons nearing or at the retirement age depend on state pension 
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and health care benefits. The children under or approaching legal age of 18, on the other hand 
depended on their parents for income and in many cases on state funded childcare and public 
schooling. Extending Kitschelt’s argument about the winners and losers of the transition, one can 
thus suggest that the younger and older age cohorts stood much more to lose as a result of the 
collapse of the socialist economic system and welfare state. 
However, the older cohort’s loss was more than loss of income. The Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republics was one of the founding members of the USSR in 1922. One can argue that 
the Ukrainian state as we know it now is a product of the Soviet system and policies. The elderly 
population of Ukraine is also a generation that was a product of the soviet political and social 
system. These persons, who in 1991 were about 50-60 years old, had lived all their lives under 
the communist system of governance. They were born between 1930 and 1940, which was the 
time of maturation of the Soviet state and the intensity of the inter-war period in the aftermath of 
the global economic crisis. For Ukraine this period is marked by the great famine of the 1930’s 
that some Ukrainian historians attribute to the state policies of the USSR. Their formative years 
coincided with the post-WWII reconstruction period and economic boom. Their youth took place 
during the “golden years” of the 1960’s period of Khrushchev’s “thaw.” In short these persons 
were born, raised, and indoctrinated as true Soviet citizens. The transformation of the regime 
therefore, meant for them much more than mere economic loss based on a self-interested cost 
benefit analysis. The transformation meant the loss of the very life, culture, and state they knew. 
The only state, political and social system they knew was to be transformed beyond recognition 
into something quite unknown and unpredictable.  
The story of the losers and winners of the transition can be expanded to include the age 
cohorts. The older cohorts of persons over 50 at the time of transition can be expected be more 
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supportive of the Communist party and its successor parties, such as the Party of Regions. This 
could be so as a result of both a tangible loss of stable income as a result of market transition and 
a result of nostalgia for the communist society. The majority of Ukrainian elderly population is 
also female. However, I expect that the gender relationship is even more complicated.  
5.3 UKRAINIAN WOMEN AND POLITICS 
Gender represents a very interesting but largely neglected issue in Ukrainian politics.  The 
formal participation and representation of women in the political life of the country remains low. 
Women are less likely to cast a vote than their male counterparts  (Lopez Pintor, Gratschew, and 
Sullivan).  While the percent of parliamentary seats held by women in the Rada, Ukraine’s 
unicameral legislature, constitutes 8% as of February 2010 (2010), this number is still rather low 
compared to the world standards (Jennings 1983) and the view that politics is not really a 
woman’s business seems to persist in Ukraine.  
Shortly after the presidential election in January 2010, the newly appointed Prime 
Minister, Mykola Azarov, defended his all-men cabinet by stating that women have no business 
in politics. As reported by Associate Press “Azarov explained that he meant he wouldn't wish 
any woman, especially if she has children, to work more than 15 hours a day as his ministers 
do”("Ukraine Primier Accused of Discrimination"  2010 ). This remark inspired a chorus of 
criticism at home and abroad, accusing Azarov of gender discrimination. Unfortunately, these 
remarks are not unique to Azarov alone, ViktorYanukovich during his campaign against Yuliya 
Timoshenko has bluntly suggested that she should “go back to the kitchen” ("Ukrainian women 
berate "Neanderthal" PM for sexist remarks"  2010).  The critics of the government seized on the 
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discontent these sexist remarks have inspired among Ukrainian women to suggest that such 
views are outdated and “Neanderthal20
"Ukrainian women berate "Neanderthal" PM for sexist 
remarks"  2010
” and further prove that the government is completely out 
of touch with the Ukrainian population (
). 
The participation and representation of women in politics have been the main focus of 
most studies of gender and politics. In Ukraine, notwithstanding a handful of feminist 
intellectuals, both traditional electoral participation and representation remain very low (Hrycak 
2001, 2007; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Norris 2000). Some scholars have credited the 
political, social, and cultural effects with these low numbers of women’s formal participation and 
representation.  The structure of the electoral system, the legacies of Communist ideology, and 
the revival of traditional gender roles in the post-independence nation-building process of 1990’s 
have all been cited as reasons behind low formal political involvement (Marsh 1996). The 
traditional view of gender roles which confines women to the domestic sphere of child-bearing 
and-rearing has persisted in Ukraine since the Soviet days and has been reinforced by the new 
project of nation building during the transition. 
5.3.1 The Soviet “Superwoman” 
Communist ideology proclaims gender equality. Women are expected to participate in the 
building of the equal and just society alongside men. In light of this ideological prescription the 
Soviet women were granted “emancipation” and encouraged to enter the social life of the 
society. In essence women were encouraged to enter the work-force and be active citizens of the 
                                                 
20 The term coined and publicized by the feminist movement FEMEN 
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USSR (Hrycak 2001). However, the “emancipation” did not challenge the traditional notion of 
women’s role in society; rather it existed side by side with it. The ideological emancipation had 
to coexist with the harsh realities of the new Soviet state formation in the aftermath of the bloody 
civil war. As Alexandra Hrycak (2001) rightfully points out, the decline in population prompted 
the Soviet state to emphasize the child-bearing duties of women as part of their citizen duties and 
responsibilities (2001). Women who had 10 or more children were hailed as heroes, “mat’ 
geroinya,” and awarded medals for their contributions to the state. Thus, the state hailed the 
reproductive duties of women as most admirable and valuable. This created a layered effect of 
sexual subjugation disguised by the emancipatory illusion. 
Women’s participation in the workforce was confined to the lower –status and lower-
paying jobs. The official policy of the state promoted gender equality at the work place, 
including equality of pay and social benefits. However, the equality did not extend to the 
opportunities for employment. Women rarely achieved managerial positions in important spheres 
of industry and were often confined to the unskilled labor position in manufacturing, retail, and 
agriculture (Hrycak 2001) and to the lower-status jobs in the spheres of culture, education, arts. 
This employment segregation coincided with the persistence and reinforcement of women’s 
traditional roles as mothers and nurturers during the Soviet period. In the USSR women were not 
encouraged to make important decisions; rather their job was to nurture the society both literally 
by being a mother, and figuratively by fostering culture and beauty.  
Such state demands placed a so-called double burden on women. They were expected to 
devote themselves to the life of their family and children and to shoulder the responsibilities of 
employment.  The segregation of employment, however, ensured that women remained in the 
lower-income brackets, further solidifying the image of a man as a sole bread-winner. 
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The gender relation remained un-politicized during the communist regime. This was 
largely due to two factors. First, the fact that most men and women had the same access to health 
care, education, and (even if segregated) employment produced the illusion of equality and thus 
prevented public or society wide grievances or disparities between the genders. Secondly, the 
gender relations in the private sphere were left to the realm of home and were never politicized. 
In other words unlike the feminists of the developed democracies Soviet women had no outlet to 
challenge the cultural standards of female subservience (Funk and Mueller 1993).  
5.3.2 Anti-colonial struggle and National Project 
The collapse of the Soviet state and newly acquired independence of Ukraine did not improve 
the situation of females; rather it has reinforced the traditional expectation of womanhood and 
introduced a host of new challenges. During the struggle for independence some women groups 
became active. Women groups organized in opposition to the Soviet war in Afghanistan as well 
as practices of hazing of the new recruit in the Red Army, of the so-called dedovshchina. Women 
also participated in the environmental groups, particularly in the aftermath of the Chernobyl 
disaster. However, post-independence female activism subsided; but, it did not disappear 
(Phillips 2008). 
 Intellectually, Ukrainian feminists faced a dilemma common to the anti-colonial 
feminists all over the world. The struggle for national liberation subsumed the gendered 
grievances by re-framing them in light of society wide colonial oppression (Yuval-Davis 1997). 
That is, women’s grievances were said to be a direct result of Soviet state oppression and  
women’s struggle was framed in line with the overall national struggle (Bogachevska 1993). 
This reframing undermines the value and validity of the feminist plight once independence is 
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achieved and women are at best left with no support in their fight for equality and at worst, and 
most commonly, are forced to assume their traditional place of solely reproductive duties. 
The process of post-colonial nation building has sought to reinforce women’s traditional 
roles as mothers of the nation. The continuing decline in birthrates creates a sense of urgency to 
control and stimulate the reproductive capacity of the women folk. States men portrayed 
women’s participation in the work force as hindering the primary responsibilities of women to 
bear and rare children. A career-oriented female was portrayed as a burden to the society due to 
her incapacity to fulfill her national duties of motherhood. The often referred to image of an ideal 
Ukrainian woman is that of berygynya, of the “keeper of the hearth” a half-goddess image of 
motherhood. This image has become prominent in the popular culture of the new Ukrainian state. 
There are several songs devoted to the half-goddess. The image of berygynya also adorns the 
main tallest tower in the Independence Square, the center of Kiev. 
5.3.3 De-Soveitization and Hyper-Sexualization 
Public opinion research, such as World Values Survey and the surveys of International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems, has also shown strong popular support for traditional 
subservient female roles in the society. Both men and women in the 1990’s seemed to firmly 
believe that men should earn more than women and under the conditions of the economic crisis 
men should have more access to jobs than women (Marsh 1996). 
 The widely held perception of Soviet womanhood as “over-emancipated” further 
contributed to the persistence or even revival of the traditional roles. That is the image of a 
woman as unskilled laborer became to be seen as contradictory to the image of femininity. Thus 
some have claimed that under USSR women have been forced to perform manly duties that led 
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to masculinization of a female; in post-independence Ukraine women are encouraged to re-gain 
their femininity(Hrycak 2001). Thus, the society encouraged women to shed the workman’s 
coveralls and develop feminine attributes of poise and beauty. Travelling down street of Kiev 
one is hard pressed to find a woman out of high heels and a manicure. Unavoidably perhaps, this 
feminization process has been going hand in hand with the hyper-sexualization of Ukrainian 
society. Images of stylized female bodies at various degrees of nudity in entertainment, 
advertising, etc. reinforce the sexual image of females as objects of desire.  Ukrainian society, 
even more so than other post-communist societies, has been hit with the wave of sexual 
exploitation. Since the collapse of the USSR Ukraine has experiences a heretofore unseen levels 
of human sexual trafficking, prostitution, and other forms of sexual exploitation. 
The social and economic conditions of the post-Soviet Ukraine have added tension to the 
gender relations. With all its faults the communist regime had guaranteed a certain level of 
economic and social security to women. However, the disintegration of the USSR took with it 
the social welfare net available for disadvantaged groups including women many of whom fell 
into poverty. Because women remain the main caregivers of children many single mothers have 
found it increasingly hard to “make the ends meet”, as segregation in the work place continues to 
exist in post-soviet Ukraine (Hrycak 2001). Low wages coupled with an increase in the cost of 
living has created much pressure on the women. The transition has also been detrimental in 
reshaping the dynamics of the Ukrainian family. The divorce rate increased during the 1990’s 
leaving many women to fend for their families on their own. Moreover, the increased societal 
pressure on women to perform parenting duties has made fathers ambivalent about their paternal 
roles and responsibilities.  The lack of state laws regulating paternal responsibilities to their 
children adds more socio-economic pressure on mothers (Zhurzhenko 2001). 
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The lack of social mobility has also been a cause for much sexual abuse and exploitation. 
Sexual harassment in the work place and sexual trafficking have become common place in 
Ukrainian society (Hrycak 2001). Given these important issues that Ukrainian women face one 
would expect that under the democratic rule gender differences should become more sharply 
manifested in politics. As the safety net of social welfare guaranteed to women under the 
communist regime disintegrates and culturally accepted inequality of women spills out 
unchecked into the workforce, where laws no longer guarantee equality in the public sphere, one 
should expect to find gendering of political issues (Aidis et al. 2007; Zhurzhenko 2001). 
Moreover, women now have a right to meaningfully cast their ballots in multiparty elections and 
have an opportunity to publically express their interests and grievances (Johnson 2007). In 
particularly expect that younger cohorts of women should exhibit different political behaviors 
than their older counterparts.  
5.3.4 The Timoshenko factor 
 The prominence of Yulija Timoshenko in the political arena of Ukraine deserves a special 
notice. Her personality and political activity provoke various reactions within Ukraine and 
abroad. In 2005 Forbes magazine named the then-Prime Minister of Ukraine, the third most 
influential woman in the world21. After her sacking as PM in 2006, she and her party still rose up 
during the 2007 election to pose opposition to the majority coalition headed by the Party of 
Regions. In 2008 she was back among 100 most influential women at number 1722
                                                 
21 http://www.tymoshenko.ua/en/page/about 
. 
22 http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/11/biz_powerwomen08_Yulia-Tymoshenko_PGEZ.html 
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 At home her image and persona invoke both admiration and hostility. Some Ukrainians 
see her as a leader of the real democratic opposition in Ukraine. Some see her as an embodiment 
of femininity and power; others see her as nothing more than a common thug and an oligarch 
trying to protect her illegally made fortune. However, regardless of her political motivation and 
ideological inclination the mere existence of a powerful female politician provides a powerful 
new incentive for women’s political engagement. Although Timoshenko has been criticized for 
her lack of focus on specifically gendered issues, I would argue that her political activity alone 
has been most influential for gender relations in Ukrainian society. Yet, I also expect temporal 
fluctuations in female voters’ support of Timoshenko. While widely popular in the wake of the 
Orange Revolution, Timoshenko managed to tarnish her reputation during her time as Prime 
Minister. The lack of gendered policies on her agenda alienated some of her female supporters. 
This behavior supports the main argument of this inquiry regarding the ability of voters to act in 
a sophisticated and complex manner. 
 
In this chapter I seek to explore the generational and gender differences in vote choice 
among Ukrainians by extending the theoretical expectations of developmental cleavage and 
learning models to age and gender in the new democracy. Similarly to the previous chapter’s 
analysis I classify Ukrainian citizens into three generational categories of early –Soviet, Soviet, 
and post-Soviet citizens. Early-Soviet generation includes those born before 1954 and 
consequently spent most of their adult lives in the USSR. Soviet generations are those born 
during 1955 – 1974 and therefore, were formed by the Soviet system itself.  The Post-Soviet 
generation is presumed to be born after 1975 and therefore, had very little experience with the 
political, social, and economic systems of the USSR. 
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The analysis of the previous chapter has shown real generational differences in Ukrainian 
citizens’ ability to cast votes correctly. I further expect that there are notable differences in 
voting behavior between the generations. Moreover, I expect to find intergenerational differences 
in voting behavior among women. Theoretical extension of the “winners and losers” model to 
age and gender in the new democracies coupled with the learning model produces the following 
set of hypotheses.  
 
5.3.5 Overall Effect of Age and Gender 
H1. Older generations are more supportive of the Communist party and its perceived 
successors on the left.  
 
H2. Women are more likely than men to support BYuT 
 
H3. Younger and middle aged women as opposed to older women vote according to the 
gender lines. 
 
Overtime changes 
H4. Decline in voters’ support for BYuT 
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5.4 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The hypotheses are tested with the use of the IFES data from 1994, 1997 -2008. The models used 
for the test of the first two hypotheses are the same as used in the analysis employed in Chapter 
2. First, the logistic regression model is used to analyze the overall impact of age and gender on 
voting preferences. The second model includes the inclusion of the time variable. The 
independent variables are interacted with the year counter. The models include all the social 
cleavage categories from Chapter 2 analysis. Table 5.1 depicts the results of the analysis 
specifically for gender and age effects. 
 
Table 5-1 Age and Gender Effect on Party Vote (Odds Ratios) 
 
CPU 
 
RUKH 
 
Our 
Ukraine 
 
BYuT 
 
Party of 
Regions 
 
 
Model 1 
Model 
2 Model 1 
Model 
2 Model 1 
Model 
2 Model 1 
Model 
2 Model 1 
Model 
2 
Age  1.50*** 1.54*** 1 1.37** 1.03 0.52* 1.08* 1.69 0.99 2.74*** 
 
0.06 0.19 0.1 0.18 0.06 0.19 0.05 1.21 0.04 0.35 
Age *YR 
 
1.01 
 
0.96*** 
 
1.05* 
 
0.97 
 
0.94*** 
  
0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.04 
 
0.01 
Female  0.79** 1.39*** 0.68* 0.67 0.87 0.07 1.20* 9.26*** 0.85* 0.25 
 
0.07 0.15 0.14 0.34 0.12 0.16 0.12 6.37 0.08 0.24 
Female 
*YR 
 
0.95*** 
 
1 
 
1.18 
 
0.88*** 
 
1.08 
  
0.01 
 
0.05 
 
0.19 
 
0.04 
 
0.07 
Year 
Count 
Variable 
 
0.78*** 
 
1.06 
 
0.16*** 
 
1.1 
 
1.96 
  
0.07 
 
0.16 
 
0.11 
 
0.21 
 
2.02 
Pseudo 
R 2 0.12 0.21 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.07 
N 5559 5559 2570 2570 2989 2989 2989 2989 2989 2989 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results presented here show support for the above hypotheses.  Older members of the 
society vote predominantly for the Communist party and its perceived successor Party of the 
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Regions. Women on the other hand seem to be more favorable toward the Bloc Yulii 
Timoshenko. Timoshenko as mentioned before is not an uncontroversial political figure; 
however, she is the first truly remarkable woman politician of the post-communist Ukraine. 
Although Timoshenko has been criticized by some for her lack of focus on specifically feminist 
issues, her presence in the political arena alone can be seen as emancipation in action. During the 
2010 electoral campaign Timoshenko’s campaign ads referred to her only as vona or she, 
underlining the gender difference between her and her opponents.  
 The remaining hypotheses are tested in the similar fashion. Interactions of age and gender 
variables allow evaluating the differences between the age groups of women. Model 1 shows the 
direct effects of age and gender on vote. Model 2 includes the time interactions.  Educational 
level and regional residence are included in both models as controls.  Table 5.2 depicts the result 
of the analysis of the third hypothesis stated above, while Figures 5.1 and 5.2 depict these results 
in form of bar graphs. The results suggest that there are notable differences between the age 
cohorts of women in their vote choice. These results further support that above hypotheses. 
Women of the early Soviet generations are much more likely to support the Communist Party 
and Party of Regions then their younger counterparts. As figure 5.1 shows, the support for these 
leftist parties is low among the Soviet generation and even lower among the post-Soviet 
generation. The Communist party is often perceived as traditional and patriarchal, thus the lack 
of overall support among younger generations is not surprising. Moreover, the early-Soviet 
generation may hold special idealistic allegiance to the Communist party coupled with the 
nostalgia for the past.  
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Table 5-2 Age Cohort Differences in Vote Choice among Females 
 
CPU RUKH Our Ukraine BYuT Party of Regions 
 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 Model 2 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Early Soviet 
Generation 1.50*** 2.29*** 0.60*** 1.41*   0.64*** 0.05** 1.02 1.58 1.21* 2.84 
 
0.12 0.63 0.12 0.26 0.11 0.07 0.12 2.15 0.13 3.36 
Soviet 
Generation 0.56*** 0.78 0.72 1.04 0.91 0.23 1.25* 1.59** 0.77** 0.16*** 
 
0.06 0.2 0.16 0.85 0.14 0.66 0.15 0.35 0.09 0.03 
Post-Soviet 
Generation 0.13*** 7.25 1.11               1.01 21.57*** 1.28* 1.2 0.70*** 0.05**  
 
0.04 12.12 0.54               0.17 25 0.17 1.73 0.09 0.06 
Education 
Level 0.65*** 0.84*** 0.89 0.87 0.93 0.97 1.06 1.03 0.99 0.98 
 
0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.03 
Region 0.72*** 0.74*** 2.34*** 2.33*** 1.31*** 1.3 1.34*** 1.35 0.80*** 0.8 
 
0.02 0.05 0.2 0.45 0.07 0.33 0.05 0.27 0.03 0.21 
Early Soviet 
Generation*YR 
 
0.97 
 
0.90*** 
 
1.17* 
 
0.97 
 
0.95 
  
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.1 
 
0.08 
 
0.07 
Soviet 
Generation*YR 
 
0.94* 
 
0.96 
 
1.09 
 
0.99 
 
1.10*** 
  
0.03 
 
0.08 
 
0.2 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
Post-Soviet 
Generation*YR 
 
0.77 
 
0.99 
 
0.82*** 
 
1.01 
 
1.19*   
  
0.13 
 
0.02 
 
0.06 
 
0.09 
 
0.1 
Year  
 
0.82*** 
 
1.09 
 
0.48** 
 
1.66*** 
 
1.23 
  
-0.02 
 
-0.2 
 
-0.14 
 
-0.14 
 
-0.16 
Pseudo R 2 0.09 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 
 
 
 Figure 5.1 also shows high support for the Bloc Yulii Timoshenko among the female 
voters of the Soviet and post-Soviet generations. This finding supports the above hypothesis H3 
suggesting that younger cohorts are more likely to vote along gender lines than more mature 
women. This is an important finding suggesting that younger cohorts of women are aware of the 
gender issues and willing to vote in accordance with these preferences.  
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Figure 29 Overall Support for Political Parties Among Females by Generation 
 
 
 
Figure 30 Overtime Changes in Political Party Support among Females by Generation 
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 The overtime fluctuations in party support are depicted in Figure 5.2 and also support the 
above hypothesis. Despite the overall general support for BYuT among younger female voters, 
the coefficients depicting the overtime support for Timoshenko’s do not appear to have statistical 
significance. Moreover, the results show an increase in support of Party of Regions among the 
Soviet and post-Soviet generations of women. This result is not entirely surprising given the 
overall expectation of this chapter regarding the behavior of women as potential losers of the 
transition. In addition to increased support for the Party of Regions, the results show an increased 
support for the Communist Party among women of the Soviet generation. This increased support 
for the leftist parties can be explained by the increased women’s awareness of their status of the 
losers of the transition. Moreover, I expect that a certain degree of nostalgia for the past drives 
this increase in the support for the Communist party among women of the Soviet generation. 
Unlike their younger counterparts who had very little experience with the Soviet system and the 
Communist party and therefore have no cognitive alternative to the Party of Regions, women of 
the Soviet generation have this important frame of reference. Thus, the results clearly show the 
important differences between age cohorts as well as the ability of Ukrainian voters to properly 
evaluate the electoral conditions vis-à-vis personal preferences and cast their vote accordingly. 
 
5.5 FEMEN: A RISE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMAN? 
The statistical results above suggest that the gender cleavage is present in Ukrainian society. The 
continued support for the Blok Timoshenko might signal the beginning of institutionalization of 
this important cleavage. Emergence and institutionalization of gender cleavage can also be 
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shown by increased female activism in during the second decade of the transition. Several 
scholars have noted the increase in female activism in years after the Orange revolution (Hrycak 
2007; Phillips 2008). This new evidence suggests that things might be changing even more as 
younger women become politically active. The younger cohorts of women, who grew up in the 
post-Soviet Ukraine, have a very different perspective on life and politics than their mothers and 
grandmothers.  These women are unburdened by the political socialization of the Soviet state and 
were not subjected to the expectations to become “superwomen.” They value their femininity as 
much as they value their independence. 
 As these younger women of independent Ukraine take the political stage the gender 
relations in Ukraine are changing. The studies of gender relations in Ukraine, as in the rest of the 
former USSR republics have focused on the intellectual influences on the development of 
feminism.  These studies explore the long standing debates among a small group of individuals 
who possess the intellectual background and authority to engage in deep rooted debates on 
women’s equality and rights. However, there is a new wave of feminism in Ukraine.  This wave 
is exemplified in a youthful, spunky, outrageous, vocal, and sometimes outright absence feminist 
movement FEMEN.  
Organized in 2008 by Anna Hutsol, a young economist who cares for women’s rights 
more than economics, FEMEN defines itself as a social movement.  It is composed mostly of 
young women of college age.  FEMEN seeks to project an image of vibrant young Ukrainian 
women who are aware of social inequalities plaguing their society and seek to bring awareness to 
these important issues. FEMEN had become famous for its theatrical protests against social and 
political inequalities by baring their bodies and using them as billboards for political messages in 
down town Kiev.  
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According to Hutsol, FEMEN activists believe that the younger women of Ukraine have 
a serious stake in the society and development of democracy. It is their goal to raise awareness of 
conditions that these women find unacceptable and spark the discussion on sexual discrimination 
in the workplace and at the institutions of higher education, sexual exploitation in form of 
prostitution and sexual trafficking, dwindling democratic freedoms, and government corruption. 
The participants, according to Hutsol, believe that democracy in Ukraine goes hand in hand with 
furthering women’s rights. They define themselves as a movement of democratization as well as 
a feminist movement.  
The movement has attracted some 25000 participants who communicate with one another 
primarily via social network sites such as Facebook, My Space, V Kontakte, etc.  The activists 
stage theatrical protests that attract the attention of national and international media with 
campaigns such as “Ukraine is not a brothel” and “End to Dirty Politics.” Each of the campaign 
involves highly sexualized method of communication in order for the messages to reach the 
observers. As Hutsol states, the only way to reach public and politicians is to use the shock 
values and media attention, both of which make the message more urgent and legitimate. Hutsol 
claims that had FEMEN relied on traditional ways of communication, they would not be taken 
seriously and that it is much harder to disregard a bunch of beautiful naked women.  
When asked about the possible counterproductive nature of the methods, Hutsol states 
that the movement members do not believe that it is counterproductive quite the opposite. Firstly, 
the methods of the movement attract the participation of younger women by keeping activism 
light and fun. According to Hutsol the more “traditional” feminist organizations tend to be run by 
older women who tend to be very intellectual and “preachy” and alienate the younger crowds.  
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Second, the unconventional and dramatic manner of the campaigns receives enough 
publicity and attention to help jump start the important discussions within the society that were 
taboo beforehand. In essence, Hutsol claims that the backward view of young women held by 
Ukrainian population forbids the society and politicians from taking anything said by a young 
woman, no matter how salient, seriously. Yet, the publicity of the activism puts pressure on the 
politicians to act as well as opens room for new discourse on gender relations.  
According to Hutsol, FEMEN has achieved some positive legislation dealing with 
prostitution laws and illegal downloads of pornography. Moreover, FEMEN has apparently 
influenced feminist movements elsewhere. Hutsol claims that FEMEN has international contacts 
with other groups and activists in Sweden, Russian, and Germany. She says that there have been 
more protests with the similar “signature.” Hutsol claims that FEMEN’s “signature move” “A 
naked woman protesting against those things she does not approve of” is being copied elsewhere.  
While being very cognizant and frank about the dangers of such activism in present day 
Ukraine, Hutsol remains optimistic about the future of the organization. She suggests that the 
current political leadership of Viktor Yanukovich does not look kindly upon any political 
opposition. Moreover, she suggests that the majority of the population as well as “the powers 
that be” do not believe that young women are capable of organizing themselves. Hutsols 
suggests that people dislike the activists and call them opinionated and obnoxious or believe that 
their activities are organized and sponsored by the foreign government. Yet, she states that at 
some point in the near future FEMEN hopes to become a political party with a strong pro-
democratic feminist agenda. Hutsol believes that FEMEN provides an educational ground for 
younger women teaches them the value of political participation and fosters good contacts for 
future involvement. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter focused on the effect of age and gender in the development of sophisticated 
electorate and “normalized” politics in the new democracy of Ukraine. While age and gender are 
often treated as control variables, very little attention is paid to their effect on their own merit. I 
argue that Kitschelt’s argument regarding the “winners and losers” of the transition should be 
expanded to account for age and gender as possible identifiers of losers and winners during the 
transition. Older persons and women can be seen as losers in the transition because of their 
reliance on the social welfare net of the USSR. Moreover, for older generations the transition is 
more difficult due to their socialization and indoctrination under the previous regime.  
 The results presented above largely support the proposed hypotheses. The older persons 
are more likely to support the Communist Party and Party of Regions, which some scholars have 
identified as a successor party to the Communists after their decline in 2002 (Zimmer and Haran 
2008).  This suggests a continued commitment to the communist party on the basis of nostalgic 
attachments. Moreover, as Chapter 4 clearly shown the middle aged and younger population has 
learned more quickly to cast votes more accurately then their older counterparts.  
 Gender is a very real and significant factor in Ukrainian politics. The presence of such 
powerful female figures and Timoshenko and activism of young feminist such FEMEN seem to 
give rise to the institutionalization capacity of the developing gender gap. The learning model 
suggests that individual voters learn from their experience with the democratic process and 
become more sophisticated in their analysis of the electoral choices. The rise of gender in 
Ukrainian politics, specifically among the younger generations is direct evidence of this process. 
The younger women of Ukraine differ markedly from their mothers and grandmothers. Their 
experience with electoral politics in independent Ukraine gives them an opportunity to 
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legitimately view themselves as part of the political process and empowers them to act on this 
perception.  
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6.0  THE LESSONS OF THE UKRAINIAN VOTER 
The “third” wave of democratization that has swept through the globe in the later part of the 
twentieth century produced an unparalleled ripple effect in the political science literature. 
Numerous scholars turned to the empirical wealth offered by the cases of newly transitioning 
states in order to evaluate the development of democracies and various components necessary for 
this miraculous socio-political transformation. The complexity of democratic development could 
not be underestimated. From institutional set up, to electoral procedure, to social and economic 
development the list of building blocks is extensive (Diamond 1993, 1999; Diamond, Linz, and 
Lipset 1995; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996).  
To date the majority of work that has examined the Ukrainian path to democracy 
represents an impressive body of work focusing on the analysis of macro-level forces such as 
economic development, institutional design and elite behaviors (Åslund 2009; D'Anieri 2006; 
Kuzio 1997; Kuzio 2000; Kuzio 2003, 2005, 2008; Kuzio and Wilson 1994). The evaluation of 
individual voter’s behavior, however, is largely underdeveloped when compared to the larger 
body of literature. Among the scholars focusing on Ukrainian politics and society there is an 
unfortunate consensus that Ukrainian electorate is “the least likely segment of Ukrainian polity “ 
to influence political processes (Copsey 2005). Yet, the events of the Orange Revolutions 
showed that the citizens of Ukraine had a surprise for the scholars. It does not seem reasonable 
any longer to ignore the Ukrainian voter and her role in the development of a democratic 
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Ukraine. In a recent publication Timothy J. Colton (2011) lamented the lack of the individual 
level analysis of Ukrainian electorate. My study is a decisive attempt to remedy this short 
coming. 
The intricate relationship between the voters and the political elites is pivotal for a 
healthy democracy where organized political elites compete for the votes of the citizens they 
seek to represent. Therefore, the interworking of this relationship receives attention in the 
literature on voting behavior in established democratic societies. In the exploration of these 
electoral relationships a special focus has been traditionally placed on the development of the 
social linkages between the citizens and the elected officials.  More specifically the ethno-
cultural and socio-economic divisions within the society have enjoyed much exploration. These 
social cleavages are well documented as the root for political competition in the old western 
democracies and are believed to serve potentially important roles in the new democracies as well 
(G. Evans and S. Whitefield 1995; Evans and Whitefield 2006; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).  
Such group identities are viewed as influential in the contexts of the developing 
democracies because they provide important electoral services to both the voters and the elites. 
For the voters, who are unskilled in the democratic process, group identities, such as ethnic, 
linguistic, and regional identification might serve as cognitive shortcuts (Birnir 2007). For the 
elites such identifications serve as important tools for mobilization of supporters (Snyder 2000).  
Yet, other analyses of voting behavior suggest that social cleavages have lost their saliency in 
predicting vote choice (Clark 2001; Clark and Lipset 1991, 2001; Knutsen 2006).  Instead voters 
rely more on campaign specific effects such as the evaluation of political, economic, and social 
issues, as well as evaluation of political leadership in casting their votes.  
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In the preceding pages I’ve explored the development of the political behavior among 
Ukrainian voters in order to shed more light on this important process in the new democratic 
polity.  Relying on the logic proposed by Russell Dalton (Dalton 1996, 2006), I proposed that 
voting decision in a new democracy is more than a product of social cleavages or election 
specific factors alone. Rather, it is a complex interplay of all of these components. Moreover, 
over time the voters are able to use the tools of decision making with more precision due to their 
experience with democracy and learning. New democracies of the post-Communist space did not 
spring out onto the world arena untainted by their historical experiences. Thus, these societies 
already possessed certain cultural, historical, political, and other divisions that could lend 
themselves to the formation of political social linkages. Furthermore, the degree of technological 
and societal development in these societies proposed a higher level of sophistication among the 
voters that would make it possible for them to evaluate the political satiations with high degree 
of cerebral activity and cast their votes accordingly. 
 As a case of culturally, ethnically, and linguistically divided society going through its 
first ever experience with democratic governance and market economy, Ukraine presents a 
unique laboratory for an evaluation of the developmental theories in voting behavior. As per 
developmental hypothesis addressed in Chapter 2, one can expect that the ethno-cultural and 
socio-economic division should find their way in to the political realm and heavily influence the 
stabilization of votes and institutionalization of political parties. The results of the empirical 
analysis, however, suggest that although these social group identifications and economic 
evaluations play an important role in determining the vote choice during certain electoral cycles, 
they tell only a part of the electoral story. Instead, I’ve argued that voters rely on a much broader 
inventory of cognitive tools in their decision making during the elections. To boot, as Chapter 4 
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has shown, over time, as citizens have more experience with democratic process, the voters hone 
their electoral skills and learn how to use their cognitive tools with more precision.  
The results of this study have some interesting implications for the study of Ukrainian 
politics and a broader literature on voting behavior. The Ukrainian voter is a sophisticated citizen 
equipped with a variety of cognitive tools s/he employs in evaluating electoral options. The 
presence of such voters bodes well for the stabilization and consolidation of political party 
system and Ukrainian democracy more generally. Furthermore, the curious case of the Ukrainian 
voter suggests a need to reexamine the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of democratic 
consolidation hypotheses as well as the developmental modes of electoral behavior. The goal of 
this concluding section of my inquiry into political behavior of the Ukrainian voters is to 
summarize the key findings of this study and further elucidate the important implication these 
findings hold for the broader literature on political behavior in the new democracies, as well as 
for the study of Ukrainian politics and society. 
 
6.1 CITIZENS’ POLITICS IN UKRAINE 
 The infamous two colored map of Ukraine is a familiar sight for all who either have a slight 
interest in Ukrainian politics or study it with zeal. The map depicting the regional split makes its 
appearance without fail after each presidential and to a lesser extent parliamentary election that 
takes place in Ukraine. These appearances are so frequent and well publicized that the whole 
study of Ukrainian electoral politics has been reduced to the geographic regional focus.  The 
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belief that we can predict Ukrainian citizen’s voting preferences based on the region of their 
residence has become perilously widespread.  
Such assumptions unfairly diminish the citizens’ role in politics; a role that is already 
largely seen as minimal by some scholars who portray the citizens as nothing more than subjects 
of political play among the powerful elites and victims of institutional shortcomings. Empirically 
such focus is problematic because of its concentration on aggregate level data and these 
assumptions that might inevitably lead to the wide spread ecological fallacy.  Moreover, the 
focus on regional differences continues to fuel a notion of Ukraine as a highly divided society 
plagued by ethno-cultural divisions.  
It is my firm belief that it is time to shift the focus to the individual level of voters and 
start paying more attention to the role of citizens in this new democracy. If the Orange revolution 
was any indication of the political maturity of Ukrainian citizens, as it has been hailed in recent 
literature (Åslund 2009; Aslund and McFaul 2006), the role of individual voters can no longer be 
ignored. This study is a step in this direction. Throughout this inquiry I sought to show that 
Ukrainian society is vibrant and complex and that citizens have an important role to play in 
consolidating and stabilizing the democratic regime through participation.  
 Ethno-cultural and socio-economic divisions within Ukrainian society exists and should 
not be dismissed. Yet, there are some interesting fluctuations in the nature and manifestation of 
these cleavages. This analysis has shown that there appears to be a general decline in the salience 
of ethnicity and linguistic characteristics on individuals’ vote choice over time and an increase in 
the socio-economic cleavages among Ukrainians. The increase in socio-economic considerations 
is particularly prominent in the late 1990’s and there is a sharp increase in identity politics in the 
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first decade of the 21st century. I would speculate that this is a result of the population’s reacting 
toward the salient issues of the day.   
As I discussed in Chapter 3, after independence Ukraine faced several unprecedented 
issues including transition to market economy, development of democracy, and nation-state 
building. The discussion of the market reform and the issues of  national sovereignty have 
dominated the political discourse since 1991(Colton 2011). The question of national sovereignty 
was linked to the geopolitical vector of Ukraine’s foreign policy. In the early 1990’s the 
Kravchuk administration had focused primarily on the issues of state building such as the 
introduction of Ukrainian as the official state language and attempting to distance Ukraine from 
Russia, while ignoring the pressing matters of economic reforms. Kravchuk paid for this decision 
dearly during the presidential election of 1994 when he lost to Leonid Kuchma. 
While in office 1994-2004, Kuchma brought economic reform to the forefront of the 
political discussion. Yet, his clumsy handling of the economic reform bred further division 
between different social classes of the Ukrainians. The socio-economic cleavage between  the 
“winners and the losers” of the transition intensified as a result of a society wide debate 
surrounding the transition to market economy, the content and the pace of these reforms.  
In the early 2000’s, however, with the help of the Viktor Yushchenko23
                                                 
23 A former banker and a doctor of economics, Yushchenko, served as a Prime Minister under Kuchma 1999-2001. 
In 2001 he was ousted from the position by a vote of no-confidence.  Following his firing Yushchenko engaged in 
organizing his Our Ukraine party, which successfully campaigned in the 2002 parliamentary election. Yushchenko 
became Ukraine’s president in 2004. 
, Ukraine’s 
economic reforms took root and its market economy was consolidated by 2005. As a result, the 
debate over the economic reform subsided and the yet unresolved issue of national sovereignty 
and identity and geopolitical leanings of Ukraine returned to the forefront of the political 
discussion during the 2004 presidential election. The results of this inquiry demonstrate a 
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significant increase in the prominence of the identity politics. Both the Party of Regions and Bloc 
Yulii Timoshenko are centrist parties with very similar populist agendas, their appeal to the 
public relies therefore on the one unresolved left over questions from Ukraine’s post-Soviet, 
post-imperial past. The voters are therefore reacting to these appeals. 
However, there is more to Ukrainian voter than meets the eye. The results of this inquire 
suggested that there numerous are cross-cutting cleavages at play in Ukrainian society. The 
importance of linguistic and ethnic characteristics have subsided over time. The evaluation of 
issues and candidates are proving to play an important role in voters’ decision making. 
Moreover, these decisions are becoming more accurate as Ukrainian voters have more 
experience with democratic process and learn through experience. These observations regarding 
the political behavior of Ukrainian voters have important implications for the future development 
of programmatic political parties in Ukraine as well as the further stabilization and consolidation 
of democracy in Ukraine.  
  
6.2 ELECTORAL COMPETITION: PARTIES AND CITIZENS 
Scholars agree that the presence of institutionalized programmatic political parties is a necessary 
component of consolidated democracy and that they serve several key functions in the 
democratic process (Linz and Stepan 1996). They organize the political elites, aggregate the 
political views of the public and articulate these concerns into public policy proposals. In short, 
the political parties provide organizational structure for the relations between voters and elites 
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(Kitschelt 1992, 1995, 2000). However, the formation of these parties has been problematic in 
the new post-communist democracies including Ukraine.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the political parties that formed in Ukraine are clientilist and 
personalistic. The legacy of “patrimonial” communism, the overall citizens’ distaste for political 
parties, and their inexperience with democratic process made the programmatic political party 
formation in Ukraine a difficult task. According to Kitschelt it will be difficult to form 
programmatic parties as long as 1) there is no economic growth and 2) voters remain 
unsophisticated. However, the empirical results of this inquiry show there are reasons for 
cautious optimism. Ukraine has moved toward growing market economy in the early 21st century 
and voters do appear to exhibit necessary sophistication.  
Chapters 2 and 3 have argued that the voters are aware of numerous components of their 
political surroundings and Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated that the voters have become more 
precise in expressing their electoral preferences. This behavior should very well push the parties 
toward appropriate gravitational poles of the competition axis. The results presented in the 
analysis of Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that the Party of Regions has already shifted to the left to 
fill the void left by the communists. The direction of the Bloc Yulii Timoshenko remains 
unclear. Moreover, the introduction of the proportional representation in the elections to Rada, 
Ukraine’s unicameral parliament, might very well contribute to this process. On the one hand, 
PR introduces a possibility of new parties forming to fill the ideational void left by the centrist 
parties. On the other hand, PR should entice sincere voting among electorates and force the 
parties to adopt more programmatic stances in order to secure the vote and support base.  A word 
of caution, however, remains. The question of national identity of Ukraine is still an unresolved 
issue that might plague Ukrainian political life for some time to come. 
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6.3 DEMOCRATIC CONTINUITY 
As Russell Dalton eloquently puts it, like all human activity the democratic process is far from 
perfect, however, the power of democratic governance rests firmly on the premise that citizens 
are the best judges of what’s best for them (2006).  The key to representation is the voter’s 
capacity to evaluate her electoral options and chose those that represent her own views and 
values.  Through the democratic process of political engagement the citizens are capable of 
influencing the direction of their society. By casting their votes citizens communicate their will. 
Moreover, the citizens hold the ruling elite accountable for their actions by rewarding and 
punishing them with the extension or termination of office.  
The normative theories about democracies have long suggested that a functioning 
democracy is only possible with a knowledgeable and engaged citizenry. If the citizens are 
unaware or passive they can be easily manipulated by the elites. Therefore, the development of 
vibrant civil society  has been identified by the scholars of democratization as an important task 
of democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996).  In the absence of savvy citizenry the newly 
democratizing states might fall victims to the so-called “gray zone” of electoral authoritarianism, 
where the elites manipulate electoral process and citizenry (Carothers 2002). 
The empirical findings of this study suggest that Ukrainian voters are gaining political 
sophistication.  First, Ukrainians are well aware of their socio-economic status and form issue 
stances based on these characteristics. Second, as democracy ages the Ukrainian public is 
displaying higher levels of accurate voting. This suggests that voters are learning the democratic 
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process and are capable of evaluating the candidates and cast their votes appropriately instead of 
relying on the group cues. These findings are very promising for the stabilization of Ukrainian 
democracy provided the institutional climate remains static and the political elites maintain their 
democratic commitments.  
The events of the Orange Revolution of 2004 showed that citizens of Ukraine are capable 
and willing to serve as the guardians of democratic process. Since the events of the 2004, 
Ukraine has held several parliamentary and one presidential election. All of these elections have 
been recognized as free and fair. The 2010 presidential election is particularly interesting in the 
fact that it gave victory to Victor Yanukovich, the leader of the Party of Regions and an 
opponent of the Orange coalition. Yet, the societies’ acceptance of the results suggests the 
further maturation of democratic institutions, democratic values, and democratic citizens. It 
remains to be seen if these trends persist, however. The Yanukovich government has taken 
several decisive steps including repression of political activists, the repeal of the Constitutional 
amendment that gave more power to the parliament, arrest of the former PM Yulii Timoshenko 
and an extension of Russian Fleet’s presence in the Black Sea. These events make the observers 
wary of Yanukovich’s commitment to democratic process in Ukraine. The Ukrainian citizens, 
however, should have an opportunity to make their sentiments known during the upcoming 
parliamentary and presidential elections.  
Timoshenko’s arrest has undermined the legitimacy of Yanukovich’s government at 
home and abroad ("US, EU condem the arrest of Tymoshenko"  2011). She was arrested in the 
process of a trial where Timoshenko was accused of corruption and exceeding her powers during 
the negotiations of the gas prices with Russian Gazprom officials during her term is PM in early 
2009("Ukraine’s ex-PM Tymoshenko arrested"  2011).  Timoshenko’s arrest was justified by the 
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authorizes on the basis of her continued lack of respect toward the judge, the proceedings, and 
witnesses including the former president Yushchenko and current PM Mykola Azarov 
("Freedom House condemns Tymoshenko arrest"  2011). The leaders of the EU and Russia both 
have expressed concerns over Yanukovich’s decision to detain Timoshenko. The arrest has also 
led to overwhelming domestic reaction. The supporters of Timoshenko are continuing to demand 
her release. Most recently the young feminist group, FEMEN, staged one of their famous 
“topless protests” demanding the release of Timoshenko and return of Ukraine to democracy 
(Mamchur 2011). The protests have been frequent and peaceful suggesting Ukrainian public 
commitment to democratic values.  
This study’s analyses of gender and age effects on political behavior give further reasons 
for cautious optimism for the flourishing Ukrainian democracy. The study suggested that the 
middle aged and younger populations proved more adaptable to democratic process and learn 
from their experience with it the most. This suggests that the legitimacy of democracy in Ukraine 
as “the only game in town” increases (Linz and Stepan 1996). Moreover, the increased political 
activism among younger Ukrainian women is also a cause for optimism. The societal acceptance 
of human dignity and open dialogue about women’s issues signals the move, albeit a small one, 
from security based transitional concerns to more democratic values (Inglehart 1990, 1997; 
Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  
 
 
 197 
6.4 BEYOND THE UKRAININA CONTEXT 
 
The empirical results of this study have several important implications beyond the Ukrainian 
context. This study contributes to the theoretical and conceptual discussion of the development 
of electoral behavior in the new democracies as well as a broader discussion on democratic 
consolidation.  
The developmental models of voting behavior that focus on social divisions as basis the 
for voter/elite connection are wide-spread in the literature on new democracies. Taking their root 
from the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), these models provide a sound argument 
regarding the formation of cleavages as social connections for political competition. The 
literature analyzing the development of the social cleavages differentiate between the ethno-
cultural and socio-economic cleavages. The finding presented here support the overall 
conclusion of the broader literature suggesting that the ethno-cultural cleavages seem to be more 
prominent then socio-economic cleavages (Converse 1974; Lijphart 1971, 1979) as the finding 
of Chapter 2 vividly illustrated.  
However, the results of this enquiry also support the claim that social class is far from 
dead in the new democracies of the post-communist Europe(G. Evans and S. Whitefield 1995; 
Evans and Whitefield 1998). The societies where the communist system prevented the 
development of capitalism the socio-economic divisions among the member of the society 
become prominent as these countries move toward market reforms. Moreover, there seem to be 
various types of socio-economic cleavages developing overtime. The initial debate on the merits 
of the market reform led to the creation of the basic cleavage between the potential “winners and 
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losers” of the transition. Yet, over time as economic transition establishes firmly one can expect 
the development of an occupation based class cleavage.  
 However, as I’ve argued here, as prominent as social cleavages might be they provide 
only a part of the story.  While ethno-national and socio-economic cleavages do influence voters’ 
electoral choices, the population of new democracies of the third wave seem to have more 
cognitive tools at their disposal. A wide spread education and heightened economic and 
technological development might serve as root causes for a wider array of cognitive methods 
used by “new” democratic public. Thus, the analysis of voting behavior in the new democracies 
should be re-examined to take into account these sophisticated publics. The developmental 
process encompasses factors broader than group affiliation or economic self-interest. 
The ethno-cultural and socio-economic evaluation play a tremendous part in voters 
capacity to evaluate their electoral choice and to cast votes, however, they play a little role in the 
systematic development of the voters capacity. The developmental process is much broader and 
extends far beyond the mere economic self-interest or group affiliation. I argue that over time, as 
voters have more practice with democratic process they become more sophisticated and learn 
how to properly link their own preferences with the appropriate parties and candidates relying on 
numerous factors that go beyond ethno-cultural and socio-economic attributes 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Hubert Kitshchelt argued that important political cleavages in 
the new post-communist democracies would form around the conflict between the “losers” and 
the “winners” of the transition(1995, 2000). By winners he means those persons whose 
occupational status and job placement could easily translate into the market relations. The losers 
on the other hand, are those persons whose professional training and occupational positioning 
would not fare well under the conditions of free market. Thus, during the transition highly 
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trained professionals occupying managerial posts are pegged against the low skilled urban and 
rural laborers.  
While this is a very reasonable claim, the analysis presented in this inquiry suggests that 
this classification of losers and winners is incomplete. The analysis of the Ukrainian voter 
suggests that the scholarly discussion about the conflict prompted by the economic, social and 
political transition should be widened to include the other losers of the transition – elderly and 
women24
Inglehart and Norris 
2000
. The study of generational and gender relations in the society is usually left to the lot of 
the sociologists, however, there is much to be learned from the examination of these 
demographic variables in the study of democratic stabilization. The findings suggest that the 
middle aged and younger populations seem to be more likely to be the fast learners and therefore 
adapt to the new socio-political conditions more quickly. Women, on the other hand, seem to 
always fall in to the category of losers of political power play. Some analyses have argued that 
democracy and the high degree of gender equality are highly correlated (
, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris 2000) Thus, more attention could be paid to such 
factors as women’s political representation and political activism in the study of democratic 
consolidation. 
The analysis of correct voting is a relatively new venue in the field of political behavior 
and up to this point has been exclusively applied in the context of the presidential elections in the 
United States (Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Richard R.   Lau and David P. Redlawsk 2001). This 
inquiry is a first attempt to apply the methodological and theoretical assumption of these models 
to other contexts. Further exploration of this approach could prove helpful for further cross 
national analysis of the importance of heuristics in electoral decision making, as well as further 
                                                 
24 And children for that matter, however, not having electoral say, this group is not of interest to us here 
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analysis of the developing democratic publics in the new democracies. The analysis presented 
here clearly shows that overtime voters learn how to cast votes with more accuracy. Moreover, 
the use of both comprehensive and naïve conceptualizations of correct vote show over time 
increase in accuracy.  
The increase of the correct vote can speak directly to the capacity of new democratic 
citizens to learn from their experience and contribute to normalization of politics and 
consolidation of democracy. Further cross national research of correct vote in the new 
democracies around the world can shed more light onto this mutually reinforcing relationship. 
More experience with democracy seems to produce more sophisticated voters, while more 
sophisticated voters in their own right can contribute to democratic consolidation. At this point, 
such is the story of the Ukrainian voter. 
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APPENDIX A 
CONSTRUCTING THE MEASURE OF THE “CORRECT VOTE” 
A.1 1994 ELECTION -- KUCHMA V. KRAVCHUK 
 
A.1.1 Correct Vote for Kuchma 1994 Measure 
Kuchma’s Job approval +  stronger ties with Russia-Ukrainian as State Language + support for 
state command economy + pace of economic reform + guaranteed employment +  guaranteed 
health care+ trust Kuchma + Russian speaker + Russian ethnic + east + south –Ukrainian speaker 
– Ukrainian ethnic – west 
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A.1.2 Correct vote for Kravchuk 1994 
Strong ties with West + Ukrainian as State Language +   support for state command economy25
The “naïve” measure for both includes only the regional, ethnic and linguistic identities 
(+ for groups supportive of the candidate; - for those who do not) 
 +    
pace of economic reform +  guaranteed employment + guaranteed health care + Trust Kravchuk 
+ Ukrainian speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + west – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – south –east 
Ethnic/linguistic group support: I include all the groups identities, not merely those who 
support the candidate.  These groups are not mutually exclusive (Barrington and Herron 2004; 
Ryabchuk 1999).  
Table A-1 1994 Election 
 
IFES 1994 Kuchma Kravchuk 
Job of President Kuchma approve/disapprove 
  Trust Kuchma yes/no 
  Trust Kravchuk yes/no 
  
    State Economy reduce/return -1 -1 
Move to free economy 3 points/ quick-slow 1 -1 
guaranteed employment 5 point scale 2 1 
guaranteed health care 5 point scale 4 2 
    Ukraine FP is better directed Russia/Both/West 1 2 
    Ukrainian spoken as official language yes/no no yes 
    Group Affiliation 
 
Russian ethnic Ukrainian ethnic 
  
Russian 
speaking 
Ukrainian 
speaking 
  
east west 
                                                 
25 Move to Free economy (pace of economic reform) 
1 – Move as quickly as possible  
-1 – Slow 
0 – not introduce any measure 
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south 
  
 
A.2 1999 ELECTION -- KUCHMA V. SIMONENKO 
 
In the previous election the question about transformation of the economy and the pace of the 
reform did not revolve around the question of whether Ukraine should transition to the market 
economy. Rather the question was how fast the transition should take place. In light of the 
market transformations in Poland via the so-called “shock therapy” numerous neighbor countries 
considered the possibility of the same policy approach.  Therefore, the opposing views were fast 
vs. slow reform with no reform at all as a center point.  
By 1999 the value of “shock therapy” has come under much scrutiny. While successful in 
Poland, Russian attempt to implement fast economic reforms proved disastrous.  Russia slid into 
a terrible economic turmoil in 1998 and many observers blamed the attempted “shock therapy.” 
In the 1999 Presidential election in Ukraine, therefore, the question frame was changed 
considerably. The Communist Petro Simonenko opposed the move toward the market economy 
on the basis of ideology which became even more validated by the unfortunate Russian 
experience. The question, thus, was polarized very differently than in 1994 -- reform v no 
reform.  Now the preferences for economic reform slow or fast found themselves on the same 
side of the answer scale opposing those who did not want any reform at all.   
The coding of the pace of the reform variable reflects this change in framing.  The 
variable values still range 1 to -1; however, -1 represents those who do not wish any reform at 
all, while preference for slow pace of reform is depicted as .5.  If the voter’s own position on the 
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issue is .5 then his/her evaluation of the candidate’s position shall reflect the positive or negative 
direction of the issue effect, albeit the impact is smaller than if the preferences were 
diametrically opposed.  
After the 1994 election the Communist Party supported president Kuchma. However, 
Kuchma’s failed economic policies led the Communists to withdraw their support in 1999.  
Simonenko and the Communist party campaigned on the strong anti-market reform platform. 
Their campaign resonated with the pensioners and other groups dependent on state subsidies.  
The Communist Party of Ukraine, one of the very few parties who survived the transition and 
collapse of the USSR without being disbanded, served as a relic of the past and provided hope to 
the skeptical and disillusioned population who refused to accept the collapse of the regime as 
irreversible fact. Moreover, the Communists voiced opposition to any foreign influences in the 
country and supported closer ties with Russian and Belarus that would resemble the previous 
Union.   
Meanwhile Kuchma has adopted a much more pragmatic approach to the foreign 
relations of his country. During his first term in office he managed to steer between the two 
gravitation poles of West and Russia without making concrete commitments to either. Kuchma 
managed to come to a settlement with Russia over the Black Sea Fleet, however, that settlement 
did not bring Ukraine or Crimea any closer into the sphere of Russia’s influence. Kuchma has 
also made headway in dealing with the West, through negotiations and cooperation with the 
European Union and NATO.   
The lack of commitment toward Russia and friendly overtones in his workings with the 
West had their consequences by the time of the 1999 election. By 1999 presidential election 
Kuchma lost the support of the Russian speaking population of Ukraine.  However, the support 
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he received from the western regions was rather lukewarm. Voters residing the west strongly 
opposed Simonenko and his Communist party, therefore, they cast their votes for Kuchma 
grudgingly, opting for a lesser of two evils.  
A.2.1 Correct vote measure Kuchma 1999 
Market v. State Economy + Pace of economic reform + Foreign assistance for economics + 
citizens right to private property + trust Kuchma + Ukrainian Speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + West 
– Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – south - east 
A.2.2 Correct vote measure Simonenko 1999 
Market v. State Economy + Pace of economic reform + Foreign assistance for economics + 
citizens right to private property + trust Simonenko + Pensioner + Russian speaker + Russian 
ethnic + South  - Ukrainian speaker – Ukrainian ethnic - west 
The “naïve” measure for both includes only the regional, ethnic and linguistic identities ( 
+ for groups supportive of the candidate; - for those who do not) 
Table A-2 1999 Election 
 
IFES 1999 Kuchma Simonenko 
    Trust Kuchma yes/no 
  Trust Simonenko yes/no 
  
    
Market Economy v State Economy 3 point/ mrk, state, in between 1 -1 
Market v State Economy (where 
should UA be) 5 point scale / 1 mrk -- 5 state 1 5 
Move to free economy 3 points/ quick, slow, none 1 -1 
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Importance of Private Property 
5 point scale/ very important - 
not at all 2 5 
    
Foreign financial assistance for 
economic dev. 5 point sclae/ positive-negative 2 4 
    
    
    Group Affiliation 
 
Ukrainian ethnic Russian ethnic 
  
Ukrainian speaking Russian speaking 
  
west east 
   
south 
   
pensioners 
 
 
A.3 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
A.3.1 Correct Vote Measure Yushchenko 2004 
Development of Democracy + Economic and Business Development + Pace of Economic 
reform+ Modernizing Healthcare+ US government assistance to Ukraine + trust Yushchenko  + 
Urainian Speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + West – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – south - east 
 
 
A.3.2 Correct Vote Measure Yanukovich 2004 
Development of Democracy + Economic and Business Development + Pace of Economic 
reform+ Modernizing Healthcare+ US government assistance to Ukraine + trust Yanukovich + 
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Russian speaker + Russian ethnic + South + Center – Ukrainian speaker – Ukrainian ethnic - 
west 
The “naïve” measure for both includes only the regional, ethnic and linguistic identities ( 
+ for groups supportive of the candidate; - for those who do not) 
Table A-3  2004 Election 
 
 
IFES 2005-06 pre-election Yushchenko Yanukovich 
Development of Democracy 
and Governance 
approve/disapprove 5 point 
(v134) 1 4 
    
Economic and Business 
Development approve/ disapprove 5 point 1 4 
Pace of economic reforms 5 points (v13) 4 2 
Modernizing Health Care  approve/ disapprove 5 point 1 2 
    
US government assistance to 
Ukraine 
positive/negative 5 point 
(v132) 1 4 
    
    
    
    
    Group Affiliation 
 
Ukrainian ethnic Russian ethnic 
  
Ukrainian 
speaking 
Russian 
speaking 
  
west east 
   
south 
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A.4 MEASURING CORRECT VOTE IN THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1998 
– 2007 
 
A.4.1 A 1998 Communist Party  
State Economy + Pace of Economic Reform+ Market v. State Economy for UA + Efficiency 
rating of the CPU+ Approval of President Kuchma + pensioner + Russian speaker + Russian 
ethnic + South + Center – Ukrainian speaker – Ukrainian ethnic - west 
 
A.4.2 1998 People’s Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) 
State Economy + Pace of Economic Reform+ Market v. State Economy for UA + Efficiency 
rating of the CPU+ Approval of President Kuchma   + Ukrainian Speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + 
West – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – south – east 
 
A.4.3 1998 Green Party of Ukraine26
State Economy + Pace of Economic Reform+ Market v. State Economy for UA + Efficiency 
rating of the CPU+ Approval of President Kuchma    
 
                                                 
26 The Green Party’s group support did not rely solely on one or the other ethnic, linguistic, or regional 
group. Thus, the “naïve” measure is not appropriate.  
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The “naïve” measure for all includes only the regional, ethnic and linguistic identities ( + for 
groups supportive of the candidate; - for those who do not) 
Table A-4 Election 1998 
 
IFES 1998 CPU RUKH Green 
     
Job of President 
Kuchma 
5 point 
scale/reelect - 
new guy 5 4 5 
     Market Economy 
v State Economy 
3 point/ mrk, 
state, in between -1 1 0.5 
Market v State 
Economy (where 
should UA be) 
5 point scale / 1 
mrk -- 5 state 5 2 2 
Move to free 
economy 
3 points/ quick, 
slow, none -1 1 -1 
     
Group Affiliation 
 
Russian ethnic 
Ukrainian 
ethnic 
 
  
Russian 
speaking 
Ukrainian 
speaking 
 
  
east west 
 
  
south 
  
  
pensioners  
   
 
A.4.4 2006 Our Ukraine 
Division of Power between Pres and Parliament + Is Ukraine divided or united + Foreign 
financial assist in democracy + Foreign financial assist in economy + Foreign financial assist in 
health and society+ trust Yushchenko  + Ukrainian Speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + West – 
Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – South – East – Center 
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A.4.5 2006 Block Yulii Timoshenko 
Division of Power between President and Parliament + Is Ukraine divided or united + Foreign 
financial assistance in democracy + Foreign financial assistance in economy + Foreign financial 
assistance in health and society+ trust Timoshenko  + Ukrainian Speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + 
Center - West – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – South – East 
 
A.4.6 2006 Party of Regions 
Division of Power between President and Parliament + Is Ukraine divided or united + Foreign 
financial assistance in democracy + Foreign financial assistance in economy + Foreign financial 
assistance in health and society+ trust Yanukovich + pensioner+ Russian speaker + Russian 
ethnic + South - Center – Ukrainian speaker – Ukrainian ethnic – West  
The “naïve” measure for all includes only the regional, ethnic and linguistic identities (+ 
for groups supportive of the candidate; - for those who do not) 
Table A-5 Election 2006 
 
 
IFES 2007 
Our 
Ukraine BUT 
Party of 
Regions  
Trust Yushchenko v40:  5 point scale 1 
  Trust Timoshenko v42:  5 point scale 
 
1 
 Trust Yanukovich v41:  5 point scale 
  
1 
Division of Power between Pres and 
Parliament 
v137:  (1 pres)(-1 
parliament) -1 1 1 
Is Ukraine divided or united  
v139: (1 united) (-1 
divided) 1 1 -1 
Foreign financial assist in democracy v 145; 5 point scale 1 2 5 
Foreign financial assist in economy v 146; 5 point scale 1 2 4 
Foreign financial assist in health and 
society v 147; 5 point scale 1 1 2 
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Group Affiliation 
 
Ukrainian 
ethnic 
Ukrainian 
ethnic Russian ethnic 
  
Ukrainian 
speaking 
Ukrainian 
speaking 
Russian 
speaking 
  
west west east 
   
center south 
    
pensioners 
      
A.4.7 2007 Our Ukraine 
Necessity of NGO's + Division of Power between President  and Parliament + Is Ukraine divided 
or united + Support Ukraine's joining the EU + Support Ukraine's joining NATO + Support 
Withdrawal of Russian Black Sea Fleet Ukraine + trust Yushchenko  + Ukrainian Speaker + 
Ukrainian Ethnic + West – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – south – east – center 
 
A.4.8 2007 Block Yulii Timoshenko 
Necessity of NGO's + Division of Power between President  and Parliament + Is Ukraine divided 
or united + Support Ukraine's joining the EU + Support Ukraine's joining NATO + Support 
Withdrawal of Russian Black Sea Fleet Ukraine + trust Timoshenko  + Ukrainian Speaker + 
Ukrainian Ethnic + Center - West – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – south – east 
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A.4.9 2007 Party of Regions 
Necessity of NGO's + Division of Power between President  and Parliament + Is Ukraine divided 
or united + Support Ukraine's joining the EU + Support Ukraine's joining NATO + Support 
Withdrawal of Russian Black Sea Fleet Ukraine+ trust Yanukovich + pensioner + Russian 
speaker + Russian ethnic + South– Ukrainian speaker – Ukrainian ethnic – west-center 
The “naïve” measure for all includes only the regional, ethnic and linguistic identities (+ 
for groups supportive of the candidate; - for those who do not) 
Table A-6 Election 2007 
 
IFES 2008 
Our 
Ukraine BUT 
Party of 
Regions  
     Trust Yushchenko q12c:  5 point scale 1 4 5 
Trust Timoshenko q12d:  5 point scale 4 1 5 
Trust Yanukovich q12e:  5 point scale 5 5 1 
     Necessity of NGO's q17: 5 point scale 1 2 4 
     Division of Power between President and 
Parliament 
q32:  (1 president)(-
1 parliament) -1 1 1 
     
Is Ukraine divided or united  
q30: (1 united) (-1 
divided) 1 1 -1 
     
Support Ukraine's joining the EU 
q35: (1 vote for) (-1 
against) 1 1 -1 
Support Ukraine's joining NATO 
q40: (1 vote for) (-1 
against) 1 1 -1 
Support Withdrawal of Russian Black Sea 
Fleet 
q44: (1 vote for) (-1 
against) 1 1 -1 
     Group Affiliation 
    
  
Ukrainian 
ethnic 
Ukrainian 
ethnic 
Russian 
ethnic 
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Ukrainian 
speaking 
Ukrainian 
speaking 
Russian 
speaking 
  
west west east 
   
center south 
    
pensioners 
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